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Abstract
The thesis opens with four cases that demonstrate various aspects of the prevention of 
intellectual disability (ID). The following four chapters introduce ID and many related 
issues (Chapter 2), the concept of geneticisation (Chapter 3), the epidemiology of ID 
(Chapter 4) and the concept of prevention (Chapter 5).
In Chapter 6 prenatal diagnosis and screening are examined thoroughly. The two 
major models, the reproductive autonomy model and the public health model, are 
described and scrutinised. For example, the questions of informed consent, screening as 
a request of the women involved, reassurance, concept of risk, locus of control and 
eugenics are critically discussed.
Chapter 7 deals with genetic counselling in general and directive versus non-directive 
counselling in particular. Chapter 8 asks the question ‘Why should ID be prevented?’ 
Five arguments are presented and critically examined: the eugenic argument, the foetal- 
wastage argument, the societal burden argument, the family burden argument and the 
quality of life argument.
In Chapter 9 Mary Ann Warren’s multi-criterial theory of moral status is presented and 
applied to potential or actual individuals with or without intellectual disability.
More practical issues are raised again in Chapter 10, which deals with the prevention 
of ID with respect to three syndromes. The conclusive chapter (11) returns to the cases 
described in the beginning.
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1. Introduction
Case 1. Sarah is a 35-year-old teacher. She has two daughters, 7 and 9 years of age, 
from her first marriage. Her second husband Tom is 42 years old and has no children of 
his own. Sarah is now pregnant at 17 weeks. The first visit to the maternity clinic took 
place at 11 weeks, and during that visit Sarah was told about serum screening for Down 
syndrome. The nurse described the syndrome and the screening procedure briefly and 
gave her a leaflet that presented the same issues in more detail.
At home Sarah and Tom studied the leaflet together and decided that she should have 
the screening test. Two weeks later the test was performed, and Sarah received the 
results during her next visit to the clinic.
The nurse explained to Sarah that her chances of having a baby with Down syndrome 
were 1 in 150. She also explained that, therefore, Sarah was considered to belong to a 
high-risk group and that a definitive diagnosis was possible though amniocentesis. 
However, the procedure itself would increase the risk of miscarriage by 1%.
At home Sarah explained the result to Tom and the dilemma they were now facing. If 
the risk estimate was valid, there was a 99.3% chance that the foetus did not have Down 
syndrome and a 0.7% chance that it did. If they wanted to be sure, the option was to 
undergo amniocentesis, but it would slightly increase the risk of miscarriage.
Sarah had asked for advice at her visit to the maternity clinic. In fact Sarah had asked 
the nurse what she would do in a similar situation. The nurse had been very sympathetic 
but refused to answer Sarah’s question. She had explained, firstly, that she was in a 
different situation in her life and could not give a definitive answer to such a question.
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Secondly, it was against the ethical rules of her profession to answer such questions. 
However, she would fully support the couple, whatever they chose to do.
Case 2. Tina is 28-year-old laboratory assistant who has just learned that she is 
pregnant. Both Tina and her partner Harry are happy about the news. It is Tina’s first 
pregnancy and also the first child for Harry.
Tina has a younger brother Kevin, who is 22 years old and intellectually disabled. The 
disability is mild and its cause is fragile X syndrome. Kevin’s diagnosis was confirmed 
when he was 6 years old. Currently Kevin is still living with his parents and he works in 
a sheltered workshop.
Because Tina is 6 years older than her brother, she has been very much involved in his 
care. Kevin has been rather healthy, but there were moderately serious behavioural 
problems in adolescence. The adult years have, however, been stable also in this sense, 
and the relationships between the family members are warm.
Tina had been tested many years ago and found to be a carrier of the fragile X 
syndrome. She knows very well what this result means. The probability for intellectual 
disability in her offspring is considerable, high for boys and low but not insignificant for 
girls. In fact, the level of intellectual functioning tends to be lower in future generations 
with the fragile X genotype.
Tina and Harry discuss their situation with their general practitioner, who also knows 
Kevin very well. The doctor uses the term ‘risk’ when he describes the dilemma, but 
Tina, especially, is not very comfortable with the word. If she has a son, his intellectual 
capacity may resemble Kevin’s. However, there is a chance that it may be considerably
7
lower or higher. In case of a girl the chances for significant intellectual disability are 
small.
Although Tina is worried about the situation, she tends to think that she would not 
have an abortion, whatever the result of the test on the foetus would be. Harry is much 
more distressed, and he finds the idea of continuing the pregnancy with a male foetus 
with fragile X syndrome almost impossible.
Case 3. Aspartylglucosaminuria (AGU) is a rare inborn metabolic disease leading 
slowly to severe intellectual disability in adulthood. It is inherited as a recessive trait, 
and the cases have been found almost exclusively in Finland. The prevalence of the 
AGU gene is approximately 1:30 in eastern and northern Finland and slightly lower in 
other parts of the country.
The disease itself is rare, 2 to 4 affected children being bom each year in the whole of 
Finland. The gene responsible for AGU has been found, and there is a relatively 
inexpensive test for it.
Some physicians suggest that testing for the AGU gene should be introduced to routine 
maternity care in eastern and northern Finland because 1) although rare, the disease 
causes a significant burden for both the families and society, this burden being mainly 
psychological for the families and economic for society, 2) there is a reliable test for the 
responsible gene, and 3) the attitudes of the population are positive towards genetic 
testing for severe diseases.
How should the health authorities respond to the request?
Case 4. A newborn baby (later to be known as Baby Jane Doe) was noted to have Down 
syndrome and oesophageal atresia (i.e., a condition requiring prompt surgical 
intervention to enable feeding). An obstetrician noted the baby’s condition and consulted 
a paediatrician. The latter again consulted another paediatrician. The doctors disagreed 
about appropriate care. The obstetrician recommended that the baby stay at the hospital 
and be kept comfortable and free of pain. The paediatricians suggested transfer to 
another hospital, where surgical repair of the atresia would be possible. Mr Doe had 
sometimes worked closely with Down syndrome children and was of the opinion that 
such children never have a minimally acceptable quality of life. His wife shared the 
opinion, and therefore they decided to follow the suggestion of the obstetrician. Baby 
Jane Doe had comfort care and died of hunger one week later. (Kuhse and Singer 1985)
These examples describe, from different points of view, situations in which the 
prevention of intellectual disability, actual or potential, is considered. The cases also 
reflect several ethical problems related to intellectual disability and its prevention. The 
degree of parental autonomy and the role of the medical community are crucial in all of 
the cases, although the emphasis in cases 1, 2 and 4 is more on the individual level and 
in case 3 it is on the societal level. The question of quality of life, both of the individuals 
in question and their families, is also relevant in all the cases. Case 1 deals with 
probabilities and risks and how people understand their meaning in particular cases.
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I shall return to all of these cases and also introduce some new ones later. Let us, 
however, concentrate for a while on case 4, which received much attention and has also 
been widely discussed in medical, ethical and lay media.
The case of Baby Doe was not at all unique as such. Similar cases have taken place 
and will take place all over the world; in fact in many parts of the world a surgical 
alternative is not even possible. What was unique was the sequence of events that 
followed. A detailed description can be found, for example, in Kuhse and Singer (1985), 
and I shall only briefly summarise it.
When the management of the Bloomington Hospital heard of the case, they intervened 
and contacted the local court, where the parents were judged to have the right to choose 
‘a medically recommended course of treatment for their child in the present 
circumstances’ (i.e., the passive way suggested by the obstetrician) (ibid., p. 13). The 
local County Department of Public Welfare was appointed as the guardian of Baby Doe. 
The Department decided not to appeal, but the County Prosecutor's office took action 
when the infant was 4 days old.
Another judge refused to order intravenous feeding to keep Bay Doe alive, and the 
State Supreme Court was asked to intervene, and by a 3 to 1 vote the ruling of the lower 
court was overturned. Baby Doe's life ended on the day that emergency intervention was 
sought from the United States Supreme Court.
Among the first to react to the case was the right-to-life movement, but soon also 
influential newspapers deplored the decision ‘to allow a helpless Down's syndrome 
infant to starve to death’ (ibid., p. 14.). President Reagan's administration reacted also 
very soon and proposed so-called 'Baby Doe regulations'. According to these regulations
10
handicapped infants should have access to any medical and surgical treatment and 
nutritional sustenance available, and the handicap could not be a contraindication of 
such care. Several earlier versions of the regulations were struck down, but the final 
ones came into effect in October 1984.
The regulations affected practices, the changes in which became evident in a survey 
done among American neonatologists (Kopelman et al. 1988). Three out of four 
respondents believed that the regulations were not necessary to protect the rights of 
handicapped infants, and two out of three believed that the regulations interfered with 
parents’rights to determine the course of action that was in the best interest of their 
children. When the respondents were presented hypothetical cases of severely 
handicapped newborns, up to 32% stated that Baby Doe regulations required care (i.e., 
maximal life-prolonging treatment) that was not in the best interest of the child. One of 
the cases was trisomy 13 syndrome, which is a severe malformation syndrome leading to 
early death. Major textbooks in paediatrics recommend only comfort care for these 
infants.
The case of Baby Doe illustrates again the many dimensions and complex issues that 
can arise from a single case. The discussion has concentrated on the conflict between 
parental rights on one hand and the rights of the baby and society on the other. However, 
some factual details in the case have been disregarded. One such detail was the attitude 
of Mr and Mrs Doe towards Down syndrome children.
Mr Doe was a schoolteacher, and he had sometimes worked closely with Down 
syndrome children. He and his wife were of the opinion that such children never had a 
minimally acceptable quality o f life (Kuhse and Singer 1985, p. 12, my italics). Since this
11
opinion was apparently crucial when decisions concerning care were made, it is 
important to examine its validity.
The American society in general, and the health care system in particular, differ from 
those in northern and western Europe. However, it is not probable that the life of Down 
syndrome children in the early 1980’s essentially differed on the other side of the 
Atlantic. The quality of life of Down syndrome children is certainly affected by 
intestinal malformations in some, heart defects in some, and so forth. However, Mr 
Doe's belief that ‘[they] never had a minimally acceptable life’ is false. Neither 
experience from daily life nor scientific evidence suggests that the quality of life of 
Down syndrome children would be so severely compromised.
It is highly questionable whether these kinds of prejudices should form a basis on 
which problems of life and death can be solved. We can imagine a situation in which a 
child would have diabetes and the parents would think that the quality of life of this 
child could never be acceptable. Here it is obvious to anyone that the parents are wrong.
What Mr and Mrs Doe were certainly also thinking of were the quality of life of the 
infant after surgical correction of the oesophageal atresia and the quality of life of the 
family as a whole. These considerations make their choice more understandable, but still 
the role of the doctors involved with the case is worth scrutinising. Two paediatricians 
suggested transfer to another hospital for surgery while three obstetricians recommended 
that Baby Doe stay in Bloomington. The obstetricians were, of course, aware of the
consequences. One can ask which of the two groups of doctors knew more about Down
%
syndrome and the life of families with such children. The answer is clear. Paediatricians
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meet such children constantly in their work, and obstetricians do not. In fact, they are 
often involved in screening programmes involving their prenatal diagnoses.
I have discussed the case of Baby Doe to illustrate some of the issues analysed more 
deeply in the following chapters. The case also illustrates the necessity for a very 
detailed description of the events of an actual case. In this particular case, the parents’ 
view on the quality of life of people with Down syndrome turned out to be the crucial 
issue.
The starting point of this thesis is the multitude of difficult moral issues that arise in 
the context of the cases described in the beginning of this chapter. What follows will be 
related to these problems, sometimes very closely, sometimes more remotely.
Chapter 2 examines the concept of intellectual disability. Firstly, various terms used to 
describe the phenomenon are presented. Secondly, the important underlying concept 
intelligence and its measurement are discussed. Thirdly, a very influential definition by 
the American Academy of Mental Retardation (AAMR) is presented, and problems 
related to it are discussed. Fourthly, the relationships between intellectual disability and 
health are discussed in light of Christopher Boorse’s and Lennart Nordenfelt’s theories 
of health. Fifthly, Tom Fryers’s taxonomy of intellectual disability, which acknowledges 
the validity of different definitions for different purposes, is presented.
Chapter 3 deals with geneticisation, the tendency to describe more and more of the 
phenomena of life in terms of genes and DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Firstly, the 
concept is described and some examples are given. Secondly, factors behind 
geneticisation and its consequences are analysed. Finally, the relevance of geneticisation 
with respect to intellectual disability is discussed.
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Chapter 4 summarises key issues in the epidemiology of intellectual disability. Various 
epidemiological research strategies yield different results, which, however, complement 
each other and can be used for different purposes. The causes and epidemiological 
trends of intellectual disability are also briefly described in this chapter.
In Chapter 5 the concept of prevention and its three levels are first defined. Then, the 
question 4 Why should intellectual disability be prevented’ is briefly introduced. Thirdly, 
attitudes towards the intellectually disabled throughout history are described. Fourthly, 
the labelling of individuals as intellectually disabled and the consequences of this 
labelling are discussed. The chapter closes with a description of actual strategies for 
preventing intellectual disability.
The use of prenatal diagnosis and screening is often related to the prevention of 
intellectual disability. Chapter 6 discusses in detail the complex ethical issues of these 
practices. Firstly, the history, methods and indications of prenatal diagnosis are 
described. Secondly, the two major models for justifying the practices, the reproductive 
autonomy model and the public health model, are thoroughly scrutinised. Thirdly, the 
chapter deals with some other critical issues in prenatal diagnosis and screening. These 
are the slippery slope argument, the relationship between prenatal diagnosis and 
eugenics and the impact of the practices on the disabled in general.
The topic of Chapter 7 is genetic counselling (i.e., the activity between a health 
professional and an individual, or a couple or a family, in which diseases or conditions 
of genetic origin are discussed). Issues of genetic counselling are highly relevant to the 
main topic of this thesis, since the most complex ethical issues in the prevention of 
intellectual disability are related to conditions of genetic origin. The chapter deals firstly
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with the goals of genetic counselling and then with successful counselling situations. 
Thirdly, the advantages and disadvantages of directive and non-directive counselling are 
examined thoroughly. Finally, some characteristics of good genetic counselling are 
formulated.
Chapter 8 is the philosophical core of this thesis. It examines in detail the issue that 
was briefly introduced in Chapter 5: why should intellectual disability be prevented. The 
following main arguments are defined and scrutinised: 1) the eugenic argument, 2) the 
foetal-wastage argument, 3) the family burden argument, 4) the societal burden 
argument and 5) the quality of life argument.
Another major philosophical issue, the moral status of intellectually disabled 
individuals, is dealt with in Chapter 9. Mary Ann Warren’s multi-criterial account of 
moral status provides the framework of reference. Moral status before individual birth 
and after birth is analysed and the relevance of these analyses for intellectual disability is 
discussed.
After these two chapters with more philosophical content, Chapter 10 comes back to 
more practical issues and examines the ethics of prevention in practice. Down syndrome, 
fragile X syndrome and aspartylglucosaminuria, a rare recessive condition found mostly 
in the home country of the author, are used as examples.
In the conclusive chapter (11), I return to the four cases presented in the very 
beginning of my thesis. The cases are examined in light of all the analyses presented in 
the preceding chapters.
Finally, a few words about the terminology used. In the beginning of the preparation 
of this thesis, I used the term ‘mental retardation’ to refer to the topic. It is a term very
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widely used, especially in the North American context. In the final stages of writing, 
however, I changed my mind and decided to use the term ‘intellectual disability’ instead. 
There are two reasons for this decision. Firstly, in very many cases no retardation 
actually takes place. Secondly, the problems these people usually have concern more 
their intellectual functioning, rather than their total mental functioning. Loving, for 
example, is a mental function, and most people with intellectual disability are as able to 
love as those of us with better intellectual capacity. In fact, they have also been 
characterised as ‘congenitally unable to hate’.
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2. On the definition of intellectual disability
Various terms referring to intellectual disability (ID) have been used, and they reflect 
both the times and the context of their use. In fact, it has been argued that the terms seem 
to have a ’half-life’ of acceptability (Kopelman 1984). In their article on the definition 
and classification of mental retardation1 Zigler et al. (1984, p.215) stated that ‘without a 
clear and universally accepted definition of mental retardation, efforts to understand its 
nature and to improve the lives of retarded persons must be seriously compromised’. 
While it is true that there is no general agreement on the definition, it is, however, not 
clear whether a single and universal definition is a preferable goal. The amount to which 
any solution would help improve the lives of the intellectually disabled is also 
questionable.
For example, the terms 'moron', 'imbecile' and 'idiot' were originally introduced as 
technical terms to cover the levels of ID. Table 2.1 lists some of the terms that have been 
used during recent years.
The problems of the definition of ID have been dealt with at length in some medical 
and psychological texts. On the contrary, philosophical texts that deal with ID present 
poor definitions or no definition at all (Boddington et al. 1991). Philosophical work 
‘tends to gravitate toward considerations of either the very severe or the very mild forms 
of handicap, where difficulties of definition and questions of ethical justification are 
possible to present as less problematic’ (ibid., p.78). Sometimes people with ID are
17
Table 2.1. Intellectual disability: current and past terminology
feebleminded
moron
imbecile, idiot 
mental retardation 
mental handicap 
mental deficiency 
learning disabilities 
intellectual impairment 
intellectual disability 
mental disability 
intellectually challenged
mentally retarded 
mentally handicapped 
mentally deficient 
learning disabled 
intellectually impaired 
intellectually disabled 
mentally disabled
mistakenly put into the same category as lunatics’ or are referred to as human 
vegetables’ (ibid.). It is also common that they are referred to as sick persons, especially 
among lay and medical people (Kurtz 1977).
Since terms related to ID must serve many purposes, it would perhaps be best to 
accept that a universal definition can never be attained. In the context of law, for 
example, the limits of control or benefit must be defined, in epidemiological research an 
exact quantitative definition is necessary, educators need their own terms, parents and 
client groups also have their own, and so on (Fryers 1992). The aim of this chapter is to 
discuss the conceptual problems related to the definition of ID, with special reference to 
the concepts of intelligence, normal and health.
11 use the term ‘mental retardation’ when I refer specifically to, for example, articles or the American 
classification using the term
18
2.1. Intelligence and intellectual disability
The definitions of ID are based on the concept of intelligence either exclusively or in a 
way that includes other criteria as well. The nature of intelligence is a controversial topic 
that has received wide attention throughout the history of philosophy and psychology.
A chapter on intelligence in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy (Honderich 1995, 
p.411) opens with the following sentence: ‘A family of intellectual traits, virtues and 
abilities occurring in varying degrees and concentrations’. Although it is not claimed to 
be a definition, this description demonstrates the problems inherent in many definitions 
of intelligence in that it assumes that we can precisely define and measure intellectual 
phenomena. But it is not so.
In the context of this chapter it is not possible, or necessary, to describe at length the 
controversies around the concept of intelligence. However, I shall give a brief overview 
on various theories as they are described in Robert J. Sternberg's Metaphors o f Mind - 
Conceptions o f the Nature o f Intelligence (1990).
2.1.1 Metaphors o f intelligence
Sternberg's main theme is that theories of intelligence are guided by underlying 
metaphors of the mind. If we are to understand theories and their interrelation, we have 
to understand the underlying metaphors. The question ‘What is intelligence?’ turns into
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‘What is intelligence as viewed from the standpoint of a particular metaphor?’ As with 
stipulative definitions, metaphors are not right or wrong, but they are more or less useful 
for various purposes (ibid., p.9).
Sternberg describes seven major metaphors of intelligence, four looking at the relation 
of intelligence to the internal world of the individual (the geographic, computational, 
biological and epistemological metaphors), two looking at the relation of intelligence to 
the external world of the individual (the anthropological and sociological metaphors) 
and one looking at the relation of intelligence to both the internal and the external 
worlds of the individual (the systems metaphor).
The geographic metaphor views a theory of intelligence as a map of the mind. The 
first representatives of this metaphor were the phrenologists, who related mental abilities 
to cranial bumps. Early in this century the metaphor of a map became more abstract and 
less literal, and new tools, like factor analysis, were invented for the study of 
intelligence. The inventor of this method, Charles Spearman, proposed two kinds of 
factors of intelligence: general and specific. For Spearman the general factor g , which he 
described as mental energy, was the basis of intelligence.
The geographic metaphor flourished in the first half of the 20th century, and the theory 
of psychometric testing and measuring was developed in great detail. According to 
Sternberg, the main reasons for scepticism against it were 1) its limited ability to 
describe mental processes, 2) the difficulties involved in testing factor-analytic models 
against each other or to falsify them, and 3) the basing of the understanding of 
intelligence on individual differences (ibid., pp. 109-110).
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The development of computer science and computer technology gave rise to the 
computational metaphor, which analogises the processes of the mind to the software of a 
computer. Because the computational metaphor of intelligence was generated largely as 
a response to the geographic one, it focused on questions of process and on 
commonalities across people and processing. Individual differences received minor 
attention or none at all.
Sternberg criticised the computational theorists for not making the similarity between 
computer programs and human intelligence clear and not taking into account what 
people in various parts of the world mean by intelligence.
The biological metaphor seeks to understand intelligence in terms of the functioning 
of the brain. Assumptions about the correlation between neurophysiology and the mind 
are based on data from studies on brain-damaged individuals and on 
electrophysiological (like electroencephalography) and metabolic (like position emission 
tomography) studies on healthy people. Research based on the biological metaphor has 
produced a vast amount of data in which various brain functions are related to cognition 
in general and to intelligence in particular.
The interpretation of the results of this research is not straightforward, however. 
Correlation does not imply causation, and, even if there is a causative link, the direction 
of the causation cannot be inferred on the basis of the relation only. The interpretation 
has often been that a biological phenomenon in the brain is the cause of a mental state, 
but this reductionistic view involves philosophical presuppositions. As a matter of fact, 
recent studies have shown, for example, that psychotherapy can produce changes in
21
brain function that can be demonstrated with position emission tomography (Flicker 
1996).
The epistemological metaphor of intelligence draws heavily on the philosophy of 
knowledge. Its main representative was Jean Piaget, who created a well-known theory of 
the periods of development of the child, beginning with the sensorimotor period and 
ending with the formal-operational period. Piaget saw the function of intelligence as that 
of adaptation, which includes assimilating the environment into one’s own structures 
(physiological or cognitive) (Sternberg 1990).
Piaget’s ideas have had profound influence on psychology, and generally his theory of 
the major stages of development has been accepted. His followers and critics have, 
however, shown severe defects in his theory. He has described carefully the 
development of formal and logical thought but not, for example, intuitive or aesthetic 
thought. Yet the latter are important parts of intelligence. It has also been shown that 
there may be different routes of development, and children may accomplish tasks at 
earlier ages than those suggested by Piaget. Piaget seems also to have largely ignored 
individual differences.
Representatives of the anthropological metaphor think that the concept of intelligence 
cannot be the same in different cultures, because what it takes to adapt in one culture is 
quite different from what it takes to adapt in another. The extreme wing, the radical 
cultural relativists, rejects any psychological universals across cultures.
The introduction of the anthropological metaphor has prevented theory and research 
from being totally Western-oriented. We may have a tendency to think that people in 
other cultures end up doing what is done in the west, if only not so well. Fieldwork has,
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however, shown that developmental patterns reflect the environment in which the child 
grows. For example, African infants show superior early sensorimotor development 
relative to Western infants.
As Sternberg noted, ‘the anthropological metaphor provides a needed counterbalance’ 
to the metaphors referring to the internal world of the individual (ibid., p. 15). It has, 
however, the danger of going to the other extreme and neglecting the relevance of what 
is inside the individual.
Another metaphor, which concentrates on the relationship between intelligence and the 
external world of the individual, is the sociological metaphor. Where Piaget tended to 
view intelligence as moving from the inside outward, the Russian psychologist Lev 
Vygotsgy viewed it as moving from the outside inward. The sociological metaphor does 
not differ very much from the anthropological one; only the emphasis of research is 
different. Where the anthropologically oriented concern themselves with how culture 
affects intelligence, the sociologically oriented focus on the socialisation processes in 
which culture affects the development of intelligence.
The limitations of metaphors focusing on the internal or external world have led to the 
development of theories that try to include both aspects. Sternberg referred to these 
theories as using the systems metaphor. For example, Gardner proposed that intelligence 
is not a single thing, but, instead, there exist multiple forms of intelligence like 
linguistic, logico-mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily kinesthetic, interpersonal and 
intrapersonal. These forms of intelligence are independent of each other, but they do 
interact. Sternberg himself has suggested a triarchic theory of intelligence, in which he 
distinguishes between three basic kinds of information-processing components,
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metacomponents, performance components and knowledge acquisition components. 
Metacomponents are higher-order processes used to ‘plan what one is going to do, to 
monitor it while one is doing it, and to evaluate it after it is done’ (ibid., pp.268-269). 
Performance components are lower-order processes that execute the instructions of the 
metacomponents. Knowledge acquisition components are used to learn how to do what 
the metacomponents and performance components actually do. Thus Sternberg's theory 
actually consists of three interrelated subtheories. In the introduction to his book, 
Sternberg compresses as follows: ‘... I define intelligence as consisting of those mental 
functions purposively employed for purposes of adaptation to, and shaping and selection 
of, real-world environments’ (ibid., p. 6).
2.7.2. Measuring intelligence
The measurement of intelligence has occurred mainly in the context of the geographic 
metaphor. As a matter of fact, intelligence testing and factor analysis - the basic 
methodology behind the metaphor - grew up together (Sternberg 1990).
In 1905 Binet and Simon published what is generally regarded as the first test of 
intelligence (Binet and Simon 1905, reprinted by Rosen et al. 1976). Its purpose was to 
identify children who were unlikely to benefit from the public education system of 
France. The intention of the testing process was to provide such children with a more 
suitable form of education (Berger and Yule 1985). At that time the terminology was in 
a state of confusion, for example, ‘one imbecile in the first certificate, is marked idiot in
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the second, feeble-minded in the third, and degenerate in the fourth’ (Binet and Simon 
1905, p.332).
Binet and Simon deliberately distanced themselves from two earlier scholars in the 
field, namely, Galton and Cattell, who had created a variety of psychophysiological 
tests, which they thought measured intelligence (Sternberg 1990). According to Binet 
and Simon, ‘to judge well, to comprehend well, to reason well, these are the essential 
activities of intelligence’ (Binet and Simon 1905, cited by Sternberg 1990, p.74). To 
criticise the psychophysiological view on intelligence, Binet cited the example of Helen 
Keller, who could be expected to score high on, for example, tests of judgement but very 
low on psychophysiological tests.
The starting point of Binet and Simon was highly practical, but they were not 
atheoretical in their approach to intelligence. On the contrary, they developed a 
sophisticated theory - more so than many of their followers in the field of intelligence 
testing (Sternberg 1990).
Binet and Simon's test was a starting point for a long tradition of psychological testing 
for which the intelligence quotient (IQ) became a central concept. In the early tests IQ 
was defined as a rate, which included the factors mental age (MA) and chronological 
age (CA). The intellectual level of the individual was defined by MA, which was 
obtained with intelligence tests. IQ was then derived by dividing MA by CA and 
multiplying the result by 100.
IQ has remained a key concept in testing, but calculating it with the means of MA and 
CA proved to be problematic (Sternberg 1990). For example, the CA of a person does 
not affect his or her performance on tests, but it is probably highly related to social
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behaviour and interests. Zigler et al. (1984) gave the following example: we would 
hesitate to tell a 7-year-old with an average IQ to catch a bus and go downtown, but this 
task could well be within the ability of a 25-year-old intellectually disabled person with 
an MA of 7. Furthermore, mental age begins to slow in growth around 15 years of age, 
and causes serious problems for interpreting the test results after that age. For these and 
other reasons, the IQ in modem tests is computed on the basis of relative performance 
within a given age group (Sternberg 1990). The test scores have been standardised to 
have a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 15 or 16. Such standardisation makes 
comparisons between scores and comparisons among the general population easy and 
meaningful. Thus current IQ scores are actually not quotients at all.
Later [I have not been able to trace the first occasion], it became typical to define ID in 
terms of the standard distribution of intelligence. At the turn of the 20th century it was 
thought that IQ is distributed normally (i.e., according to the Gaussian curve) (Figure 
2 . 1).
Individuals whose IQ was below some point on this curve were defined as 
intellectually disabled. The most commonly used cut-off point for ID has been two 
standard deviations (SD) below the mean. The following definition has been widely 
used, for example, in epidemiological research:
Definition 1. A person is intellectually disabled i f  he or she falls below two standard 
deviations in a standardised intelligence test.
26
70 100 IQ
Figure 2.1. Standard distribution of intelligence
In most intelligence tests one SD is 15 points, and therefore an IQ of 70 has become the 
borderline defining ID.
Choosing two standard deviations is, of course, purely a matter of convention. In fact, 
it has been suggested that all individuals with IQs below one SD would comprise the 
group intellectually disabled, which would mean 16 % of the population, not 2.3 % as 
with the preceding definition.
The definition of ID based solely on IQ may serve its purpose when the aim is to 
obtain quantitative information concerning, for example, the number of individuals in 
need of special services. It is, however, far from adequate in describing individuals and 
their needs.
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The constancy of IQ along the life cycle is another controversial matter. It has been 
suggested that the IQ of an individual can vary as much as 50 points (Hunt 1961). On 
the other hand, some researchers claim that, for most people IQ remains relatively 
stable.
It was noted as early as 1914 that the original assumption of the distribution of 
intelligence (as presented in Figure 2.1) includes a fundamental error (Hagberg 1992). 
Large population tests have revealed that there are far more people at the lower end of 
the curve than could be expected from the Gaussian distribution. The prevalence of ID 
(IQ < 50) has, in several studies, been around 0.4 %, although in the theoretical normal 
distribution it would be only 0.05 % (Fryers 1984).
As an explanation for the excess of individuals with very low IQ’s, it has been 
suggested that there are actually two distributions of intelligence: one for the vast 
majority of people, for whom intelligence is a result of interaction between genes and 
the environment, and the other for the minority with organic damage (Figures 2.2a and 
2.2b). [Figure 2.2a presents the peak at the lower end, as it has been presented in several 
texts (e.g., Zigler et al. 1984), but it is not at all clear that intelligence is normally 
distributed among those with suspected organic damage. Therefore the presentation in 
Figure 2.2b may reflect the actual distribution better at the lower end.]
In any individual, genes play some role in determining intelligence, although there is 
no consensus in the scientific community as to what extent. In fact, a heated discussion 
continues still today after the publication of The Bell Curve (Hermstein 1994), in which 
the author argues for a strong genetic basis for IQ. Nobody, however, denies that the 
environment has an important influence as well. As Zigler et al. (1984, p.219) wrote:
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‘Whatever genes one inherits for intelligence (the genotype), the phenotype expression 
will be higher if the person experiences a good rather than a terrible environment’.
A recent review article in Science (Wickelgren 1999) describes research that swings 
the pendulum again towards the environment. Firstly, new results support the idea that 
racial differences in IQ are not genetically determined. Secondly, early speech input has 
been found to have a dramatic effect on the development of a child’s language skills. 
Thirdly, a study comparing children bom in the first 9 months of one year to those bom 
in the last 3 months of the same year showed a mean IQ difference of 3.5 points. This 
difference was entirely environmental since it was due to the fact that the former group 
entered school one year earlier.
Whatever the genetic basis for intelligence, it is not determined by a single gene but by 
several interacting genes, the number of which may be very large. For example, a five- 
gene model may explain the variation in IQ between 50 and 150 (between -3SD and 
+3SD) (Zigler et al. 1984). Although the model is artificial, it is in accordance with 
empirical findings concerning persons with very low IQ's (below 50), who almost 
always show evidence of organic damage. Thus there must be another distribution for 
these persons, in whom the biological apparatus required for intelligence has been 
damaged pre-, peri- or postnatally.
For severe ID the proportion of people without organic damage is very low. On the 
other hand, the majority of the people with mild ID belong to the lower end of the 
normal curve (i.e., no damage can be shown for them). The latter group has been 
referred to as 'familially retarded' or 'retarded due to psychosocial disadvantage' (ibid.). 
By definition, there must be a group of people at the lower end; therefore these labels
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may be misleading. In this book, I refer to these people as minus variants, which is the 
term used also in the context of growth disorders.
For an individual it may be difficult or impossible to say whether he or she is a minus 
variant or has organic damage, which cannot be shown with current technology. As 
groups, however, the minus variants and those with brain damage show some 
differences. Members of the latter group often carry physical features or handicaps 
which differentiate them from others, while members of the former group do not. Those 
with organic damage often have siblings with a normal IQ, while minus variants have 
parents or siblings with IQ’s below average. This difference may influence the
IQ10070
Figure 2.2a. Two-group approach to intellectual disability, as presented, for example, 
Zigler et al. (1984)
70 100 lu
Figure 2.2b. Two-group approach to intellectual disability: suggestion for the 
distribution at the lower end
self-image of the children, as the child with organic ID feels different from other people 
in the family (Zigler et al. 1984). It has also been pointed out that a minus variant is 
most likely to be bom to a family with low socio-economic status, while brain damage 
occurs more evenly across all levels of income (ibid.).
It may seem that the statistical definition of a phenomenon is value neutral. If we look, 
for example, at the distribution of height within a certain population, we obtain a curve, 
that at least roughly resembles the Gaussian curve. We then call the individuals ‘short’ 
whose height is below -2SD on that curve. Is this a value-neutral judgement? No, 
because the very idea of having a group of short people contains a notion of 'shortness' 
as a deviant from 'normal'. In his book On the Normal and the Pathological Georges 
Canguilhem described the nature of these concepts somewhat aphoristically: ‘...the
31
pathological must be understood as one type of normal, as the abnormal is not what is 
not normal, but what constitutes another normal’ (Canguilhem 1978, p. 119).
It should be noted here that the use of the word 'normal' is not at all unambiguous. If 
we specify that 'normal height' means exactly that one's height is between -2SD and 
+2SD in a given population, then perhaps we can say the word is used in a value-neutral 
way. But that is not how 'normal' is (here I would like to say 'normally') used in ordinary 
or scientific language. In fact, the word has very many meanings, which are usually not 
specified when it is used. Table 2.2 lists various words and expressions that can replace 
'normal' in everyday or scientific language.
Table 2.2. The varieties of normal: words and expressions, which can replace 'normal' 
(modified from Grasbeck 1995)
1. Ordinary, usual, everyday
2. Typical, characteristic
3. Mean, average
4. Gaussian, fitting the Gaussian distribution
5. Lies in the area x + 2SD
6. Does not statistically differ from healthy reference population
7. Physiological, reference, control
8. Optimal, ideal, good, not pathological
9. Not dangerous, harmless, trivial
10. Suitable, fits the norm(s), adequate
11. Recommended
12. Perpendicular
The idea that Gaussian distribution describes biological phenomena originated in the 
19th century, when it was noted that the results of several anthropological measurements
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actually did fit quite well into the distribution. It was then inferred that there is a 
connection between the Gaussian function and nature: in a way nature ’wanted’ 
organisms to have the 'right values' (Grasbeck 1995). Vacha (1982) saw a direct 
connection here to Platonic thinking and an eternal idea of man. As a matter of fact, 
Vacha suggested that we should abandon the use of the word normal completely and 
replace it with other expressions.
The application of statistical normality to biomedicine has many weaknesses. The 
distribution of several biological phenomena is not normal: it may be skew, it may have 
several peaks, it may be lognormal (i.e., the distribution of the logarithms of the 
observed values is normal), and the like. If a series of independent measurements is 
performed on a person, the probability of obtaining results that are outside the normal 
range (+2SD) increases rapidly. After 20 tests there is a 64% probability of 'pathological' 
results in at least one test (Grasbeck 1995).
Even in the context of the geographic metaphor the authorities on IQ testing have 
different opinions concerning the nature of the phenomenon they are measuring. Some 
of them have proposed an operational definition: intelligence is what IQ tests measure. 
This definition was first suggested by Boring in 1923 (Sternberg 1990) and adopted, for 
example, by Jensen in 1969 (ibid.). Boring did not believe in putting an end to the 
discussion by this circular definition; instead he saw it as a narrow definition, to be used 
until further scientific research allows it to be extended (ibid.).
An operational definition is, of course, problematic since there is no gold standard of 
intelligence against which the test results can be compared. Usually (e.g., in medicine),
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when a new diagnostic test is developed, its sensitivity and specificity are determined 
and expressed with reference to a gold standard.
Block and Dworkin (1974) discuss an analogy that shows the problem with 
operational definition. If we define temperature as what thermometers measure, we 
come to absurdities. We could then say that thermometers cannot be improved or that no 
other device can measure temperature more accurately. The early thermometers not only 
measured temperature but also many other things, like air pressure. IQ tests may well 
measure things other than intelligence, whatever intelligence is.
If there is no gold standard for developing IQ tests, what has been used as reference? 
Results of IQ tests obviously correlate to something. They do, in fact correlate to very 
many things: ‘... the IQ has more correlates than any other known measurement’ (Zigler 
et al. 1984, p.225). The causal relations in the correlations are, however, complex and 
vague.
One of the things IQ tests correlate with is success. It has been argued, in fact, that a 
major factor involved in selecting test items is their correlation with success (Block and 
Dworkin 1974). The same authors argue also that these correlations are built into the 
tests.
The idea of measuring IQ and defining a group of people as 'intellectually disabled' is 
in fact value laden from the very beginning. As noted earlier, Binet's purpose was to 
benefit the children at the lower end of the IQ distribution. On the other hand, the values 
of some people may suggest that the group should be eliminated.
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2.2. The definition of the American Academy of Mental Retardation
The inadequacy of the IQ-based definition has led to attempts to define ID in terms of 
IQ and some other qualities, like adaptation. One influential tradition is represented by 
the American Academy of Mental Retardation (AAMR).
The AAMR was founded in 1876, and, since 1921, it has published nine editions of a 
manual on the definition of mental retardation (MR) (Mental retardation ... 1992, p. ix). 
The fifth edition, published in 1959, brought two dramatic changes: it introduced 
formally the adaptive behaviour criterion to the definition and it raised the cut-off point 
of MR from -2SD’s to -1SD. The latter change was then overturned in the next edition in 
1973.
The latest edition of the manual was published in 1992. It acknowledges the 
shortcomings of the term mental retardation but retains it. The commonly used term 
developmental disability is, according to the AAMR, less specific because it does not 
necessarily relate to intellectual functioning. The AAMR defines MR as follows:
Definition 2.
Mental retardation refers to substantial limitations in present 
functioning. It is characterised by significantly subaverage 
intellectual functioning, existing concurrently with related limitations 
in two or more of the following applicable adaptive skill areas: 
communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, 
self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and 
work. Mental retardation manifests before age 18.
The following four assumptions are essential to the application of the 
definition:
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1. Valid assessment considers cultural and linguistic diversity as well 
as differences in communication and behavioral factors;
2. The existence of limitations in adaptive skills occurs within the 
context of community environments typical of the individual's peers 
and is indexed to the person's individualized needs for supports;
3. Specific adaptive limitations often coexist with strengths on other 
adaptive skills or other personal capabilities; and
4. With appropriate supports over a sustained period, the life 
functioning of the person with mental retardation will generally 
improve, (ibid., p.5)
In the explanations the definition is further clarified. For example, ‘significantly 
subaverage intellectual functioning’ is defined as an IQ standard score of approximately 
70 to 75 or below, and the age limit of 18 years is justified by referring to the fact that in 
the American society of today individuals typically assume adult roles at that age. It is 
acknowledged that, in other societies, a different age criterion may be more appropriate. 
Although the behaviour of a person who has suffered brain damage in adulthood may 
look like the behaviour of somebody with ID, there are differences. An analogy 
describes the difference: both poorly built and a well-built houses damaged by fire 
function poorly, but for very different reasons.
The next chapter in the AAMR manual describes further the theoretical considerations 
on which the definition is based. It is emphasised that mental retardation refers to a 
particular state of functioning and thus is not something you have (like blue eyes or a 
bad heart), nor is it something you are (like short or thin).
The structure of the AAMR definition is also presented as a figure (Figure 2.3)
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Figure 2.3. General structure of the definition of mental retardation introduced by the 
American Academy of Mental Retardation (from Mental Retardation .... 1992)
Functioning is at the base to emphasise that the model is primarily functional. 
Capabilities and environments form the two sides of the triangle and therefore indicate 
that both are, as such, necessary but not sufficient conditions of mental retardation. Thus 
the definition reflects the systems approach to intelligence described earlier in this 
chapter. Support systems are not included in the triangle but their importance is stressed 
by their inclusion in the figure.
Desirable environments for a mentally retarded person are also characterised as 
follows:
they provide opportunities for fulfilling the person’s needs; they 
foster the person’s well-being in physical, social, material and 
cognitive life areas; and they promote the person’s sense of stability, 
predictability and control (ibid., p. 13)
One of the main differences between the current and previous versions of the AAMR
manual is described as a paradigm shift ‘from a view of mental retardation as an
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absolute trait expressed solely by an individual to an expression of the interaction 
between the person with limited functioning and the environment’ (ibid., p.x).
Another new thing is the abandonment of the traditional subclassification of the levels 
of retardation (mild, moderate, severe and profound) and the introduction of a 
subclassification of intensities and a pattern of support systems (intermittent, limited, 
extensive and pervasive).
The AAMR definition has also been greatly criticised. MacMillan et al. (1993) have 
raised the following three points: 1) the change in the IQ limit to 75, 2) the ignoring of 
developmental consideration in the approach to adaptive skills and 3) the failure of the 
definition to recognise different subtypes of ID.
MacMillan et al. (1993) criticised the shift of the upper limit of the IQ criterion, since 
small shifts have substantial consequences for the percentage of the population eligible 
to be diagnosed with ID. Table 2.3 presents the relation of various IQ limits and 
intervals to the proportion of a population falling under the limit or within the interval. 
At this point the criticism is not, however, justified because the earlier version of the 
AAMR definition did not include a rigid upper limit either. Instead, it was explicitly 
stated that ‘The upper limit is intended as a guideline; it could be extended upward 
through IQ 75 or more, depending on the reliability of the intelligence test used’ 
(Grossman 1983, p .ll) .
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Table 2.3. Proportion of the population falling below certain intelligence quotient (IQ) 
cut-offs and falling within certain IQ intervals in the normal distribution (MacMillan et 
al. 1993)
IQ Proportion below (%) IQ interval Within (
<70 2.28 56-60 0.30
70 and below 2.68 61-65 0.69
<75 4.75 66-70 1.52
75 and below 5.48 71-75 2.80
The second point in the criticism concerned the problems connected with the inclusion 
of adaptive skill areas in the definition. MacMillan et al. argued that the 10 adaptive skill 
areas adopted ‘fail to consider developmental factors and cannot be assessed reliably 
with current scales’ (MacMillan et al. 1993, p.325). It is true that most of the 10 
categories cannot be applied to young children. It is also true that the development of 
psychometric instruments to assess adaptive behaviour is far behind the development of 
IQ tests. However, as Reiss has stated in his answer to the criticism (Reiss 1994), 
measures of adaptive skill behaviour are not essential to the adaptation of the new 
definition. Assessing adaptive skills can be based on structured interviews, observations 
and other data sources. Even IQ test results are interpreted in the context of other 
information.
The third point in the criticism concerned the failure of the definition to recognise 
different subgroups, like organic and familial groups (about the groups, see the 
preceding discussion). The same can, however, also be said about the earlier definitions
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of the AAMR. It is very important to recognise the existence of these two groups, but I 
do not see why it should be done at the general level of definition.
The intent of the 1992 AAMR definition was not to change who is or who is not 
considered to have ED. Instead, the intent was to change how people think about ID (i.e., 
the emphasis shifted from the deficiencies of the individual to the support needed by the 
individual) (ibid., p .l). In addition, the importance of the interaction between the 
individual and his or her environment was stressed in the new definition.
If a definition based solely on IQ (like definition 1) is compared with the new AAMR 
concept, the advantages of the latter from an individual’s point of view are obvious. The 
AAMR definition is rich and flexible, while the former is narrow and rigid. On the other 
hand, the former is unsuitable, for example, for international comparisons on the 
prevalence of ID.
2.3. Intellectual disability and health
It is common to refer to intellectually disabled people as not healthy or handicapped. 
When these expressions are used, the definition is usually not given or even thought 
about. In the background, however, is some theory of health, disability or handicap, 
though it may be hidden. In the following discussion, I briefly review ID in light of two 
different theories of health and the WHO-based taxonomy presented by Tom Fryers 
(Fryers 1992).
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2.3.1. B oorse’s biostatistical theory o f  health
The first theory of health has been called the biostatistical theory. It is represented, for 
example, by the American philosopher Christopher Boorse (Boorse 1977). Boorse 
remarks in the beginning of his paper that we should ‘distinguish sharply between 
theoretical health, the absence of disease and practical health’, the last being a less- 
demanding ideal (ibid., p. 542). His goal was to analyse health and disease ‘as 
understood by traditional physiological medicine’, which he takes for granted and does 
not define. In the mid-70's when Boorse's paper was written, a discussion on the nature 
of medicine was also launched by Engel in a famous paper criticising the so-called 
biomedical model (Engel 1977).
The definition Boorse proposed includes the following points (p.562):
1. The reference class is a natural class of organisms of uniform 
functional design; specifically, an age group of a sex of a species.
2. A normal function of a part or process within members of the 
reference class is a statistically typical contribution by it to their 
individual survival and reproduction.
3. Health in a member of the reference class is normal functional 
ability: the readiness of each internal part to perform all its normal 
functions on typical occasions with at least typical efficiency.
4. A disease is a type of internal state which impairs health, i.e. 
reduces one or more functional abilities below typical efficiency.
Thus Boorse sees diseases as deviations from the species biological design and their 
recognition as a matter of natural science, rather than as evaluative decisions.
Boorse includes both somatic and mental health in his definition, and he also mentions 
MR on several occasions (ibid., e.g. pp.560 and 564). For him MR is an example of an
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extremal disease, which is one-sided in the sense that the other extreme (very high 
intelligence) is not considered a disease.
Boorse’s biostatistical theory of health resembles IQ-based definitions of ID to a great 
degree. He refers directly to the concept of statistical distribution when he mentions MR 
and he also refers several times to the concept of normal (e.g., normal function or 
normal functional ability). By normal he means a statistically defined phenomenon.
Boorse seems to consider the intellectually disabled as a homogeneous group, the 
members of which cannot, from his point of view, be healthy. His reference class, ‘an 
age group of a sex of a species’, is a strictly biological concept, and the contribution of 
the relation between the individual and the external world to health or disease is ignored. 
Boorse does not discuss the concept of intelligence, but the way he describes mental 
phenomena in general suggests that his theory resembles those mentioned under the 
geographic and biological metaphors of mind (see the preceding discussion).
As has already been noted, the intellectually disabled are far from a homogeneous 
group. Even the basic distinction between the minus variants and those with organic 
damage (see the preceding discussion) shows that the Boorsean view is too narrow to 
describe ID. While it is true that many individuals with ID that is based on organic 
damage are not healthy according to Boorse's definition, the opposite can be said of 
many or most of the minus variants. The functions related to individual survival and 
reproduction are intact even though success in school or work may not be so.
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2.3.2. Nordenfelt’s welfare theory o f health
The second theory of health has been presented by Lennart Nordenfelt in his book 
On the Nature o f Health (1987). As Boorse, he aims to cover both somatic and mental 
health in his definition, which is based on action theory.
Nordenfelt divides theories of health into the following two categories: analytic and 
holistic. He criticises the former and especially Boorse’s biostatistical theory. One of the 
main points in this critique is the inability of biostatistical theory to consider the 
interaction between an organism and its environment.
Nordenfelt himself promotes a holistic perspective, which he calls the welfare theory 
of health. He focuses on a person as a whole and asks whether this whole person is 
healthy or not. After a careful and lengthy analysis of some of his basic concepts he 
defines: ‘A is healthy if, and only if, A is able, given standard circumstances in his 
environment, to fulfil those goals which are necessary and jointly sufficient for his 
minimal happiness’ (ibid., p.79).
Questions like ‘what is real happiness’ or ‘what is minimal degree of happiness’ are 
not scientific questions but evaluative ones in the welfare theory. These evaluations do 
not simply appear from nowhere; they are formed in social settings.
Nordenfelt also takes ID as an example when he discusses his welfare theory. A 
person with very low intelligence and a low degree of vitality sets very few and 
primitive goals. He is then able to fulfil these goals, and the situation permits their 
fulfilment. It is, however, possible that his happiness does not meet the requirements of 
minimal human happiness as it is generally understood in society.
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As earlier described, we come to the division between severe and mild ID. A person 
with severe ID is very probably unable to fulfil his goals ‘given standard circumstances 
in his environment’; another person with mild ID may very well be able to do so.
2.3.3. Fryers’ taxonomy
Instead of trying to present a complex and sophisticated definition of ID, Fryers (1992) 
has proposed a taxonomy in which the validity of different definitions for different 
purposes is acknowledged. Fryers applies the concepts of impairment, disability and 
handicap to delineate global and partial categories in his taxonomy (Table 2.4).
Fryers' taxonomy is based on a classification published by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) in 1980. The need for it originated in the inadequacy of the disease 
classifications to ‘reflect the full range of problems that lead people to make contact 
with a health care system’ (International Classification... 1980, p. 10).
The extension proposed in the classification was presented as 
disease or disorder impairment -> disability -> handicap
The concepts are defined in the classification as follows:
In the context of health experience,
an impairment is any loss or abnormality of psychological, 
physiological, or anatomical structure or function (ibid., p. 27)
a disability is any restriction or lack (resulting from an impairment) 
of ability to perform an activity in the manner or within the range 
considered normal for a human being (ibid., p. 28)
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Table 2.4. Taxonomies related to mental retardation (adapted from Fryers 1992)
Global categories
Gl. Intellectual impairment 
Criteria
Main categories
G2. Learning disability 
Criteria
Main categories
G3. Mental handicap/retardation 
Criteria
Main categories
Partial categories
Pl. Physical impairments 
Criteria
Main categories
P2. Specific disabilities 
Criteria
Main categories
P3. Specific handicaps 
Criteria
Main categories
Intellectual: intelligence or development tests 
Severe: IQ<50 (or ’severe and moderate’)
Mild: IQ 50-69
Usually educational: for example, reading or 
numeracy tests
Various, according to legal, administrative and 
professional contracts
Social: for example, dependency or 
maladaptation scales
Severe: co-extensive with severe intellectual 
impairment, if IQ<50 is used as a necessary 
condition
Mild: many factors in selection, varying in 
different communities
Pathological or etiological diagnosis 
Very many diagnostic groups, for example, 
cerebral palsy (CP), phenylketonuria (PKU), 
fragile X syndrome
Functional: standardised or clinical assessment 
Few syndromes; many specific disfunctions, for 
example, autism, epilepsy, blindness
Social disadvantage
For instance, finance, housing, employment, 
education
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a handicap is a disadvantage for a given individual, resulting from an 
impairment or a disability, that limits or prevents the fulfilment of a 
role that is normal (depending on age, sex, and social and cultural 
factors) for that individual (ibid., p.29)
It is obvious that a simple linear relation is not always the case: a handicap may, for 
example, result from an impairment without the mediation of a disability. A child with 
celiac disease, who is functionally limited, may lead a fairly normal life but experience 
disadvantage when unable to enjoy a fully normal diet.
In the WHO classification, impairment refers to the level of organs or systems, 
disability indicates the level of the person, and handicap reflects interaction with and 
adaptation to the individual’s surroundings (ibid., p. 14).
The classification considers subnormality of intelligence as an impairment, which it 
obviously has to be by definition. It does not, however, necessarily lead further in the 
sequence: an individual with a moderately low IQ may perform without disadvantages, 
for example, in a rural setting.
The purpose of ’global’ categories in Fryers’ taxonomy is to describe the client group as 
a whole, while the ’partial’categories are not exclusively related to retardation. Fryers 
reminds that ‘we are discussing international, scientific taxonomy and nosology, not 
what terms are currently acceptable for clients, parents and politicians in particular 
countries’ (ibid., p. 184). The purpose is not to apply the taxonomy to individuals but to 
research into human groups. Fryers stresses that ‘individuals require thorough individual 
assessment of their impairments, disabilities and handicaps, their motivations, abilities
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and social advantages, before being offered services’ (ibid., p. 185). Here Fryers is very 
much in line with the AAMR definition, although he does not mention it explicitly.
In the taxonomy category, G1 refers to the most widely used concept of ID, in which 
impairment is defined as 'low intelligence1. The concept of intelligence, again, is vague, 
but roughly it can be defined as the capacity to learn and apply learning. Fryers 
acknowledges the problems related to the concept of IQ and its testing but, in the 
absence of anything better, accepts their use.
Category G2, learning disability, will not delineate the same group as G l. Besides 
intelligence there may be other factors (motor, sensory, emotional, social) behind 
learning disabilities. Category G3 is largely socially defined; it is related, rather than 
due, to intellectual impairment. Only partially understood complex social selection 
processes result in great variation of the prevalence in different societies and also to 
significant bias with respect to sex, social class and racial distributions.
The three global categories relate closely, especially among those with severe 
intellectual impairment (i.e., individuals with low IQ's always have learning disabilities 
also and have handicaps in the social sense). On the other hand, mild intellectual 
impairment is not always co-existent with the two other global categories.
Partial categories are grouped in the same way as global categories, the crucial 
difference being that, far from all individuals in these categories have intellectual 
impairment. Category PI refers to biomedically defined phenomena, P2 to functional 
deficits and P3 to social disadvantage.
All categories in the taxonomy are valid for different purposes. They certainly have 
very different means of measurement. They provide a variety of perspectives also with
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[ respect to the prevention of ID. The means needed to prevent learning disability (G2)
may be only partially the same as those needed to prevent physical impairment (PI).
2.4. Concluding remarks
A comprehensive definition of ID that would cover every individual and would be 
suitable for all purposes does not exist, and it may not even be worth aiming at. The 
difference between mild and profound ID is enormous. There are no common 
behavioural patterns and even within one clearly defined category (like Down or fragile 
X syndrome) individual differences can be great (Boddington et al. 1991). The AAMR 
definition does not mention values or norms explicitly but admits implicitly the 
; normative nature of the definition. The attempts to base the definition solely on IQ have
I also been attempts to reach a value-neutral solution, but they fail as we have seen.
f
ID is clearly a normative concept, and to a large extent it has been socially 
constructed. Boddington and Podpadec even argue that ‘what holds the class together is 
the assumption that they are excluded absolutely or in degree from certain valuable
i
I
! aspects of life’ (ibid., p. 183). To illustrate their conclusion they quote, for example, the
i discussion concerning surgery in the case of a Down syndrome child and a 'normal' child
; in Kuhse and Singer's Should the Baby Live? (1985). The authors argue that ‘Down's
| syndrome is surely relevant to the decision to operate because it means a reduced
: potential for a life with the unique features which are commonly and reasonably
regarded as giving special value to human lives’ (ibid., p. 140). The degree of this
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’reduced potential’ is not entirely dependent upon the child but is also socially 
conditioned (Boddington et al. 1991).
In this thesis the concept of ID is used in two ways. When individual cases are 
discussed, the concept is used in the broader sense, like in the AAMR definition. 
However, when quantitative aspects in epidemiology and the prevention of ID are 
discussed, then the concept is understood in the narrower, IQ-based sense.
I have dealt with the issues of definition at length because they are so complex and 
because they provide the necessary background for further discussions on epidemiology 
and prevention. Before moving on to these questions, however, I would like to side-track 
briefly and explore geneticisation and its relevance to my main topic, the prevention of 
intellectual disability.
iSi
[
i
iI|
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| 3. Geneticisation
if
.
‘Cause of mental retardation is discovered’2. ‘Alcoholism, over-eating and madness are 
inherited’3. ‘Genes reveal your destiny’4. These are actual examples of a very common 
way of reporting news on scientific research on the human genome. The general formula 
of a news report for a finding is the following: ‘It was announced today by scientists at 
(Harvard, Vanderbilt, Stanford) Medical School that a gene responsible for (some, 
many, a common form of) (schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s, arteriosclerosis, prostate cancer) 
has been located and its DNA sequence determined. This exciting research, say 
I scientists, is the first step in what may eventually turn out to be a possible cure for this
disease’ (Lewontin 1997, p.29).
: What was actually discovered in the first example? Not a general cause of mental
retardation, of course, but mutations in a regulator gene, XH2, that are responsible for an 
extremely rare syndrome called ATR-X, which includes severe ID, anaemia, 
characteristic facial features and genital abnormalities. So far, about 50 individuals with 
the syndrome have been identified.
What did the second headline refer to? The text reports vaguely, and much more 
modestly, some findings concerning the role of genes in alcoholism, obesity and 
! schizophrenia. Genes do not determine any of these conditions but increase
i
| susceptibility for them, it is concluded.
2 Financial Times 22 March 1995
3 Helsingin Sanomat 8 November 1996 (my translation)
4 Aamulehti 4 May 1997 (my translation)
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The third example taken was from a more general report on genetic research in a major
5
I Finnish newspaper. The article concentrated on the current state of genetic knowledge,
and the text was more modest than the headline, which is common.
It is not only diseases that are stated to be genetically determined, but also traits like 
religiosity, political orientation, job satisfaction, leisure-time interests and proneness to 
divorce according to a claim based on studies done on identical twins (Horgan 1993). 
There are selfish genes, pleasure-seeking genes, celebrity genes, gay genes, and the like 
(Nelkin and Lindee 1995). A recent report in The Lancet suggests that the bad behaviour 
of adolescents has a genetic basis (McGuffin and Tapar 1997). And, finally, a headline 
tells us that ‘Faulty genes lead to old age’ (cited by Spallone 1997), and in Minnesota a 
1994 gubernatorial candidate from the religious right contended: ‘There is a genetic 
predisposition for men to be heads of households’ (cited by Nelkin and Lindee 1995,
j  p. 107).
I The preceding examples are very recent, and it might appear that the idea of
f
} explaining almost everything in terms of genes is the result of the rapid development
| that has occurred in genetic technology in the past 20 years. However, already in 1907,
!
j Burbank (cited by Nelkin and Lindee 1995, p. 19) wrote the following words: ‘Stored
I
| within heredity are all joys, sorrows, loves, hates, music, art, temples, palaces, pyramids,
[
[
hovels, kings, queens, paupers, bards, prophets and philosophers ... and all the mysteries
|
| of the universe.’
I
| The common denominator of the examples is geneticisation, which refers to the
‘ongoing process by which priority is given to searching for variations in DNA 
sequences that differentiate people from each other and to attributing some hereditary
51
basis to most disorders, behaviours and physiological variations’ (Lippman 1994, p. 13). 
The term has its roots in the concepts of scientisation and, more specifically, 
medicalisation (Parsons 1997).
Geneticisation can occur at different levels (Hoedemaekers 1998). Firstly, it can occur 
at the conceptual level, when genetic terminology is used to define problems (genes for 
violence, fatness, etc.). The second level is institutional and involves specific genetic 
expertise to deal with problems (e.g., the distribution of medical research funding). The 
third level at which geneticisation takes place is cultural, and genetic knowledge and 
technology lead to changing individual and social attitudes towards reproduction, health 
care, prevention and control of disease. Finally, the fourth level of geneticisation is 
philosophical in that genetic imagery may influence our views on human identity and 
individual responsibility (e.g., the limits of free will).
Geneticisation can be seen as the younger brother of the specific aetiology theory that 
flourished in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. According to it, a necessary and 
sufficient cause can be found for most diseases. The success of the latter was obvious 
with the advent of medical microbiology and the popularity of the former relates to 
advances in molecular medicine.
The most obvious problem with geneticisation is that it oversimplifies extremely 
complex issues. A scientific salto mortale is performed in the drawing of conclusions on 
the basis of genetic findings and human behaviour, and the importance of the 
environment is ignored or underestimated.
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Next, I first explore the possible explanations of the popularity of genetic explanations 
for disease and behaviour, then discuss problems related to geneticisation, and, finally, 
conclude with some remarks of the relevance of the issue to my main topic.
3.1. Behind geneticisation
Why have genetic explanations become so popular? Scientific development has, of 
course, been faster than anyone could possibly foresee some decades ago, but this pace 
does not totally explain the current genomania (Lewontin’s term). Other explanations
i
can be found in general political development, the diminishing role of religion, the 
relative simplicity of genetic explanations, and the role of the media, especially science 
I reporting.
| Geneticisation implies a shift of responsibility from society to the individual in the
| sense that if, for example, alcoholism and crime are explained in terms of genes, no
i
[ societal change can be hoped to be of any help. This shift aligns with the current
i
I political climate in many western countries (Conrad 2001). Genetic explanations appear
f
|
j to provide a rational and neutral justification for existing social categories (Nelkin and
| Lindee 1995, p. 194).
s
i
I Explicit religious metaphors referring to the genome as the Bible, the Holy Grail or the
I Book of Man are common, as are more secular metaphors like a map, a library or a
|
I recipe. Nelkin and Lindee (1995) have remarked that DNA has assumed a cultural
I
meaning similar to that of the Biblical soul. Like the soul, DNA is invisible but real, and
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it is relevant to morality, personhood and social place. In a way it is even immortal.
Thus the vacuum of the diminishing role of religion in Western societies has been
i
partially filled by other issues.
Although the scientific issues in genetics are extremely complex and beyond 
comprehension for most people, the idea of ‘one gene - one consequence’ is attractive, 
when the alternatives are vague, incomplete and extremely complex social explanations. 
The expected specificity of genetic explanations raises hope for straightforward 
solutions or ‘magic bullets’ to alleviate human suffering (Conrad 1997, p. 142).
It is easy to blame irresponsible media for the exaggeration of the meaning of 
scientific results. Often the contents of the articles do not match the headlines, which 
report ‘breakthroughs’ and ‘new hopes’ (Karki 1998). An analysis of genetics reporting 
in the Helsingin Sanomat, the largest newspaper in Finland, shows also clearly a
I discrepancy between the headlines and the contents (Lauren 1998). A possibly
| unintended effect is that the public image of the role of genes is more deterministic than
could be argued on the basis of the study results. It is not, however, only the journalists 
who create the news. Scientists have their role in writing their press releases, which form 
the basis of news reports. It was found in Lauren’s survey that nine out of ten articles 
reporting found or localised genes were very optimistic about drugs or gene therapy that
I could soon be developed.
|
j An illuminating example of the relationship between science and the media is the 
introduction of the term ‘gay gene’ into popular and scientific discourse (Conrad 2001).
| The first report relating homosexuality and a genetic marker was published in July 1993.
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Let me set aside the scientific issue itself and concentrate on how the finding was 
reported and what followed.
The report reached the front pages of most major newspapers in the United States (and 
probably elsewhere as well, although I am not aware of any research in this respect).
The report explicitly noted that it is unlikely that a single gene would be responsible for 
homosexuality. However, several articles began, for the first time, to use the term ‘gay 
gene’ to describe the findings. Within the next two years the term became more 
common, and, when Dean Hamer, the scientist behind the finding, and a journalist 
published a book about the research leading to the discovery, ‘gay gene’ appeared in the 
subtitle of the book.
A term like ‘gay gene’ is partially a journalistic short cut for a longer and scientifically 
more precise expression (e.g., a marker for a gene predisposing to homosexuality). At 
the same time, however, it probably indicates an increasing acceptance of the 
geneticisation of homosexuality. Of relevance is also the usage of the term: do we write 
about a gay gene, the gay gene or the ‘gay gene’.
‘Gay gene’ is an example of ‘the one gene issue’, a tendency to oversimplify complex 
genetic issues. Another example of geneticisation in science reporting is ‘the 
disconfirmation dilemma’ (Conrad 2001). This phenomenon refers to the fact that new 
findings in genetic research are prominently reported in the news media, but findings 
that disconfirm or do not replicate earlier findings are far less frequently and 
prominently reported. This trend follows the logic of news: finding something new is 
news, but not finding it may not be (ibid.). I shall return to the consequences of this 
disconfirmation dilemma later.
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3.2. Consequences of geneticisation
Geneticisation does not only mean a minor side-track in the discourse on genetics and 
the philosophy of science. It has consequences that reach beyond these disciplines and 
involve science more generally, social life and even legal practice.
Geneticisation implies determinism and reductionism that, as such, are not new 
phenomena but have recurred in each generation since Darwin’s day, argues Steven 
Rose (1995, p.380). According to Rose, what is new is the way in which the mystique of 
the new genetics is seen as strengthening the reductionist argument.
Rose goes on to argue that naive neurogenetic determinism is based on a faulty 
reductive sequence whose steps include: reification, arbitrary agglomeration, improper 
quantification, belief in statistical ‘normality’, spurious localisation, misplaced causality, 
and dichotomous partitioning between genetic and environmental causes.
Reification means that a dynamic process is converted into a static phenomenon. An 
example is violence, which is converted into a ‘character’, aggression. It can then be 
studied in isolation or as a part of the dynamically interactive system in which it appears.
The next step is arbitrary agglomeration, which lumps together many reified 
interactions as exemplars of one thing. I have already mentioned a recent report on the 
genetic basis of bad behaviour, which concludes with a suggestion that the bad 
behaviour of adolescents is probably heritable (McGuffin and Thapar 1997).
In improper quantification, numeric values are given to these reified and agglomerated 
characters. IQ is an example, and problems related to it have already been discussed in 
Chapter 2, as have the problems with the next step, statistical normality. Another
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example of problematic quantification is a gene for ‘novelty seeking’, which made 
headlines in early 1996. Two research reports in Nature Genetics suggested a causal 
relationship between the D4 dopamine receptor gene and the normal personality trait of 
novelty seeking (Benjamin et al. 1996, Ebstein et al. 1996). The studies were based on 
the hypothesis that novelty seeking is mediated by dopamine neurotransmission. Again, 
the validity of the findings is not the issue; instead I wish to make one remark 
concerning the significance of the results. In the latter study the effect size (i.e., the 
difference in questionnaire scores between groups with and without the particular allele) 
was 0.5 SD units. Statistical significance was, of course, reached but what does a 
difference of 0.5 SD units mean? In IQ it would be 7 or 8 points, in the birth weight of 
males with 40 weeks’ gestation it is about 200 grammes. I cannot see that a difference of 
this magnitude would be particularly significant in a person’s life.
Rose’s next step, spurious localisation, refers to the way of speaking of, for example, 
gay or schizophrenic brains or genes rather than of brains or genes of a gay or 
schizophrenic person. As noted earlier, this is not only shorthand, but also reflects and 
perhaps endorses geneticisation and determinism. The latter extends, of course, beyond 
genes and genetics, an example being the localisation of gayness in the hypothalamus or 
corpus callosum.
Misplaced causality does not concern the relationship between genes and behaviour or 
disease, since the changes that take place in the genome of an individual during life 
cannot be attributed to behaviour, with the exception of some environmental exposures 
leading to DNA changes in particular tissues (e.g., smoking leading to lung cancer).
With misplaced causality Rose refers to the problem of defining the direction of
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causality when a correlation between a brain structure or pattern of metabolism and a 
disease or particular type of behaviour is found.
The final step in this faulty reductive sequence is dichotomous partitioning between 
genetic and environmental causes. Cases in which the genotype of an individual 
determines the course of life are limited to rare single-gene defects like Huntington’s 
disease. In the vast majority of cases, however, it is the interplay between genes and the 
environment that determines the lives of people. The ‘genetic fatalism’ that underlies 
much public discourse about genetics has expanded beyond scientific knowledge 
(Conrad 2001).
An obvious political consequence of geneticisation is that it turns attention away from 
the social and economic conditions that lead to violence, depression, obesity and the 
like, and also the environmental conditions that lead to diseases like cancer. If violence 
is explained in terms of one’s genetic makeup, society is relieved of the collective 
I responsibility that fosters violence (Nelkin and Lindee 1995). BRCA1 and BRCA2
| genes are linked to breast cancer, but they account only for a small percentage of all
f
[
j cases. Genes predisposing to colon cancer have been located, but, again, they explain
I
j only a minor part of the total, dietary factors playing a major role in determining the
f
| incidence. It has been suggested that we could ‘map’ the environment for sources of
f
| ‘susceptibility’ instead of mapping the genome (Abby Lippman, cited by Harper and
| Clarke 1997, p. 104). As a consequence, in health research, there is the danger that
I[
t important areas become neglected because tremendous costs and efforts are directed
j
!
f
| towards genetic research.
i
I
|
i!
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A consequence of the disconfirmation dilemma is that through the reporting of genetic 
discoveries, the discoveries are infused into the culture, while the neglect of 
disconfirmations produces ‘errant cultural residues, obsolete ideas that remain part of 
public knowledge’ (Conrad 2001).
Geneticisation may be manifest even in legal practice. Nelkin and Lindee (1995) have 
reported a custody dispute from 1990 in which a Californian couple had both donated 
their gametes and contracted with a surrogate to carry the fertilised egg to term. 
However, the surrogate mother refused to relinquish the baby at birth. The judge 
' awarded sole custody to the couple but did not justify the decision by referring to the
original contract. Instead, he linked the child’s proper place to his genetic lineage and 
called the surrogate mother a ‘genetic hereditary stranger’ to the child.
One consequence of the exponential increase in genetic knowledge is that it may 
I question our traditional views about responsibility and free will. Geneticisation 
| considers genes as agents of destiny, and moral responsibility is removed from
| individuals by the biological excuse, hence the concept of ‘genetic fatalism’ (Nelkin and
|
Lindee 1995, Conrad 2001). Currently, we are far from being able to determine how 
much of an action is genetically determined and how much is free will. Genetics may, 
however, call into question some traditional ideas about freedom and responsibility. As
|
Parens (1996, p. 16) has noted, ‘it may be that some of the dominant ways of thinking
I
[ about those ideas have been simplistic and are no longer tenable’. If the idea of an
i
| absolutely free will has to be abandoned due to the results of genetic science, there is no
I
need to throw away the concept of responsibility as well. And even if an IQ gene or 
genes were located some day, this finding would not dictate any social policy (ibid.).
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3.3. Concluding remarks
Advances in genetic research have also revealed how little we know about the complex
interaction between genes and the environment. People with the same DNA pattern may
have a range of clinical manifestations or none at all. Two examples illustrate this
possibility. In the first, two sisters having the same mutation associated with retinitis
pigmentosa have dramatically different phenotypes. One is blind, whereas the other can
drive a truck even at night (Hubbard and Lewontin 1996). The second example concerns
two monozygotic twin sisters who belong to a family at high risk of breast and ovarian
cancer (Diez et al. 1997). With comparable reproductive histories and life-styles, one
has, by the age of 49 years, suffered from cancer twice, whereas the other has remained
healthy.
It is, of course, possible that some day more genes will be found that cause breast
cancer, the role of genes predisposing to homosexual behaviour will be confirmed and
the interaction between genes and environmental factors under certain conditions will be
[ clarified. So far, however, the data are only fragmentary. With respect to, for example,
![
| violence, ‘some people may, under some environmental conditions, have a
[ predisposition to violence in some circumstances some of the time’ (Callahan 1996,
| p. 14). This situation is a long way from any specification, and it is hard to imagine a
science that could predict whether such a predisposition would lead to violent behaviour
in a particular place at a particular time. There is also a conceptional issue: how should
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we think about a person with a ‘gay gene’ who does not behave homosexually or of a 
person with a gene for alcoholism if he or she does not drink?
Advances in genetics have had a far greater impact on detection, diagnosis, screening, 
prevention and counselling than on therapy. Whatever is written in grant applications 
and press releases, there still remains a serious gap between disease characterisation and 
therapeutic utility (Friedmann 1990). As to prevention, the major solution so far has 
been the selective termination of affected pregnancies, and it is questionable whether 
this practice can be hailed as a great victory of modem science. Lewontin (1997, p.52) 
goes as far as claiming that the use of genetic counselling and selective abortion is ‘a 
sign, not of the success of molecular biology in producing a scientific medicine, but of 
its failure’.
The exaggerated hope molecular medicine has provided for people suffering from
I various inherited conditions was the subject of a recent editorial in Thorax. The editorial
| points out that the prognosis, for example, for cystic fibrosis patients, depends ‘more
I upon the less glamorous development of current methods, and perhaps new
pharmacological approaches, than upon gene therapy’ (Dodge 1998, p. 158).
After all the criticism that has been presented here about geneticisation, it would not 
be fair not to recognise the great potential genetic science has to alleviate human 
suffering. The criticism against geneticisation comes partly from within genetic society
[ and partly from outside groups, like philosophers and sociologists. Peter Conrad (1997)
|
| calls the latter to be active players in the discourse. Credibility is lost if it is denied that
}
j  genes can have an effect on social behaviour. There is a role for social science in
research into the interaction between genes and social structures. There is also a role for
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philosophy in clarifying conceptual issues, revealing value judgements and enquiring 
into the questions of empirical science.
How is all this relevant to my main issue, the prevention of ID? Since it is the 
commonest form of disability in children and genetic aetiology represents 30 to 50 % of
\
the cases, the consequences of geneticisation are highly relevant, at least in the 
following ways.
Firstly, geneticisation may overemphasise the role of genes in the development of ID, 
and the role of environmental factors may therefore be given less attention both in the 
public eye and in scientific discourse. This situation, in turn, would lead (or has already 
led) to the distortion of the balance in research resources. Secondly, geneticisation may 
raise unjustified hopes for gene therapy to correct errors leading to ID. The prenatal 
diagnosis of Down syndrome has been available for over three decades, but abortion 
remains the only option for prevention. Thirdly, the general fatalism associated with 
geneticisation may create a discouraging atmosphere in the education of intellectually 
disabled people, whatever the aetiology of the disability.
The issue of geneticisation has been a side-track but an important one. Now it is time 
S return to the main stream and look first at the epidemiology of intellectual disability.
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4. Epidemiology of intellectual disability
Epidemiology can be defined as ‘the study of the distribution and determinants of 
disease frequency’ (Hennekens and Buring 1987, p.3). Although the word 'disease' 
occurs in the definition, epidemiology deals as well with, for example, impairments and 
handicaps, or in the current case, ID. Originally, the term epidemiology was used almost 
exclusively in the context of epidemics of infectious diseases, but the changing pattern 
of human morbidity and mortality expanded the scope to cover all kinds of diseases, 
impairments and handicaps.
Disease frequency refers to the quantification of the phenomenon, and it is most 
frequently expressed as incidence or prevalence. Incidence quantifies the number of new 
events or cases of the phenomenon in a population during a specified time interval. 
Prevalence quantifies the proportion of individuals in a population which has the disease 
at a specific instant. Incidence and prevalence are interrelated, and this interrelation can 
be expressed mathematically by saying that prevalence (P) is proportional to the product 
of the incidence rate (I) and the average duration (D) of the disease as follows:
P = I x D
Distribution of the disease considers such questions as who gets the disease, when it is 
gotten, and where. Descriptive studies provide data for such practical purposes as 
planning health care. They are needed also for formulating hypotheses concerning
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possible causal or preventive factors. The term determinant in the definition refers to 
these causal factors.
4.1. Research strategies in the epidemiology of intellectual disability
The starting point of an epidemiological study is the definition of the entity to be 
studied. With the discussion in Chapter 2 in mind, it can be noted immediately that 
! research on the epidemiology of ID has a major difficulty even in the very beginning.
Such difficulties are not, however, unique in epidemiology. On many other occasions, 
too, many definitions and studies on a particular topic (e.g., bronchial asthma) are not 
comparable because of the lack of a common definition.
Three classical research strategies are possible, all of which have their advantages and 
| disadvantages. These strategies are cohort (register-based), cross-sectional and case-
control studies. I shall discuss each of them in light of an example.
4.1.1. Cohort studies
In a cohort study subjects are classified on the basis of the presence or absence of 
exposure to a particular factor and followed for a specified period of time to determine 
| the development of disease in each exposure group (ibid., p.22). In cohort studies
j multiple effects of a single exposure can be examined, as can the effect of rare exposures
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(depending on the sample size). Prospective cohort studies with large sample sizes are, 
however, time consuming and expensive.
The process of identifying the intellectually disabled subjects in a population is of 
crucial importance to the validity of the results. Differences in the process are a major 
cause of the great variance in prevalence figures.
A common means of identifying intellectually disabled subjects is administrative. 
Persons, who have been put in this category by some authority, usually medical, social 
or educational, are included. In such studies high prevalence figures are obtained for 
school years and much lower figures are found for adulthood, due to the fact that, in 
adulthood, adaptive behaviour takes presence over IQ as a means of identifying ID 
(Richardson and Koller 1985). For the pre-school years the prevalence is low because 
mild cases, which form the majority, are not recognised until the child attends school.
An example of a large and well-constructed cohort study on ID (and various other 
phenomena) is that done in two provinces in northern Finland (Rantakallio and von 
Wendt 1986). The study population consisted of 12 058 live births and covered 96% of 
all births in the region in 1966. Follow-up data were collected at various ages and a large 
study on ID was conducted in 1980-1981. Of the original population, 278 livebom 
children had died, and only 14 could not be traced at the age of 14 years.
Information on intellectually disabled children was obtained by collecting all existing 
protocols for intelligence tests from health care and social welfare authorities and 
institutions for intellectually disabled children. A special inquiry concerning all children 
not attending school at a level appropriate for their age was also made.
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The prevalence of ID at the age of 14 years was 11.9 per 1000, and the prevalence of 
intellectual subnormality (IQ 71 to 85) was 13.7 per 1000. The authors noted that they 
had obtained higher prevalence figures, especially for severe ID, than most earlier 
studies, and they discussed the possible explanations at length. They suggested that the 
difference could be partially explained by the exceptionally successful follow-up (only 
1.2 per 1000 children could not be traced at 14 years of age).
It is worth noting that the definition of ED in this survey was based solely on IQ 
measurements.
4.1.2. Cross-sectional studies
A cross-sectional study is a survey in which a population is not followed-up over time 
but is instead assessed at a particular point of time. In a way, a cross-sectional survey 
provides a ’snapshot’ of the health status of the population (Hennekens and Buring 
1986).
An example of a cross-sectional survey on ID is a project conducted in the Kuopio 
province in Finland (Kaariainen et al. 1985). In it four birth cohorts bom in 1969-1972 
were screened in two phases, first at school followed by those who scored low being 
given psychological tests. Altogether 12 882 children were screened, and the prevalence 
for ID was 13.8 per 1000. The research project was multi-disciplinary, and several 
reports concerning the medical, dental, social and economic aspects of ID were 
produced.
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One of the most interesting findings in the Kuopio project was that, of the mildly 
intellectually disabled, 81 % and, of the severely intellectually disabled children, 18 % 
were unregistered and therefore outside special services. This fact, of course, reflects 
partly the supply of these services, but it also reveals how unreliable the administrative 
criterion may be in the assessment of ID.
4.1.3. Case-control studies
In a case-control study subjects are selected on the basis of whether they do (cases) or do 
not (controls) have the particular disease under study (Hennekens and Buring 1986). The 
groups are then compared with respect to a characteristic or an exposure. The case- 
control strategy is useful in the evaluation of rare diseases, and it allows the study of 
diseases with very long latency periods. On the other hand, this strategy does not allow
| direct computation of incidence or prevalence rates. The selection of cases and controls
}
must be done with extreme care, and the setting is still prone to bias.
Case-control studies can evaluate a wide range of potential etiologic factors, and they 
are therefore used to test specific hypotheses or create new hypotheses concerning 
aetiology.
An example of a case-control study on ID is the survey done by Louhiala (1995) in an 
area in southern and central Finland. The identification of the relevant cases was made 
| mainly on the basis of the registers of three districts of special care for the intellectually
j
; disabled. Perinatal data concerning 33 factors possibly associated with risk for ID were
i
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\ then collected from the 12 maternity hospitals in the area. One control for each case was 
randomly selected from the hospital delivery book covering the birth year of the case 
child.
Independent risk indicators for ID were low maternal social class, multiparity, multiple 
pregnancy, male sex, small for gestational age, asphyxia, hypoglycaemia and 
hyperbilirubinaemia in the newborn. The risk for ID in association with a low Apgar 
score and very low birth weight (< 1500 g) seemed to increase, while the risk associated 
with moderately low birth weight seemed to decrease in the 1970’s, when neonatal 
intensive care was introduced. This finding was not surprising, because the tiniest babies 
usually died before the introduction of intensive care, and there was no possibility for 
them to become disabled.
4.2. Prevalence of intellectual disability
|
J
Of the two commonest measures in epidemiology, incidence and prevalence, the former 
is not useful in ID research, as it would require the possibility to determine the 
intellectual status of newborn babies, which is not feasible, if intelligence is understood 
as it is operationalised in present IQ tests. The concepts of intelligence and ID can be 
applied only to older children, and especially mild ID is often noticed as late as school 
age. Therefore, the occurrence of ID is commonly expressed in terms of prevalence 
figures.
I The variation in the methodological strategies used and the probable true differences
i
j between populations explain the wide range of prevalence rates, between 9 and 80 per
68
1000 children (Richardson and Koller 1985). The figures obtained for severe ID are 
more stable than those for mild ID. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show some prevalence figures 
from various parts of the world. The huge differences between those for Maine and 
Salford and, on the other hand, between age groups illustrate the influence of 
methodology and also the difficulties of comparative epidemiology in this area.
Table 4.1. Prevalence figures for severe intellectual disability *
Year Place Age group 
(years)
Prevalence 
(per 1000)
Notes
1960 London 10-14 2.8
1966 Amsterdam 10-14 5.2 Administrative assessmen
10 and 15 7.3 Individual assessment
1970 Aarhus 10-14 4.5
1980 N. Finland 14 6.4
1982 Kuopio 10-11 6.3
* Data adapted from Richardson and Koller 1985, KSariainen 1985 and Rantakallio and von Wendt 1986
Table 4.2. Prevalence figures for mild intellectual disability *
Year Place Age group 
(years)
Prevalence 
(per 1000)
Notes
1957 Maine 5-9 16.3 Predominantly rural, lower
10-14 35.1 socio-economic class, upper
15-19 16.1 IQ limit 75
1961 Salford 5-9 0.4
10-14 0.3
15-19 8.7
1966 Amsterdam 10 14.3
1980 N. Finland 14 5.5
1982 Kuopio 10-11 6.3
* Data adapted from Richardson and Koller 1985, KaSriainen 1985 and Rantakallio and von Wendt 1986
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Abramowicz and Richardson (1975) reviewed 27 epidemiological studies of severe ID 
and concluded that a remarkable consistency existed in the prevalence, approximating 4 
per 1000. They wrote:
The best approximation of the ’true’ prevalence rate of severe mental 
retardation appears to be between 3 to 5 per 1000. For those reliable 
studies that present prevalence rates for older children, the median 
’true’ prevalence of severe mental retardation is 3.7 per 1000 and the 
average ’true’prevalence is 3.96 per 1000. Since cases of severe 
mental retardation in a community can be missed and because there 
may be a tendency to overestimate a child’s potential by classifying 
him as mildly rather that severely mentally retarded, the average 
figure of 4 per 1000 age-specific population is probably a fair 
estimate of the number of severely retarded children who require 
services in a community, (ibid., p. 29)
Fryers (1984) has strongly criticised the way prevalence rates are assumed to be stable 
and the way temporal and geographic variations are ignored. It is worth noting that 
Abramowicz and Richardson discuss ’true’, not true prevalence, and they present 4 per 
1000 as a fair estimate of severely intellectually disabled children who require services 
in the community. In fact, in the studies they found reliable, the prevalence varied 
between 2.6 and 5.5 per 1000.
4.3. Causes of intellectual disability
If the definition (or part of the definition) of a phenomenon refers to a statistical 
distribution (like the normal distribution), speaking of causes of that phenomenon is not 
always sensible. At the population level it is obvious that part of the population is 
necessarily present and meets the criterion. At the individual level, on the other hand, it
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may be impossible to conclude whether a person is disabled plainly because he happens 
to be at the ’wrong end’ of the distribution or whether methods are merely lacking for 
determining the cause.
In cases in which a causal factor can be determined, the factor cannot, however, be 
proclaimed as the \iltimate cause’, since causality is a complex phenomenon and 
involves a chain or web of different causal agents. Even for Down syndrome the 
ultimate cause is unknown, although for many purposes it is sufficient to say that an 
extra chromosome 21 is responsible.
In the following discussion the concept of cause should be considered as a practical 
term that expresses current knowledge of the essential part or item of the causal chain 
leading to ID. Table 4.3. presents a classification of disorders that lead to severe or mild 
ID and also some examples. More comprehensive lists are available in, for example, in 
Fryers’ work (1984) and in the AAMR manual (Mental Retardation ...1992).
The classification in Table 4.3. is based on the timing of the primary event. In many 
cases the timing is, however, difficult or impossible to determine. An increased 
understanding of the underlying pathological mechanisms may influence the location of 
a disorder in the classification. The commonest change occurs when a single genetic 
defect is found in a disorder, which so far has been placed in categories 2.2 or 5.
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Table 4.3. Classification of disorders in which intellectual disability can occur and 
examples for each category
Class Examples
1 .Pre-conceptional
1.1.Chromosomal causes
1.2.X-linked causes 
1.3.Other genetic causes
2. Prenatal
2.1 .Malformations of the 
central nervous system
2.2.Malformation syndromes
2.3.Environmental causes
3.Perinatal 
3.1.Intrauterine disorders
3.2.Neonatal disorders
4.Postnatal
4.1.Head injuries 
4.2.Infections
4.3.Psychosocial causes 
4.4.0ther causes
5.Unknown causes
Multiple locations are also possible for many entities (e.g., microcephaly may be of 
genetic origin or it may originate during pregnancy). Category 4.3 is problematic in 
sense that, in many cases, it is impossible to determine whether ID is a result of the 
influence of genes or due to adverse environmental conditions during infancy and
Down syndrome (trisomy 21)
Fragile X syndrome 
Phenylketonuria (PKU)
Anencephaly, spina bifida, hydrocephalus, 
microcephaly
Foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS), cocaine- 
induced brain damage, irradiation during 
pregnancy
Placental insufficiency, obstetrical trauma 
Hypoxic-ischaemic encephalopathy, intra- 
ventricular haemorrhage, infection, 
hypoglycaemia
Cerebral contusion 
Meningitis
Cerebral anoxia (e.g., near-drowning)
j childhood. The latter is mentioned in most classifications, but its nature is seldom 
specified. Kurtz (1977, p.52) suggests that
... products of an aberrant subculture are not mentally retarded in the 
sense that they do not possess the biological capacity to perform in an 
acceptable manner; rather, the subcultures which are significant to 
them have emphasised behaviours that are not sampled by 
intelligence tests - i.e., they may have ’correctly’ learned the ’wrong’ 
things.
Other forms of classifications are possible and feasible; for instance Fryers has used 
the main classes of primary disorders (present at conception, like Down syndrome), 
primary disorders with secondary neurologic sequelae as a secondary effect, like 
phenylketonuria (PKU), and secondary disorders, like foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS).
| 4.4. Trends in the epidemiology of intellectual disability
J Very few studies have been reported on changes in the occurrence of ID. This lack is
[ understandable because the methodological difficulties are obvious. Administrative
f|
| definitions of ID are very much related to the resources available, and therefore analyses 
| of time trends are not feasible. Cross-sectional studies done at certain intervals could be
| useful, but, due to the small prevalence rates such studies are expensive and labourious.
| The validity of a comparison in which the same IQ tests have been administered to age
| cohorts between, for example, 10- or 20-year intervals, can also be questioned.
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Changes over time in the same population were studied in Salford, England, between 
1951 and 1980 (Fryers 1984). The object of the study was severe ID (IQ<50) and the 
case finding was based on existing registers. The prevalence for the age group of 5 to 9 
years increased through thel960’s and early 1970’s from 1.89 to 5.07 and decreased 
thereafter to 3.57 in 1980.
As reasons for the increase in prevalence, Fryers mentioned improved case finding, a 
general increase in survival and differential migration, by which he meant that families 
with intellectually impaired children elect to move to the area (known for good services) 
more often than did other families.
The reasons for the decrease in prevalence in the next decade are less obvious. Fryers 
suggested that a reduced incidence of some specific syndromes like PKU and 
kemicterus due to blood group incompatibility was at least possible.
It may be that it is not sensible to speculate about the overall changes in the prevalence 
of ID in general. The focus could be on specific groups, like the most severely disabled 
who require many services. There is also a need to follow the occurrence of specific 
disorders as a part of the quality control of health care in general and preventive 
measures in particular.
One indirect method for studying time trends is to survey risk factors and changes in 
them over time. There is, for instance, some evidence that the risk for ID associated with 
a low Apgar score increased after the introduction of modem neonatal intensive care 
(Louhiala 1995). It was assumed that, earlier, babies with low scores very often died and 
the survivors did not carry a significant risk for ID, but with intensive care more babies 
with severe brain damage survive.
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Some data concerning changes in the prevalence of ID can also be obtained in the 
context of research on other handicaps. The epidemiology of cerebral palsy (CP) is 
much easier to study and data from England suggest that the prevalence of severe ID 
association with CP slightly increased during the 1980’s (Nicholson and Alberman 
1992).
5. Prevention of intellectual disability: general issues
‘It is better to be healthy than ill or dead. That is the beginning and the end of the only
real argument for preventive medicine. It is sufficient.’ These lines were written by
|
| Geoffrey Rose in his book The Strategy o f Preventive Medicine (Rose 1992, p. 4), which
0!
' is an introduction to the ideas behind preventive medicine at the individual and
[ population levels. The citation is the humanitarian argument for prevention. Rose also
I
i described the economic argument, which, according to him, proves to be misleading or
even false when scrutinised more closely in individual cases.
Rose writes about preventive medicine, which, of course, covers intellectual disability 
only partly. As seen in Chapter 2, ID is not exclusively (and in many cases not at all) a 
medical matter but is also a social construction. Thus a person with ID may be healthy 
and the discussion about prevention must go beyond the scope of medicine. In this 
chapter the concept of prevention is first defined. Secondly, the question ‘ Why should ID 
be prevented?’ is introduced. Thirdly, the general strategies and practical possibilities 
for preventing ID are described. Fourthly, the ethical issues that arise in the context of
| this prevention are briefly introduced.
I
j
j;
\ 5.1. Levels of prevention
Prevention is usually divided into three levels, primary, secondary and tertiary (Mental 
retardation... 1992).
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Primary prevention refers to actions that occur before the onset of the problem and 
that stop the problem from occurring. Secondary prevention refers to actions that shorten 
the duration of, or reverse the effects of, existing problems. Tertiary prevention refers to 
actions that limit the adverse consequences of a problem and improve the individual’s 
level of functioning.
It is obvious that preventive activities concerning ID may be both medical and social, 
behavioural or educational. Examples of primary prevention are vaccination against 
Haemophilus type B meningitis (medical), prenatal care, support to avoid FAS 
(behavioural/educational) and general welfare programmes (social). Examples of the 
secondary prevention of ID are newborn screening of PKU (medical) and early infant 
intervention in high-risk families (educational). Tertiary prevention concentrates on 
people with ID in the form of, for example, optimised medical care (e.g., regular 
screening for hypothyreosis in Down syndrome) and various educational programmes.
On many occasions, the primary prevention of ID means the same as the prevention of 
the medical condition leading to ID, and the ethical problems are thus equivalent. There 
is, however, a form of primary prevention of ID that differs from the usual methods of 
preventing disease or disability. This radically different method, which has a unique 
spectrum of ethical problems, is the prevention of the existence of the people or persons 
with the probability to become intellectually disabled at some stage in life.
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5.2. Why should intellectual disability be prevented?
The first and crucial question with respect to the prevention of ID is, of course, why 
should it be prevented? Later in this thesis a long chapter (Chapter 8) will be devoted to 
a thorough discussion of this topic. At this stage, however, it is necessary to describe 
briefly the main points. Although there are various and extensive prevention 
programmes (like serum screening for Down syndrome), this question has not been 
widely discussed. Instead it has been taken for granted that prevention per se is a good 
thing.
The primary aim of the prevention of a disease or a handicap is usually to help the 
person who is thought to suffer from the disease or handicap in question. As regards ID, 
the situation is different. Of course there can be strategies that are successful in 
preventing both painful and deadly diseases and ID (like vaccination against 
Haemophilus influenzae type B infection). On a general level, however, it is not only the 
well being of the (future) intellectually disabled person that is at issue, but also the well 
being of the family and society.
The reasons for wanting to prevent ID are to avoid negative consequences in the 
following areas:
-economic impact on families 
-economic impact on society 
-disruption of families 
-quality of life of persons with ID
Each of these areas have been dealt with in detail in Chapter 8, but some preliminary 
remarks nevertheless follow.
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There is anecdotal evidence of the economic burden that an intellectually disabled 
child causes to his or her family. However, little systematic empirical research has been 
done on this topic. At least in developed societies the possible additional costs are, to a 
great extent, borne by society or, for example, insurance companies.
There is also little exact data on the economic burden placed on society by 
intellectually disabled people. It is obvious that a person who, for instance, is never able 
to work increases the burden. On the other hand, there are programmes and legislation 
that try to enable persons with handicaps to function like other people, be employed and 
become self-sufficient. The recent trend to close massive institutions and integrate the 
disabled into society probably decreases the economic burden on society also.
An intellectually disabled child always brings about a crisis in a family, but the impact 
is not entirely negative. There are both families that have been weakened and families 
that report to have been enriched by the presence of a disabled child.
Anyone who has had some contact with intellectually disabled people can relate 
anecdotes about happy and social individuals with ID whose quality of life is obviously 
high, or, on the other hand, they know of intellectually disabled individuals with severe 
physical handicaps who seem to suffer greatly through much of their lives. It should, 
however, be recognised that the experience of persons with ID may be very different 
from that of the people who know them. The few studies that have been done on the 
quality of life of intellectually disabled people provide mixed evidence, and it is not 
clear whether the ones who are unhappy feel bad because they are disabled or because 
they have been poorly cared for (Rose-Ackerman 1982).
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5.3. Attitudes towards intellectual disability
It is often useful to take a brief look at history to obtain a wider view of a phenomenon. 
Since attitudes towards ID have varied greatly, I shall give a short overview of them in 
both Western societies and some other cultures.
In ancient Rome and Greece, the intellectually disabled were treated as objects of 
scorn and persecution. Early Christianity brought some pity for the intellectually 
disabled as St. Paul had asked to ‘comfort the feeble-minded’. In medieval times they 
served as fools or jesters or were regarded as ‘les enfants du Bon Dieu’, who were 
wandering about the streets of Europe (Rosen et al. 1976). An abnormal child could also 
be thought to be a ‘changeling’, a child of nature demons of semihuman form 
(Boddington and Podpadec 1991). In England, the distinction between the bom fool and 
the lunatic was made for the first time in the 13th century.
Superstition still prevailed during the Reformation when both Luther and Calvin 
regarded the intellectually disabled as ‘filled with Satan’ (Rosen et al. 1976). The 
revitalised interest in education and humanitarianism during the Renaissance may have 
paved the way for the educational movement of the 19th century.
The 19th century brought about many changes, both in the lives of the disabled and 
also in the attitudes of other people. The first special schools were founded both in 
Europe and in the United States and, beginning about 1866, ‘idiocy’ ceased being 
regarded as a unitary and homogeneous condition (ibid.). The changes in the goals of 
those dealing with the intellectually disabled were rapid. First came the desire to ‘make
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the deviant undeviant’ (between 1850 and 1880), then to shelter ‘the deviant from 
society’ (1870 to 1890) and finally to protect ‘society from the deviant’ (1880 to 1900) 
(White and Wolfensberger 1969, cited by Rosen et al. 1976, p.xix).
At the turn of the 20th century attitudes towards the intellectually disabled had 
gradually changed, and such people were often regarded as a menace (Rosen et al.
1976). The popularisation of the works of Darwin and Mendel inspired studies on 
human heredity, which carried an aura of science. Richard Dugdale, for example, 
studied the Juke family over seven generations and found a large number of prostitutes, 
deformed persons, paupers, criminals, and lazy, weak-minded and blind individuals but 
only one case of idiocy (Dugdale 1877, reprinted by Rosen et al. 1976). It is surprising 
how Dugdale's own interpretation of poor environmental conditions leading to 
degeneracy in this family was replaced later by the conclusion that heredity was the 
main factor and that actually half of the family had been feeble-minded.
During the same years the population with ID appeared to be scientifically identifiable 
by the use of standardised intelligence tests that had recently been developed in France. 
An influential American scientist, Henry Goddard, who had translated and popularised 
Binet's work, was convinced that feeblemindedness was hereditary and that the 
intellectual capacity of an individual was irreversible. Goddard described another 
family, the Kallikaks, for whom he identified 480 descendants of a feebleminded girl. 
Only 46 of these were normal, others were feebleminded, illegitimate, sexually immoral, 
alcoholic, epileptic or criminal (Bourguignon 1994).
Goddard and his followers started the eugenics movement, which argued for the 
segregation of the disabled from society, sterilisation as a means of alleviating the
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problem of the spread of feeblemindedness in society, restrictions on the immigration of 
undesirable classes, and marriage restrictions for the feebleminded, the epileptic, the 
criminal and others.
An article by a prominent representative of the eugenics movement, Reverend Karl 
Schwartz illustrates the spirit of it (Schwartz 1908). He began by stating that ‘it is not a 
pessimistic view of life to wish to see a man get out of the world, who is not fit for it, 
and who has little or no chance of ever becoming so’ (ibid., p. 149). By the unfit he did 
not mean only profoundly intellectually and physically handicapped individuals but ‘an 
idle, inefficient and vicious class’ that would ‘sap the strength of the strong’ (ibid., 
p .149).
Schwartz further wrote that ‘abnormal individuals are not only valueless but are 
generally harmful to society; for besides being nonproducers, they absorb the energies 
and the productive power of others. Hence, in the development of a people it becomes 
necessary that the lifetime of these abnormal individuals should be shortened’ (ibid., 
p .150).
The eugenics movement in America never widely adopted this extreme position but, 
for instance, compulsory sterilisation remained a common practice for decades.
In Germany, however, the direct medical killing of defective individuals who would 
harm the volk was proposed in the 1920's and became the practice a decade later. 
Falsified medical records were kept to create the impression that doctors sought to cure 
rather than kill defective children (Bourguignon 1994). The age of the children involved 
gradually moved upwards and also individuals with minor impairments, juvenile 
delinquents and eventually Jews were drawn into the euthanasia project.
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The eugenics movement gradually lost its scientific backing during the first decades of 
the 20th century as intelligence research began to show that intelligence is modifiable 
(Skeels and Dye 1939), and increasing knowledge showed that not all the causes behind 
ID were genetic (Rosen et al. 1976).
Major changes in the attitudes towards the intellectually disabled occurred during 
World War II. Manpower needs were severe and mildly disabled men were released 
from institutions for the armed forces or defence work in factories. The success of these 
men was one starting point for the de-institutionalisation movement of later decades 
(ibid.).
The development in the attitudes toward intellectually disabled people after the war 
has been described in terms of the ‘normalisation’ principle. Normalisation means that 
the living environment of the disabled should resemble that of the non-disabled as much 
as possible and that they should have as independent a life as possible. De­
institutionalisation has taken place as a sign of this normalisation.
5.4. Labelling
A 10-year-old boy was admitted to a child psychiatric ward after a suicide attempt.
There he was found to be intellectually subnormal although he attended an ordinary 
primary school. He was an adopted child of parents in high academic positions who 
apparently had expected their only child to do well in school, and this expectation had 
caused frustration which gradually grew unbearable and led to the suicide attempt.
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Would this have happened if the intellectual subnormality of the child had been noticed 
earlier (i.e., is it possible that labelling the boy as intellectually subnormal would have 
given him and his family some advantage)? In general, is there any advantage for an 
individual, for the family or for society in having someone decide that the individual 
meets certain criteria for ID?
A label can be seen as ‘a verbal or linguistic device that, in its most fundamental 
terms, creates and sustains a world’ (McCullough 1984). At the same time, as the 
individual gains a world, he or she, also loses a world (i.e., the world of the rest of us). 
The world gained through the label ID means entitlement to special treatment and 
education aimed at helping the person in question overcome or ameliorate difficulties in 
private and social life. The world lost means losing full moral worth as a bearer 
of rights and responsibilities.
Labelling individuals as intellectually disabled can be justified for the following three 
reasons: the benefit to the person, the benefit to society and the benefit of maintaining 
the integrity of observation and description (Kopelman 1984). Whatever the justification 
for labelling a person as intellectually disabled, something is also always lost. To be 
recognised as intellectually disabled may mean that one is endowed with a ‘master 
status’, which becomes a central characteristic of the individual (Kurtz 1977).
As an example of a benefit to society Kopelman mentions people who are not 
entitled to drive a car because they cannot understand road signs. She calls for a heavy 
burden of proof to demonstrate this kind of justification for labelling people. The third 
justification for labelling, maintaining the integrity of observation and description,
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cannot function alone; there cannot be a situation in which labelling a person as 
intellectually disabled would not benefit him or her or society but still would be 
important for research, for example.
Must the world gained, special education, special treatment and the like always be 
purchased at the price of a world lost or diminished moral status? Probably something is 
always lost, but the loss may not be a universal loss of rights since the two worlds are 
not necessarily logically connected (McCullough 1984). If we take a case-by-case view, 
instead of looking at the disabled as a class, it may be possible to balance the loss of 
rights so that it is individually tailored to meet the specific situations that will be faced in 
| life.
5.5. General strategies for the prevention of intellectual disability
On the basis of the preceding discussion, it is obvious that there are two very different
i
i  approaches to the issue of preventing ID. The first concentrates on the individual level,I
and the idea is to find strategies to eliminate the causes leading to the excess number of
1
persons at the lower end of the IQ distribution. The second tries to influence the 
environment so that a person with subnormal intellectual functioning can better adapt to 
society and would thus not be intellectually disabled in the sense of the AAMR 
definition. Table 5.1 lists some examples of the former approach.
i
I
[
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The issue of prevention can also be considered in terms of theoretical or practical 
possibilities. Theoretically a large proportion of severe ID (with an organic background) 
can be prevented. On the other hand, practical possibilities are limited.
In cases in which the aetiology of ID is entirely genetic, it would theoretically be 
possible to eliminate the entire category if a complete genetic map of the foetus were 
available
Table 5.1. Examples of strategies for prevention
Aetiology Examples
1 .Pre-conceptional
1.1 .Chromosomal causes 
1.3.Other genetic causes
2.Prenatal
2.1 .Malformations of the 
central nervous system
2.2.Malformation syndromes
2.3.Environmental causes
3.Perinatal
3.1.Intrauterine disorders
3.2.Neonatal disorders
4.Postnatal
4.1.Head injuries 
4.2.Infections
Prenatal screening (e.g., for Down syndrome) 
Newborn screening (e.g., for phenylketonuria)
Folate therapy during pregnancy, ultrasound 
screening
Health education (e.g., about alcohol, drugs and 
radiation during pregnancy)
Optimal prenatal and obstetric care 
Optimal neonatal care
Health education (e.g., cycling helmets) 
Vaccinations, health education, optimal care
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and all foetuses with defective genes were aborted. Even scientifically, however, such 
actions are not possible in the foreseeable future, and the practical possibilities for 
eliminating genetically determined ID are limited.
Table 5.2. Theoretical and practical possibilities for preventing intellectual disability. 
+++ refers to complete or nearly complete, ++ to great and + to limited preventability
Aetiology of ID Theoretical Practical
possibilities possibilities
1 .Pre-conceptional causes +++ +
2.Prenatal
2.1.Malformations of the central
nervous system ++ +
2.2.Malformation syndromes ++ +
2.3.Environmental causes ++ +
3.Perinatal
3.1.Intrauterine disorders ++ +
3.2.Neonatal disorders ++ +
4.Postnatal
4.1.Head injuries ++ +
4.2.Infections ++ +
4.3.Psychosocial causes +
5.Unknown causes ++ +
Theoretically, it is possible to eliminate obstetrical, neonatal and paediatric 
complications leading to ID, but, again, the practical possibilities are limited. In fact, 
neonatological developments may also increase the number of intellectually disabled 
persons in the category of very-low-birthweight babies.
The development in medical diagnostics has decreased the number of cases in which 
the aetiology is unknown. Even today, however, there are many individuals whose ID
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probably has some somatic, but so far unknown, background. It can be expected that this 
category will become smaller but that it cannot be eliminated totally.
A summary of the theoretical and practical possibilities of preventing ID is presented 
in Table 5.2.
5.6. Ethical problems in the prevention of intellectual disability: introduction
The two different approaches mentioned in the previous chapter for the prevention of ID 
should be kept in mind also when ethical problems are considered. At the practical level, 
however, these strategies overlap. Actions taken towards an environment in which 
persons with subnormal intellectual functioning can better adapt to society can be 
considered primary prevention for ID in the group of the minus variants (see Chapter 2), 
but it can also be considered secondary prevention in the group of intellectually disabled 
people with organic brain damage.
The variety of strategies used in the prevention of ID is great. It is obvious that also 
the range of ethical issues involved is large, from problems related to the individuals 
concerned to problems at the level of society as a whole. Technically, there is great 
variation, too, some strategies being extremely complex and others being relatively 
simple. An example of a preventive strategy that is non-problematic both technically and 
ethically is the addition of iodine to salt in certain geographic areas to prevent 
hypothyreosis. A good example of a strategy that is highly problematic both technically 
and ethically is serum screening to prevent Down syndrome. The prevention of FAS is
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an example of prevention that is biologically simple (do not use alcohol during 
pregnancy) but ethically complex.
In the following discussion I briefly describe the ethical problems that arise in the 
process of prevention. They are also summarised in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3. Outline of ethical problems in the prevention of intellectual disability in 
various aetiological subgroups
1 .Pre-conceptional causes
-access to prenatal diagnosis 
-individual or societal level of prevention 
-directive or non-directive counselling
2.Prenatal causes
-autonomy in antenatal care (e.g., foetal alcohol syndrome) 
-ethical problems related to ultrasound screening
3. Perinatal causes
-malformed newborn: quality of life; who decides 
-newborn with brain damage: quality of life; who decides
4 .Postnatal causes
-large prevention programs (e.g., vaccinations)
-parental refusal of therapy
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5.6.1. Pre-conceptional causes
Prenatal diagnostics are available today for many genetically determined diseases and 
conditions, also those leading to ID. Depending on the system of health care, prenatal 
services are offered either publicly or privately. In many countries both the private and 
public sectors of health care perform these diagnostics.
Another question with respect to prenatal diagnostics is the focus of the action itself. 
When worries about eugenics are expressed in this context, the activity is defended on 
the grounds that it is the women themselves and the families who are of primary 
concern, not society in general. Thus the primary aim would not be to prevent ID in 
general, but to help women and families to make an informed decision concerning 
! reproduction. The situation is not so clear, however, since trends toward seeing the 
prevention at the societal level as the primary aim also exist. The question is currently
i
highly relevant with respect to screening for Down syndrome, and I deal with this 
question in detail in Chapter 6. 
j The nature of genetic counselling is also relevant here. It is obvious that counselling 
I can never be value neutral, but whether value neutrality should be the aim still remains
I
a question. This is a general issue relevant to all genetic counselling and also counselling 
for conditions originating later in the pre-, peri- or postnatal period.
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5.6.2. Prenatal causes
FAS has been mentioned as an example of a prenatal cause leading to ID. From a purely 
biological point of view its prevention would be very simple (‘do not drink alcohol 
during pregnancy’) but developing practices in antenatal care to prevent FAS has proved 
extremely challenging and also ethically problematic. The main ethical issue is about the 
autonomy of the pregnant woman and the possible paternalism of the health care 
personnel involved.
It is sometimes not possible to define the timing of the accident leading to brain 
damage and further to ID. Second-trimester ultrasound screening can detect such brain 
damage in many cases and is in practice in many countries. It is obvious that serious 
ethical problems are involved also in the implementation of ultrasound screening.
5.6.3. Perinatal causes
If prenatal ultrasound screening has not been performed, or sometimes even in spite of 
it, a malformation may be diagnosed only after birth. Serious brain damage may also be 
the result of difficulties during the perinatal period itself. In both cases parents and 
health care personnel have to face serious ethical issues like who should decide about 
the possible withdrawal of life support or whose quality of life is at stake.
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5.6.4. Postnatal causes
As shown in the previous chapters, only a minor part of ID with an organic background 
originates after the perinatal period. The major causes during this period are various 
diseases and accidents leading to brain damage. Some of these diseases (like meningitis 
caused by Meningococcus or Haemophilus influenzae type B) can be prevented by 
vaccinations, and parental refusal of such vaccinations may be the ultimate cause of ID 
in the individual. Similarly, for religious or other reasons, parents may deny their child 
therapy for such a disease and thus put him or her at risk of death or permanent injury.
5.7. Concluding remarks
The prevention of ID can take place at many levels, and only some of these levels 
involve medical activities. Primary prevention is sometimes possible, but secondary or 
tertiary prevention is no less important. All forms of prevention may be ethically and 
technically simple or complex. Even the question ‘why should ID be prevented’ does not 
have a simple answer.
In the following chapters, I focus on ethical issues that arise in the context of the 
prevention of ID due to pre-conceptional causes. Ethical issues arising with respect to 
the other groups are, however, often similar. Parental autonomy and the roles of society 
and the medical community are examples of such questions.
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6. Prenatal diagnosis and screening
During the past four decades several techniques have been developed to enable 
physicians and geneticists to estimate the risk for certain diseases, syndromes and 
conditions or to set the exact diagnosis already during the foetal period. On the other 
hand, effective possibilities for curing or preventing these conditions have not been 
developed as rapidly. In fact, only foetal transfusions to manage, for example, serious 
blood group incompatibility can be considered routine treatment. Other forms of foetal 
therapy are still experimental.
One of the justifications for developing these new techniques has been that, in the 
future, it would be possible to treat conditions that we first learn to assess. One of the 
major rationalisations given to the human genome project has been that the 
characterisation of the human genome would lead to therapeutic innovations.
Prenatal investigations can be in the form of either screening or diagnostics. These 
terms are not used consistently, and they overlap, but in general the results of screening 
may be the demonstration of an increased risk for a certain condition (like Down 
syndrome or neural tube defect) or a definitive diagnosis. In a diagnostic procedure a 
definitive diagnosis is obtained or excluded, within the limits of uncertainty allowed by 
the chosen method. While, in the health care context in general, people come to ask for 
help, screening investigations are offered to people without any symptoms. An example 
of a test that can perform both a screening and a diagnostic function is ultrasonography.
In screening ‘a population group is examined with the aim of mapping the occurrence 
of a particular trait; in some cases, this includes tracing those people who have the trait
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concerned’ (The Danish Council of Ethics 1993, p.47). Health screening has its origins 
in the 19th century ideas about regular precautionary medical examinations for adults. 
Early in the 20th century an analogy with the regular check-ups needed for automobiles 
was presented (Nelkin and Tancredi 1995). Interest in preventive medicine declined in 
the 1920’s and 1930’s but increased again after the Second World War (ibid.).
Genetic screening in general means the study of the occurrence of persons with a 
specific gene or chromosome composition in a population (The Danish Council of 
Ethics 1993). The first widespread screening test was for the detection of PKU in 
newborns. Untreated PKU leads to intellectual disability, but, with a modified diet from 
birth on, normal intellectual development can be accomplished.
In the guidelines of WHO, the following requirements have been given for screening 
programme (ibid., p.68):
1. The disease must constitute a major health problem.
2. There must be an accepted treatment for patients diagnosed as having 
the disease.
3. Diagnostic and therapeutic facilities must be available.
4. The disease must be demonstrable in a latent or early symptomatic 
stage.
5. A suitable test or examination method must be available.
6. The test/examination method must be acceptable to the population.
7. The progress of the disease in untreated cases - including 
development form latent to manifest phases - must have been 
adequately clarified.
8. The treatment indications must be clearly defined.
9. The cost of detecting the disease (including diagnosis and treatment 
of patients) must be in reasonable proportion to the health service’s 
total expenditure.
10. The screening action must be an ongoing process, not an on-off 
phenomenon.
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It is easy to note that prenatal screening meets questionably some of these 
requirements. If the pregnant woman is considered the patient, then the ‘treatment’ in 
most cases would be abortion. If, on the other hand, the foetus is the patient, the 
treatment would, in most cases, mean killing the patient. The preceding list was 
obviously created with diseases like breast cancer or prostate cancer in mind.
These reservations have been taken into consideration in the report of the Dutch 
Health Council on genetic screening (Hoedemaekers 1998). It does not, for example, 
explicitly require that acceptable treatment must be available. Instead, it proposes that 
meaningful options must be available for the persons screened. Noteworthy also is the 
fact that the Dutch report no longer requires that the condition screened be serious.
In the following discussion the term prenatal diagnosis refers to procedures in which a 
definitive diagnosis for the foetus can be obtained or excluded prenatally, and prenatal 
screening concerns procedures that provide risk estimates for certain foetal conditions.
6.1. History
The widespread use of prenatal diagnosis is a recent phenomenon, but its history is 
longer than usually thought, dating back to the 1950’s.5 It seems not to be a product of 
deliberate research and development, but rather a side-product of basic medical research 
(Munthe 1996).
5 The following sketch of the history of prenatal diagnosis is based on Cowan 1994
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Separate groups of scientists in three countries discovered simultaneously that the sex 
of human foetuses could be predicted by analysing cells from the amniotic fluid. The 
first reported abortion after prenatal diagnosis through amniocentesis was performed in 
I960.6 The mother was a carrier of haemophilia, and the foetus was male, thus a possible 
haemophiliac had it been bom. The first abortions due to the chromosomal diagnosis of 
Down syndrome were performed in 1968.
The first invasive technique used in prenatal diagnosis, amniocentesis, was still in a 
developmental phase and was applied narrowly in the early 1970’s, but some non­
medical events that took place at that time formed the grounds for the diffusion phase of 
that technology.
Firstly, in the United States, several lawsuits were settled in which parents of disabled 
children sued for malpractice when an obstetrician had not referred a woman over the 
age of 35 years for amniocentesis. Because of the success of these lawsuits, the 
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Academy of 
| Pediatrics advised their members to offer prenatal diagnostic services or referrals forj
prenatal diagnosis to avoid the risk of being taken to court (Cowan 1994).
Secondly, the diffusion of amniocentesis could not have taken place without the 
simultaneous reformation of abortion laws in many countries (e.g., the United States, 
Canada and Great Britain) (ibid.). It has even been argued that legalised abortion was the 
prerequisite for the development of prenatal diagnosis (Reid 1991). The changes in 
social values in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s occurred, however, simultaneously with 
| the advent of amniocentesis, and it is not easy to determine the impact of one on the 
other (ibid.).
6 A diagnosis of a disease was not set, only the sex of the fetus was determined
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The development in genetics has already had a great impact on diagnostics, screening 
and counselling. Its impact on prevention has so far been based only on abortions that 
have been performed after diagnostic procedures and practically no therapeutic forms of 
intervention have become available. There still remains a serious gap between disease 
characterisation and treatment (Friedmann 1990).
The total effect of prenatal screening and diagnosis on the occurrence of the conditions 
searched for is difficult to estimate because of the fluctuation of the prevalences. In 
some cases, like Down syndrome, changes in the maternal-age profile cause changes in 
the prevalence. It is, however, obvious that the total effect of prenatal screening and 
diagnosis on the population level is small. For example, the history of the settlement of 
an area, immigration and family size are factors that have far greater effect on the 
genetic structure of a population than prenatal diagnosis, even when taken to an extreme 
(Simola 1995).
6.2. Methods
Amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling are the most widely used invasive 
techniques in prenatal diagnosis. The former is usually performed at 15 to 16 weeks of 
gestation. About 20 ml of amniotic fluid is aspirated from the uterus, after location of 
the placenta by ultrasonography. Results are obtained within 1 to 4 weeks, depending on 
the nature of the test. The risk of miscarriage associated with amniocentesis is 0.5 % to 
1.0 % (Kingston 1994, D ’Alton and DeChemey 1993).
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In chorionic villus sampling, foetally derived chorionic villus material is obtained 
transcervically with a flexible catheter between 9 and 12 weeks’ gestation. The sampling 
is also performed under ultrasonographic guidance. The procedure increases the risk for 
miscarriage slightly more than amniocentesis, but the experience of the operator may be 
crucial for the outcome (D’Alton and DeChemey 1993). In the early 1990s a serious 
side effect, absent or defective limbs of the newborn, was reported after the procedure 
(D’Alton and DeChemey 1993). The association is not, however, clear, and a recent 
registry-based analysis could not confirm the association (Froster and Jackson 1996).
A rarer invasive technique is foetoscopy, which is performed during the second 
trimester in cases in which the foetus must be seen directly to identify dysmorphic 
features or to obtain foetal samples (Kingston 1994).
A non-invasive method of prenatal diagnosis is ultrasonography, which in its original 
one-dimensional mode enabled the diagnosis of hydrocephalus in the 1970s. The 
technique has developed rapidly, and today the detection of, for example, clefts of the 
lip and palate, as well as structural abnormalities of the brain and heart, is possible 
(ibid.).
In the future it may also be possible to ascertain the karyotype of the foetus non- 
invasively by analysing foetal cells in maternal blood (Bianchi 1995).
Since late abortion is usually considered worse (more dangerous and also morally 
more questionable) than early abortion, early prenatal diagnosis is preferred. Modem 
medicine also offers a way in which to use prenatal diagnosis to ‘avoid’ termination. A 
case has been described in which in vitro fertilisation, gamete intrafallopian transfer and 
chorionic villus sampling were used for a couple who were carriers of beta-thalassaemia
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(Brambati et al. 1990). A quadruplet pregnancy resulted, and two of the foetuses were 
‘reduced’ after chorionic villus sampling. The authors describe their method as a way to 
avoid termination, but I do not see anything but a technical difference between ordinary 
termination and ‘reduction’ in a multiple pregnancy.
6.3. Indications
Indications for prenatal diagnostic procedures can be divided into the following three 
! classes: general, specific and ethnic risk factors.
General risk factors include advanced maternal age7 and demonstrated risks for certain
i o
abnormalities in a screening test. Specific risk factors are identified in the family 
history, the history of previous pregnancies or the mother’s medical history (D’Alton 
and DeChemey 1993). Ethnic risk factors refer to the fact that, in certain populations,
| the frequencies of some recessive genes are so high that screening for the carrier status 
directly or indirectly is considered justified. Today, the great majority of investigations
I
! are directed towards families in which the risk factor is general and thus first defined in 
| statistical terms (Simola 1995).
Many prenatal diagnostic evaluations end up confirming that the foetus does not have 
the condition searched for (e.g., in the Nordic countries amniocentesis and chorionic
[
villus biopsy lead to selective abortion in only 1.5-3.8 % of cases (Brondum-Nielsen and 
| Norgaard -Pedersen 1993).
[ 7 Being over 34 years of age at the time of delivery increases the risk for numerical chromosomal abnormalities
8 Like elevated or reduced serum alpha-fetoprotein concentrations
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Foetal sex determination without a history of sex-linked disease in the family may be 
the major indication for prenatal procedures in some parts of the world. For example, in 
India, ultrasonography or amniocentesis for that purpose is illegal, even though it is still 
common practice. The strong cultural pressure to have sons is alive and leads to 
abortions of female foetuses (Booth et al. 1994). A majority of geneticists in the United 
States also said in a survey in 1987 that they would perform prenatal diagnosis for sex 
selection. They justify their view by referring to women’s autonomy, while their Indian 
colleagues mention social pressures to limit the population and the expected harm to 
unwanted girls (Boss 1993).
6.4. Consent for prenatal diagnosis
As with any medical examinations or research, consent is nowadays considered an 
essential prerequisite also for prenatal investigations. The issue is not, however, as one­
dimensional as sometimes presented.
Consent can be defined as ‘the granting to someone the permission to do something he 
would not have the right to do without such permission’ (Downie and Caiman 1994, 
p.245). In various contexts adjectives like ‘informed’, ‘competent’ or ‘implied’ are often 
associated with it.
Informed consent is the term used most often in health care, in both research and 
clinical settings. It is problematic, for example, in the sense that a layman’s consent can 
hardly ever be ‘fully’ informed in the same way as that of the person responsible for the
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investigation or research. Also relevant is the question of side effects: how ‘fully’ are 
these to be described?
Competent consent refers to the ability of the patient or subject to understand the 
information given. The issue is two-sided in that it is not only a question of the mental 
capacity of the receiver of the information, but also very much an issue involving the 
quality of the information given.
Implied consent refers to the assumption that the person has given consent by coming 
to the doctor and asking for help or advice. Certainly people consent to something by 
making an appointment, but their views on what they consent to may differ from those 
of health care personnel.
Empirical research has pointed out some problems related to consent in prenatal 
examinations. Even though prenatal testing is experienced as voluntary, women report 
that it is difficult to decline such testing when it is offered (Sjogren and Uddenberg 
1988), or it is experienced as a routine or self-evident act. A Finnish study showed, for 
example, that only one-fourth of the women taking part in serum screening described 
actively deciding about their participation (Santalahti et al. 1998). In the same study 35 
out of 91 women suggested, as an improvement, that screenees should receive more 
information, primarily about the conditions the screening can reveal and secondarily 
about the technical characteristics of the test. The authors noted also that, since public 
health nurses and hospital personnel were aware of the ongoing study, they may have
i
paid special attention to the issues of consent and adequate information, and thus the 
| results may have given a better picture than actually existed before the study.9
I
i _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
I Q
[ This is an example of how even the research process can influence practice. It also demonstrates the
I difficulties in obtaining a picture of what really happens in practice.
In a British study, routine consultations between midwives, obstetricians and pregnant 
women were tape-recorded and the way alpha-fetoprotein screening was presented was 
analysed (Marteau et al. 1992b). The results showed that, in general, little information 
was provided about the test, the conditions screened for and the meaning of either a 
negative or positive test. It was also found that the screening was very often presented in 
such a way as to encourage women to undergo the test.
It has also been shown that the level of knowledge of the women who have been given 
information before being screened for Down syndrome is poor and concentrates on 
practical aspects of the test (Smith et al. 1994). For example, only one-third of the 
women had correct knowledge about such claims as ‘Most women with positive results 
have normal babies’ and ‘Negative results do not guarantee that everything is all right 
with the baby’ (both true).
Consent was not even sought in a study screening for haemoglobinopathies in 
pregnant women in Rochester, New York (Rowley et al. 1989). The authors justified 
their decision in the following way: ‘Consent for screening was not routinely sought; 
providers agreed that obtaining truly informed refusal required counselling approaching 
that to be provided to identified carriers and many providers might have declined to 
participate if they had had to obtain it’. Altogether 18 907 pregnancies were screened 
during the study period and 810 (4.3 %) were positive. Of these 551 (68 %) came for 
counselling and the partner was tested in 315 (57 %) cases. A prenatal diagnosis was 
offered to 53 persons and accepted by 25. Thus many of the testees never knew they had 
been tested, one-third of those who tested positive did not come for counselling, and in 
slightly more than half of the cases the partner was tested. Yet the authors concluded
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that ‘these data indicate that women identified as hemoglobinopathy carriers during 
pregnancy accept and use genetic information’ (Rowley et al. 1989, p. 157).
6.5. The reproductive autonomy model
The objectives of prenatal diagnosis and screening have been expressed in many ways, 
and it is possible to distinguish three different models or views on the primary objectives 
of these activities.
The first model can be called the patient welfare model due to its emphasis on 
maternal and foetal welfare. It has been argued that the ‘primary purpose of prenatal 
diagnosis is the continuation of normal and wanted pregnancies in which the welfare of 
both mother and foetus is the prime consideration’ (Campbell 1984, p. 1634). [What 
Campbell actually has in mind here, is, however, probably prenatal screening, not 
diagnosis]. While maternal and foetal welfare are good goals, they are not, however, 
necessarily the reason for prenatal screening. Another example of screening in health 
care reveals the problematic nature of the patient welfare model. According to the logic 
of the model, the purpose of, for example, mammographic screening would be the 
continuation and welfare of the lives of women who screen negative. However, the 
actual purpose of mammography screening is to discover and destroy early cancer.
By analogy, the purpose of prenatal screening would be to discover and destroy 
defective foetuses. Both cancer and the defective foetus are treated as something equally 
undesirable. And, further, if we accept Campbell’s formulation, should we not engage in
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lots of screening activities to reassure people that they do not have this or that disease or 
condition? The theme of reassurance recurs later in the context of autonomy, but so far 
this formulation of the objective of prenatal diagnosis can be considered vague. At least 
the welfare of foetuses cannot be the primary purpose of prenatal screening since the 
foetuses for whom the whole system was established will probably lose their lives.
The second model has been named the public health model (Lippman 1994), and it 
sees prenatal screening and diagnosis as a means of reducing the frequency of selected 
birth defects and thus improving public health. The model has been powerful, and it is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter.
The third model is the reproductive autonomy model (ibid.), which concentrates on the 
individual level and sees prenatal diagnosis mainly as a means to give women 
information to aid them in their reproductive choices.
The reproductive autonomy model can be considered a widely accepted standard in 
prenatal diagnosis and screening today, and several guidelines on both sides of the 
Atlantic have emphasised it. For example, American guidelines from 1979 for the 
ethical, social and legal issues of prenatal diagnosis, aim at helping workers in this area 
to ‘provide the most favorable circumstances for thoughtful, informed, morally 
responsible decision making by parents’ (Powledge and Fletcher 1979, p. 169). The 
guidelines ‘were developed in a moral framework favouring the protection of individual 
choice and the autonomy of parents’ (ibid., p. 171). A recent American report states 
explicitly that ‘in a society such as ours, autonomy far outweighs any public health 
considerations’ (cited by Marteau 1995, p. 1216). The Encyclopedia o f Bioethics 
emphasises that ‘prenatal diagnosis is for the purpose of providing information to
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couples about what they can expect’ (Evans et al. 1995, p.989). In Great Britain the 
Royal College of Physicians has listed the following four objectives for prenatal 
diagnostic services:
• to allow the widest possible range of informed choice to women 
and couples at risk of having children with an abnormality;
• to provide reassurance and reduce the level of anxiety associated 
with reproduction;
• to allow couples at risk to embark on having a family knowing that 
they may avoid the birth of seriously affected children through 
selective abortion;
• to ensure optimal treatment of affected infants through early 
diagnosis
(cited by Marteau 1995, p. 1216)
The general issue of autonomy is, of course, far too large to be dealt with in detail 
here, but a few things are worth mentioning. Firstly, the heavy emphasis on the principle 
of autonomy in modem bioethics is of American origin and has its roots in the Anglo- 
American law tradition that gives priority to individual over societal rights (Boss 1993). 
From a European, African or Asian perspective the picture of autonomy may look quite 
different.
While in Great Britain and northern Europe autonomy has been ranked almost as high 
as in the United States, southern European bioethics stresses different things. Patients in 
these countries are generally less concerned with their autonomy than with finding a 
doctor whom they can fully trust (Gracia 1993).
The systems of thought in many parts of the world favour collective rather than 
individual thinking, and this preference is reflected in decision-making. An example is a 
young rural woman in South Africa who, after childbirth, developed paralysis of the
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lower limbs and could not accept a lift to hospital because she had not consulted her 
mother (Qureshi 1997). In Japan, the family as a unit is preferred to the individual, and, 
for example, the diagnosis of cancer is revealed first to the family, which then decides 
whether the patient is told or not (Ohara 1997).
Secondly, emphasising parental autonomy in reproductive decisions may very strongly 
obscure other important issues. Concerning selective abortion, Boss (1993, p. 12) 
remarked that ‘the discussion ... has more often centered around who should decide, 
with the final decision generally resting with the mother, rather than the more basic 
question of whether the decision should be made at all and, if so, under what conditions 
or within what limitations’. Strong emphasis on autonomy may even lead to a more 
unstable policy concerning indications for prenatal diagnosis. Goodey (1997, p.207) 
believes that ‘ “informed choice” is really a way of dumping on individual parents the 
moral responsibility for choices already made by the wider society, and perhaps the 
burden of challenging those choices’.
The reproductive autonomy model has been formulated in various ways with different 
emphases, and below I examine it in the form of the following claims: 1) prenatal 
diagnosis is a response to the request of pregnant women, 2) prenatal diagnosis provides 
reassurance of the health of the foetus to anxious parents, and 3) prenatal diagnosis 
enhances the control women have over their reproduction.
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6.5.1. Response to a request
A central justification for the widespread offering of prenatal screening and diagnosis 
is that these methods are considered responses to the request of pregnant women. The 
exact opposite, however, has been suggested also (i.e., that the availability of prenatal 
screening and diagnosis has created the requests). There is, in fact, some empirical 
evidence to support the latter view. Press and Browner (1997) examined the spreading of 
the maternal serum alpha fetoprotein (MSAFP) test in California and concluded that 
institutional and professional support for testing has yielded high rates of patient test 
acceptance. In California it is mandatory to offer MSAFP testing for every pregnant 
woman, and this practice has been interpreted to mean that it is standard care (ibid.). The 
authors demonstrated also how the connection between abortion and MSAFP was absent 
when the test was described by the providers to the patients. Thus the ‘very ethical 
issues of prenatal activity become obscured in the processes by which this screening test 
becomes accepted as routine’ (ibid., p.979).
A European study on the diffusion of four prenatal screening tests across Europe 
concluded more carefully that the ‘demand for the test from individual consumers has 
always been said to be high, although the influence of the consumer is often difficult to 
document, and in the country reports must be derived from anecdotal comments’ (Reid 
1991, p.41). According to the report, the diffusion of the tests is affected by the 
following three significant common factors: the importance of religion, the dependence 
on physicians’ and consumers’ knowledge and attitudes, and the degree of control 
exercised by governments over the development of the service.
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The manner in which a test is offered to women may influence significantly its uptake. 
Only 10 % uptake was reached when a carrier test for cystic fibrosis was offered in 
writing, but the uptake rose to 87 % when the test was offered verbally with enthusiasm 
(Watson et al. 1991). In an article on informed consent and the screening for Duchenne 
muscular dystrophy (Parsons and Bradley 1994, p. 105) the authors speculated the 
following scenarios, where the offer for the test could be framed very differently:
• You want all the tests don’t you?
• You don’t want the Duchenne test do you?
• You do want the new Duchenne test don’t you?
• Have you thought about the new test? What have you decided to do?
Prenatal testing is usually offered by experts whose attitudes apparently have greatly 
affected the willingness of pregnant women’s requests. In a study by Marteau et al. 
(1991) it was found that the willingness to have amniocentesis was associated with a less 
negative attitude towards the termination of an affected baby and a higher perceived risk 
of the foetus being abnormal, but not with actual age-related risks. There was no 
significant relation between the actual and perceived risk for abnormality.
The way the concept of risk is dealt with is interesting. The 35th birthday has become 
a turning point at which the pregnant woman becomes a risk case. At that age the risk 
for Down syndrome is 1/385, and for a chromosomal abnormality in general it is 1/202. 
Five years later it is 1/106 and 1/65, respectively (D’Alton and DeChemey 1993). 
Women who are 35 years old or older are considered as ‘high risk’ in this context. 
However, amniocentesis, which carries a risk between 1/100 and 1/200 for spontaneous 
abortion, is considered a ‘safe’ procedure (Kingston 1994). When professionals talk
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about risks in this way, it is not surprising that no significant relation exists between 
actual risk and perceived risk in the thinking of pregnant women.
Risk figures can also be experienced very differently. Firstly, even the formal way a 
risk figure is presented influences its interpretation. According to a study in which risk 
figures unrelated to genetic risk were presented to undergraduate psychology students, 
the percentages tended to be chosen as having greater magnitude than their equivalent 
proportions (Kessler and Levine 1987). In another study, respondents were asked to 
grade given risk percentages into the following four classes: high, moderate or low risk 
or cannot say (Somer et al. 1988). A risk of less than 1 % was graded as high by 6 % and 
low by 68 % of the respondents. At the other extreme a risk of 50 % was graded as high 
by 39 %, moderate by 52 % and low by 3 % of the respondents. It is worth noting that 
there was no difference in risk perception with respect to the general education of the 
respondents.
Furthermore, the whole risk estimate, which is so central in the scientific part of the 
genetic counselling process, may have little meaning for the prospective mother or 
parents. For them there are only two outcomes: they will or will not have a defective 
child.
The issue of risk raises also the issue of paternalism: whose conception of the risk 
level is the ‘right’ one? Bosk (1992, p.47) described a postclinic conference at a centre 
providing genetic counselling services and cited a medical doctor as follows: ‘There are 
three different situations to worry about. Cases where parents accept a very high risk, 
cases where they deny there is any risk at all, and cases where they can’t get the
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meaning of the risk clear in their own minds’. When is a risk ‘very high’, and when can 
it be said that the meaning of a risk is clear in one’s mind?
A request for prenatal diagnosis and subsequent termination of pregnancy may be the 
result of external pressures on the woman or couple. If they feel that they can take care 
of the handicapped child but cannot trust society to do so after they are gone, the choice 
may be termination against their own wishes. According to Clarke (1990), the provision 
of prenatal diagnostic services for a particular condition may itself create a pressure to 
terminate an affected pregnancy: why else would there be such testing?
Commercial issues may also influence the uptake of prenatal diagnosis in countries 
where the private sector takes care of these activities. On a video presenting a prenatal 
diagnosis centre the narrator states:
you are pregnant, and like most pregnant women, you are wondering:
“will my baby be bom healthy and normal?”. If your HEALTH care 
provider has told you that you are at INCREASED risk of having a child 
with a serious birth defect, prenatal diagnosis may offer you an answer
to this question Whether or not you decide to have a prenatal
diagnosis, is up to you, but whatEVER your choice, try to keep in mind 
that most babies are bom perfectly healthy.10
This kind of rhetoric, which resembles that of commercial television, is further evidence 
to support the view that the availability of tests creates requests for prenatal screening 
and diagnosis and not necessarily vice versa.
The eagerness for prenatal diagnosis may also be viewed from the providers’ side, as 
health professionals’ willingness for technological solutions to all kinds of problems 
(Lippman 1994). Examples from other fields of medical technology show that once a
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new method (e.g., computer-assisted tomography) is available, new standards are 
produced concerning what ought to be available. This situation is probably true as well 
with prenatal diagnostic methods, the development of which creates new standards.
Angus Clarke, a geneticist, has expressed his worry about an obvious risk connected to 
prenatal diagnostic services. The feeling of parents when facing the fact that their foetus 
has a serious disorder is sadness, and this feeling is also, in part, shared by the person 
whose task is to break the bad news. However, at the same time, the geneticist may tend 
to have a sense of triumph at the diagnosis and subsequent termination. Clarke warns 
that the true justification of the procedure - the prevention of future suffering (of the 
disabled person or the family) when sought by the families concerned - may be obscured 
(Clarke 1990).
6.5.2. Reassurance
Although it is gross exaggeration to say that reassuring the great majority with normal 
results in prenatal testing would be the primary purpose of the activity, it is worth 
examining the role reassurance may have in the justification of prenatal diagnosis and 
screening.
Firstly, there is evidence that at least chromosomal and alpha-fetoprotein testing are 
reassuring to most women (Gates 1994).
Secondly, however, false positive results outnumber correct positive ones in most tests 
and cause anxiety, which is also well documented (Marteau 1995).
10 Transcribed by Riitta Karki from the documentary The Cyborg Cometh, A Big Table Film Company 
Production for Channel Four Television, presented in Finnish TV1 8 November 1995
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Thirdly, the reassurance of those receiving negative test results may be false, since, 
despite the information given before testing, there is a tendency among women tested to 
think that the test has ruled out more than it actually has.
Fourthly, women or parents often poorly understand the tests they undergo. 
Respondents in a Californian study on alpha-fetoprotein screening justified their 
accepting the test with comments like ‘because I wanted to make sure my baby would be 
the healthiest that it could be’ or ‘I wanted to do anything that could help me or my 
baby’ (Press and Browner 1994, p.213). I assume that the comments did not refer to the 
possibility for advance preparations for neonatal surgery to repair meningomyelocele or 
hydrocephalus. A woman interviewed in a Finnish study commented in a similar way: ‘I 
have the principle that all the tests which are done are done for my and my baby’s best 
interests’ (Santalahti et al. 1998). The test in question was serum screening for Down 
syndrome, and one may question what the woman meant by her ‘baby’s best interests’. I 
guess that she did not have an adequate picture about what she had taken part in but was 
sharing something that has been called ‘collective fiction’, in other words, situating the 
testing within the domain of routine prenatal care and denying its central connection to 
selective abortion and its eugenic implications (Press and Browner 1993).
6.5.3. Who controls prenatal diagnosis?
It is obvious that the introduction of prenatal diagnosis and screening has increased 
possibilities for controlling reproduction. It is, however, far less obvious where this 
control lies. The claim that it lies with pregnant women is only a half-truth.
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The pregnant women - the people whom prenatal diagnosis mainly concerns - have not 
made the decisions about the conditions that are sought for. Individual pregnant women 
do not necessarily draw the line between ‘normal, wanted’ and ‘abnormal, not wanted’ 
in the same way as the medical community does. The latter is also far from uniform in 
its thinking. This has also been demonstrated empirically. In Canada, for example, 
female physicians were more liberal than their male colleagues with regard to access to 
amniocentesis and selective abortion. They also had a less directive relationship with 
their patients. The least and most directive specialities were obstetrics and paediatrics, 
respectively (Bouchard and Renaud 1997).
A grey area between foetuses with normal chromosomes and foetuses with serious 
defects leading to retardation or severe anomalies is the group with sex chromosome 
abnormality. Most of them are compatible with normal life expectancy and actually 
often go undiagnosed. In a comparative study, which was performed in England and in 
Finland, it was found, for example, that a decision to terminate was made more often in 
Finland than in England and also more often when post-amniocentesis counselling was 
given by an obstetrician rather than a geneticist (Holmes-Siedle et al. 1987). The sample 
size in that study was small, but it shows how much cultural and religious factors and 
the counselling process itself influence women’s decisions.
One form of control can also be seen in the way genetic disorders are described. 
Independently of each other, Lippman and Wilfond (1992) observed that, for cystic 
fibrosis and Down syndrome, the information provided to those considering genetic 
testing differs strikingly from that provided to those who have a child with one of these
113
conditions. The overall information was correct in both circumstances, but the before­
birth information was more negative than the after-birth information.
Parental control over reproduction may be seriously limited by economic constraints, 
especially in countries where health care is financed mostly through private insurance 
companies. In a case of a pregnant woman with already one child with cystic fibrosis the 
insurance company, a health maintenance organisation (HMO), agreed to cover prenatal 
testing but not the care of an affected child, who could have been aborted. The foetus 
was found to be affected and the HMO finally agreed to cover the child’s treatment, but 
the initial policy of the HMO shows the limits of the control women themselves have 
over their pregnancies (Gates 1994). To my knowledge, so far there have been no cases 
in which insurance coverage has actually been rejected for a handicapped child whose 
diagnosis was known prenatally but who was not aborted. At least in the United States 
such a case would be highly political and reach high publicity.
The nature of the discourse determines the attitudes towards ‘abnormal’ foetuses. 
Children bom with a disorder are considered ‘failures’ and the births as accidents where 
nature has failed to perform its natural selection, through which most abnormal foetuses 
abort spontaneously (Lippman 1994). The latter theme is common in the justification of 
selective abortion: it is considered the completion of the natural process. (See Chapter 
8.)
In the beginning of the era of prenatal diagnosis there was serious disagreement about 
whether amniocentesis ought to be provided at all to couples who would not undergo 
abortion. Although the ‘official policy’ today states that, after prenatal diagnosis, there is 
total freedom of choice either to continue the pregnancy or to terminate it, practice again
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shows a different picture. Many doctors operate on the assumption that the only purpose 
of prenatal diagnosis is to detect foetuses with major anomalies so that they can be 
aborted (Hill 1986). Women can even be denied the right to diagnostic testing if they are 
not willing to abort in case of disability (Santalahti et al. 1996).
Prenatal diagnosis and screening are examples of new technologies that have raised 
vivid discourse also in the feminist framework. Early feminist writings in the mid- 
1980’s suggested that it was another ‘male takeover’ of female nature (Rapp 1994). No 
single simple feminist answer exists, however, for the question of the role of these new 
technologies in women’s lives. They are potential tools both for liberation and for 
control over women’s lives (ibid.).
6.6. The public health model
Although the reproductive autonomy model has been said to dominate current thinking 
in genetics and medicine in general, contrasting views are expressed more or less openly 
also today. In the public health model either the general health and well-being of the 
population or economic factors are used as justification for prenatal diagnosis and 
screening. In the following discussion, I first examine arguments that have been 
presented to support the public health model. These are 1) the argument referring to 
public health, 2) the economic argument and 3) the ‘medical view’ argument.
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6.6.1. Impact on public health
In the early days of prenatal diagnosis some very strict opinions were expressed in 
which not much room was left for individual autonomy. John Littlefield (1969, p.722) 
wrote an editorial to the New England Journal o f Medicine, in which he promoted the 
recently invented technique to perform prenatal chromosomal diagnosis: ‘Perhaps it 
should be carried out routinely in older pregnant women exposed to an increasing risk of 
delivering a mongoloid infant’. Later he stated that ‘society and the professions must 
appreciate and accept that the proper therapy now is for the family, and at times that 
means abortion’ (ibid., p.723).
An eminent geneticist, Bentley Glass, who was the president of the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science, wrote in 1971 about future man: ‘No 
parents will in that future time have a right to burden society with a malformed or a 
mentally incompetent child. Just as every child must have the right to full educational 
opportunity and a sound nutrition, so every child has the inalienable right to a sound 
heritage’ (Glass 1971, p.28).
A Swedish researcher Lars Svennerholm wrote one year later in a book about mental 
retardation: ‘Nor is it any ethical problem to advise an abortion when a woman carries a 
male foetus with muscular dystrophy or haemophilia, but what about a female foetus 
who is a carrier of this defect? Up to this day, approximately 250 amniocenteses in 
connection with metabolic diseases have been performed. Already, a praxis has been 
formed: in the cases where there has been doubt whether the foetus is a carrier of or 
homozygous for the disease and there has been no time for a new test, a termination has
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been performed. Consequently, rather one abortion too many than the birth of a sick 
child.’11.
These three quotations were from the early days of prenatal testing, but reference to 
public health as a justification of prenatal diagnosis has not disappeared. A report on 
population health outcomes by the Faculty of Public Health Medicine in the United 
Kingdom specifies as the objective of prenatal services to ‘reduce the number of infants 
bom with Down syndrome and neural tube defects’ (cited by Marteau 1995, p. 1216).
The first three views represent overt paternalism, which is commonly rejected in 
current health care settings, at least in the United States, United Kingdom and northern 
Europe. The doctor’s authority over matters other than strictly medical ones is no more 
self-evident.
Paternalism has been defined as ‘the power and authority one person or institution 
exercises over another to confer benefits or prevent harm for the latter regardless of the 
latter’s informed consent’ (Honderich 1995, p.647). Paternalism can be divided into 
categories like soft and hard paternalism (Hayry 1991) or genuine, solicited and 
unsolicited paternalism (Wulff et al. 1986). An example of genuine or soft paternalism is 
a father who prevents his child from playing with matches. An example of solicited 
paternalism is a patient who explicitly gives the power of decision to the doctor. A 
morally problematic form of paternalism is hard or unsolicited paternalism in which the 
patient is not consulted when decisions concerning investigations or treatments are 
made.
It is, however, far too simple to regard paternalism as an on-off phenomenon. The 
encounter between the doctor and the patient is so complex that genuine rcorc-patemalism
11 Translated and cited by Munthe 1996
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may be unattainable. This complexity is obvious already in the preceding definition of 
paternalism. To be able to give fully informed consent would require substantial 
knowledge, which is usually unattainable in normal circumstances. The doctor or other 
health care professional is a gatekeeper who controls the amount of information given to 
patients, and this control as such contains an element of paternalism.
Glass’ statement about future parents having no right to ‘burden society with a 
malformed or a mentally incompetent child’ represents, however, overt paternalism, 
which is hard to justify without much of the patient rights gained during past decades 
being thrown away. In the same way, Swennerholm has described an overtly 
paternalistic practice where doctors have made a general decision to abort in a 50-50 
risk situation.
Another controversial issue in the preceding examples is the use of the word ‘therapy’ 
in the context of abortion. In fact, ‘therapeutic abortion’ is a commonly used term 
referring to the termination of pregnancy after prenatal diagnosis. I shall discuss the 
moral status of the foetus in later chapters, but a few remarks are relevant here.
It is more and more common to refer to the foetus as a patient or talk about foetal 
therapy. Whatever our view on foetal rights or foetuses as persons, it is agreed that 
foetuses can be treated on some occasions and that they are considered to have at least 
some rights. Littlefield referred to abortion as sometimes proper therapy for a family. 
This is a rather odd expression for eliminating something that, on another occasion, is 
considered a patient. Littlefield is right when he refers to the family as the target of the 
whole activity, but ‘therapy’ is not the proper term to describe it.
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6.6.2, Economic argument
Another line of argument to support the public health model has been economic, 
although at the governmental level it has largely been considered unacceptable (Reid 
1991). Numerous examples of direct reference to economic justification can, however, 
be found in the literature.
For example, Pauker and Pauker (1994, p.l 152) have discussed the question of what 
should be the age above which amniocentesis should be offered to all women. At the end 
of their article they wrote: ‘Because limited resources now restrict the number of 
amniocenteses that can be performed and the number of couples who can be counselled, 
any restriction should reflect the risk in an individual pregnancy, not just the woman’s 
age, and should be based on an analysis that includes economic costs of short- and long­
term medical, social and home care for affected children, many of whom mature into 
physically and intellectually impaired adults’.
Chappie et al. wrote, in 1987, an article in which they concluded that the British 
Health Authorities should attach high priority to the setting up of DNA screening 
laboratories. They admitted that there would be enormous difficulties in conducting a 
cost-benefit analysis and that they did not consider the ethical issues at all. An implicit 
assumption behind the calculations seemed to be that those offered the services would 
fully participate and that in cases in which, for example, cystic fibrosis, beta- 
thalassaemia or haemophilia would be found, abortion would always follow.
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The authors also wrote: ‘As well as parental consent for termination of pregnancy, 
doctors involved in the care of affected families must consider the diseases sufficiently 
severe to warrant referral for termination’ (ibid., p .l 192). Talking about ‘parental 
consent for termination’ is particularly revealing. The idea of termination does not come 
from the pregnant woman or the couple but is suggested by the doctor. What level of 
severity justifies abortion is also a matter for the medical community to decide.
A third example comes from Finland, where policy decisions concerning health 
services are made locally by health committees, which consist mainly of laymen 
nominated on a political basis. In 1993 two gynaecologists and a medical geneticist 
proposed that serum screening be started in their area. The proposal listed factors to be 
considered when an appropriate screening program is chosen. In the long run, savings 
were said to be expected because of the reduced number of intellectually disabled 
persons (Santalahti and Hemminki 1998).
Indirect reference to public health or economics is also common. For example, 
Dalgaard and Norby (1989, p.324), when discussing autosomal dominant polycystic 
kidney disease (ADPKD),12 ended their article by stating: ‘However, neither gene 
product manipulation nor gene therapy may become feasible for ADPKD in the 
foreseeable future. This stresses the importance of access to selective reproductive 
prevention as well as further development of conventional therapeutic measures’. In 
their review article on prenatal diagnosis D’Alton and DeChemey (1993, p .l 18) wrote: 
‘Cost-effective screening is expected to be possible for many disorders, including cystic 
fibrosis’. The term ‘cost-effective’ has, in fact, been mentioned as one of the 
prerequisites for genetic screening (Simpson 1991). How it is measured is not obvious,
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and one may wonder whether it is implicitly assumed that defective foetuses are always 
or nearly always aborted and therefore the screening is cost-effective.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that, in practice, doctors tend to think in terms of 
public health and the economy: After being told she carried a foetus with Down 
syndrome, a woman described her experience at an appointment with a doctor as 
follows:
My husband wanted to take rapid action to get rid of the problem and 
he had a good ally in the doctor. I became very angry. I was 41 years 
old, and I was told that, after the abortion I would certainly become 
pregnant again and that certainly the baby would be healthy. The 
doctor explained how expensive the tests are and how few defective 
foetuses are found. I understood that, if the foetus were aborted, my 
child would pay with its life because of the investigations done ‘in 
vain’ if it were healthy. Or if I would not agree to the abortion, I 
would be wasting society’s money.13
The woman wrote her story when the child was two and a half years old, and it is, of 
course, impossible to form an objective picture of what happened at that appointment 
three years earlier. The actual conversation may have been less black-and-white than 
what she recalled, but her story describes the tendency of at least some members of the 
medical profession to think about prenatal screening as a population-level tool for 
prevention.
The preceding examples have one thing in common. The underlying assumption seems 
to be that, in all or nearly all cases, the diagnosis of the disease or handicap in question 
leads to abortion. In fact, the very idea of cost-benefit calculations includes this premise 
and can thus be considered to contradict the reproductive autonomy model. If the
12 which has nothing to do with intellectual disability
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primary aim of prenatal diagnosis and screening were to enhance reproductive 
autonomy, the success of these activities would be measured in such terms, and the 
economic consequences would be totally irrelevant.
Another problem with most of the cost-benefit analyses is the omission of factors other 
than financial costs and benefits from the calculations. Some authors mention these and 
recognise also the ethical issues involved; others simply present monetary calculations.
An attempt has been made to combine the reproductive autonomy model with the cost- 
benefit analysis of a genetic screening programme (Modell and Kuliev 1991). In it a new 
model for the cost-benefit analysis of genetic services for thalassaemia is proposed. The 
model also takes into account non-financial costs and benefits.
The authors begin by listing some disadvantages of traditional cost-benefit analyses, 
which aim to show the superiority of prevention through the use of screening and 
prenatal diagnosis in financial terms only:
1. Patients and families are caused psychological harm by describing 
them as a financial burden to society.
2. Treatment and prevention should be seen as complementary aspects 
of a single policy, not as competing policies.
3. The traditional analyses seem to imply that that prevention is better 
because it is cheaper. It should, however, be considered better only if 
people want it.
4. When costs are expressed in pounds per affected birth prevented, the 
implication is that the main objective in prenatal diagnosis is 
termination of affected pregnancies.
Thereafter, the authors describe their own suggestion in which the main benefit of a 
genetic screening programme is informed choice on the part of couples at risk. Whatever 
their choice, as long as they are informed and offered counselling, the aim has been
13 Puskala 1995; my translation from Finnish
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achieved. The main cost of the service is termination of pregnancy. In the case of 
thalassaemia the financial cost of having a healthy child after selective termination of an 
affected foetus is 30% of the annual cost and 2% of the total (discounted) cost of treating 
a thalassaemic patient.
Modell and Kuliev admit that their attempt is only an outline that should be developed 
further. They have, however, shown that alternatives to the mainstream are possible.
6.6.3. ‘Medical view’ argument
In another case history a clinical geneticist told a group of paediatricians and 
obstetricians about the difficulties of counselling in cases in which one relative has the 
fragile X syndrome, which leads to intellectual disability in 85% of male carriers but 
only 25% of female carriers. When describing the particular case of a healthy woman 
with the fragile X genotype, the geneticist stated: ‘It would be hard to make her 
understand why, according to the view o f modem medicine, a foetus with the same 
genotype as the mother, should be aborted . . . \14
The speaker did not explain what he meant by ‘the view of modem medicine’, but he 
seemed to think that there is a collective understanding of how situations like these 
should be handled. It is worth noting that his view came up spontaneously in a weekly 
meeting and thus probably represents the actual values that direct his work and thinking. 
If asked about his views in a separate interview, the picture might have been different.
In a British case a retired physician described a patient from the early 1960s who had 
severe asthma and became pregnant in spite of a sterilisation operation (Gregg 1994).
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The patient was a devout Roman Catholic and termination of pregnancy would have 
been out of the question. The case description goes on: ‘While it might have been 
medically correct to advise termination of the pregnancy it would have been wholly 
inappropriate...’ [my italics]. The doctor respected the autonomy of the patient, but at 
the same time his statement reveals his opinion that there is a common medical 
understanding about the conditions in which advice for termination should be given.
In another Finnish case an obstetrician described the patients of a post-natal ward in a 
weekly meeting. A 42-year-old woman had given birth to a child with Down syndrome 
and in relation to comments on this birth the statement: ‘There are still those women 
who do not want to have amniocentesis’ was made.15 The assumption of the speaker 
seems to be that, hopefully, as time passes, such women will no longer exist.
In all these examples the speakers seem to assume a collective understanding about 
issues that are more of a moral than a scientific nature. Is there such collective 
understanding and what could be its nature?
It may be useful to separate the realms of facts and values when this question is dealt 
with, although it is obvious that, in medicine if anywhere, these realms are inseparable.
The view the medical community often wants to give of itself is that of a unanimous 
and unified collective of scientifically oriented individuals. Medical science is seen as 
the true basis of the practice of medicine, and the new paradigm of evidence-based 
medicine is considered a means of truly scientific practice. This may be the impression 
if one looks only at textbooks and major journals, especially in the English language. 
But looking a little further, particularly at medical practice in various parts of countries
14 My italics, I was present at the meeting
151 was present at the meeting
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dominated by Western medicine, gives a totally different picture (Payer 1990). The 
variance of practices and even the spectrum of diagnoses are huge, and the picture of a 
unanimous collective collapses.
No doubt, there is also something that might be called common understanding with 
respect to many moral issues in medicine. This understanding is exemplified by various 
codes accepted, for example, by the World Medical Association. However, in a 
multitude of moral issues, the medical community is far from unanimous, and there is 
great variability between countries, cultures and specialities.
What is particularly interesting in the two examples that were just presented is that the 
speakers assume something, and that something directly contradicts the view expressed 
explicitly in several guidelines and codes. This situation raises the question of whether 
there is, in addition to the official view expressed in textbooks and guidelines, a hidden 
common morality that is expressed in daily practice.
It has been said that there are three ways of describing what a physician does. If he or 
she is asked how a problem should be handled, the answer may refer to textbooks or 
what the doctor thinks should be done. The third description is what he or she actually 
does in such situations. The same may be true in moral issues, the third way representing 
the hidden common morality that finds its expression in the actual daily practice of 
physicians.
6.7. Additional critical views
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In addition to the preceding arguments concerning various aspects of the reproductive 
autonomy and public health models, there are some issues worth mentioning that do not 
refer specifically to any of the models. These issues are the slippery slope argument, the 
relationship between prenatal diagnosis and eugenics, and the impact of prenatal 
diagnosis on the lives of the disabled.
6.7.1. Slippery slope
The slippery slope argument means that, although a practice may be unobjectionable 
in one type of case, if it is once permitted, its use will inevitably be extended to other, 
more morally dubious cases (Honderich 1995). The inevitability supposed is not logical 
by nature but is, instead, based on a certain view of human nature that assumes people 
always want more than they have (ibid.).
The slippery slope argument has been used commonly in medical ethics, especially in 
discussions concerning euthanasia and abortion. The problem with the argument is that 
it describes something that has happened in a certain historical setting, but it cannot 
forecast that, in a future setting, a similar slippery slope will logically be the outcome.
The most popular example of an actual slippery slope is the Nazi euthanasia 
programme which had its roots in the psychiatric reform and poor economics of the 
1920’s (Burleigh 1994). Starting with compulsory sterilisation in the interest of racial
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fitness it gradually grew into a systematic murder programme for 200 000 mentally ill or 
physically disabled people and, later, 6 million Jews in the ‘Final Solution’.
Other examples of slippery slopes that are offered in medical ethics are the practice of 
euthanasia in The Netherlands and the practice of abortion in the countries that 
liberalised their abortion laws in the 1960’s and 1970’s. Both of these examples fail, 
however, to prove that an actual extension of a limited practice has taken place. While it 
is true that a small number of euthanasia cases occur in The Netherlands without explicit 
consent of the patient, it is not known what the situation was before. Thus nothing can 
be said about the possible change in the situation. A standard argument against abortion 
maintains that a substantial increase in the number of abortions has taken place in the 
countries in which more liberal abortion laws have been introduced (Sutton 1990). This 
argument fails also, since, in fact, empirical data can be provided that show a decrease 
in the number of abortions. For example, in Finland the yearly number of abortions has 
decreased from 20 000 in the early 1970’s to 10 000 in the 1990’s.
What form would the slippery slope argument take in the context of prenatal diagnosis 
and how powerful would it be? The formulation of the argument could be as follows: If 
prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion are applied in the first phase to severely 
handicapping conditions, they will inevitably be applied to milder and milder handicaps 
and eventually to qualitative characteristics that, by no serious definition, can be 
considered handicaps.
In the time scale of the 30 years during which prenatal diagnosis has been available, 
no slippery slope has been recognised, at least in general policies concerning the severity 
of the conditions justifying prenatal diagnosis. Down syndrome was one of the first
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conditions diagnosed, and in all these years a discussion about whether it is a serious 
handicap or not has been going on. Foetal sex determination without a history of sex- 
linked disease in the family has not become a widely accepted practice in Western 
countries, and the practice in India can hardly be considered to support the slippery 
slope argument. Thus the argument has turned out not to support a critical view of 
prenatal diagnosis and screening.
6.7.2. Prenatal diagnosis and eugenics
The connection between prenatal diagnosis and screening on one hand and eugenics 
on the other hand is sometimes discussed and mostly denied by geneticists. The word 
‘eugenics’ has bad connotations that lead thoughts to the Nazi era, and thus the 
eagerness to dissociate from it is understandable. On the other hand, in 1991, an 
editorialist of Nature wrote: ‘The eugenic issue, to which the present practice of 
amniocentesis followed (sometimes) by abortion is a crude approach, is similarly 
unstoppable in the long run’ (Ethics and the human genome 1991, p.591). I have already 
briefly discussed the historical development of the attitudes towards intellectual 
disability (see the chapter on prevention) and shall return to the concept of eugenics for 
a while.
Eugenics can be defined either as ‘a science concerned with the control of hereditary 
traits through selective human mating’ or as ‘the deliberate control, by law or social 
pressure, of the perpetuation of human genetic traits’ {The New Grolier Multimedia 
Encyclopedia on CD-ROM, Release 6, 1994).
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Positive eugenics aims at increasing the reproduction of individuals considered the 
most valuable to society. A modem version of this kind of thinking is the founding of 
sperm banks, which select their donors with strict IQ criteria. Another example of 
present-day positive eugenics is found in Singapore, where it was decided in 1983 to 
offer educational advantages to children bom to educated women (ibid.).
Negative eugenics aims at decreasing the reproduction of individuals who are 
considered genetically handicapped. The commonest means of negative eugenics has 
been compulsory sterilisation, a common practice in many countries until the 1960’s. A 
form of present-day negative eugenics is China’s 1995 Law on Maternal and Infant 
Health Care (Jones 1996, Nature Genetics 1997). Under Article 10 of the law, people 
diagnosed with a ‘genetic disease of a serious nature’ are asked to take (unspecified) 
long-term contraceptive measures or to be sterilised. Article 16 of the same law is less 
specific but implies compulsory prenatal testing and pressure on women to abort under 
certain circumstances.
These examples of positive and negative eugenics are rather extreme, but it is worth 
looking at the preceding definitions of eugenics in light of the aims of genetic 
counselling and prenatal diagnosis today. Some current programs to prevent serious 
genetic disease fit the definition of eugenics as a ‘science concerned with the control of 
hereditary traits through selective human mating’. Examples of these programmes are 
the screening for Tay-Sachs gene among Ashkenazi Jews and the thalassaemia gene 
among Cypriots (D’Alton and DeChemey 1993). Both programmes have been 
successful in decreasing the incidence of these diseases.
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If eugenics is ‘deliberate control, by law or social pressure, of the perpetuation of 
human genetic traits’, the public health genetics of today can be seen to share its aim. 
Today, control by law is mostly out of the question, but social pressure has been 
demonstrated in several studies in many countries. It can also be said that the agency of 
eugenic control has shifted from society to the individual (Boss 1990).
What is the effect of current practice in prenatal diagnosis on the human gene pool in 
general? Abortion of affected foetuses with chromosomal disorders will not affect 
significantly the gene pool since the disorders are not usually inherited but are results of 
errors in gametogenesis. Abortion of foetuses with multifactorial or polygenic disorders 
has also little or no known effect on the gene pool since other factors besides genes have 
an obvious influence on the status of the individual.
Prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion will probably reduce the frequency of 
dominant monogenic disorders like Huntington’s disease. However, not all families are 
willing to take this path, and fresh mutations are also occurring that cannot be 
anticipated.
A greater part of severe monogenic disorders are inherited as a recessive trait. If it is 
true that the availability of prenatal diagnosis increases the number of healthy children 
who replace the foetuses lost through selective abortion, then the number of abnormal 
genes in the human gene pool actually increases, since the healthy children are carriers 
of the recessive genes (ibid.).
The application of prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion is thus dysgenic, not 
eugenic, when the total effect on the human gene pool is considered. The magnitude of 
this dysgenic effect is, however, so small that it would take over 200 years for it to make
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any measurable impact (Jackson 1990). Whether we want to utilise prenatal diagnosis or 
not has to be judged on other grounds.
6.7.3. Impact on the disabled
The standard argument from the disability activists against prenatal screening is that it 
is ‘selective genocide against the disabled’16 (i.e., it has a serious negative effect on the 
lives of the disabled, who either are among us already or who are bom in the era when 
prenatal diagnosis is possible). On the other hand, proponents of prenatal screening have 
argued that its widespread availability will have little or even a positive effect on the 
lives of the disabled. The latter view has been justified by references to the increased 
awareness of carrier statuses for various diseases, which might blur the distinction
1 n
between the affected and the unaffected. In the following discussion I 
first consider possible discrimination as a practical issue and then analyse the 
philosophical argumentation at the conceptual level.
Little empirical research has been done so far and not much can be said about the 
actual effect of prenatal screening and diagnosis on public opinion. Marteau and Drake 
(1995) studied the influence of genetic screening on the attributions that are given for 
disability. According to the attribution theory more help is given when dependency is 
attributed to factors such as lack of ability on the victim’s part than when it is attributed 
to a lack of effort on the victim’s part. In the study pregnant women, geneticists,
16 a term used by the disability movement itself; it appears in a citation from Luker (Abortion and the Politics o f  
Motherhood) in Bosk 1992, p.25
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obstetricians and a general sample of men and women in three countries (the United 
Kingdom, Germany and Portugal) responded to two case vignettes in which a woman 
gave birth to a child with Down syndrome. In the first case the woman declined the offer 
for testing; in the second no test was offered by the hospital. In all the groups of 
respondents the woman who declined the test was attributed more blame for the 
disability of her child than the other woman was. An interesting finding was that the 
geneticists were the least likely to attribute blame following the birth of a child with 
Down syndrome. The authors widely discussed the limitations and implications of the 
study and noted that, while genetic screening may influence attributions for the birth of a 
child with a disability, it is not known how these attributions differ from those made 
before screening was widely available.
In a French follow-up study of a cohort of Down syndrome foetuses and newborns, a 
larger-than-expected number of unexplained deaths was observed (Julian-Reynier et al. 
1995). Due to the lack of detailed data about the deaths, the authors were cautious about 
their conclusions, but they discussed the possibility that parents and professionals may 
feel more justified than in the past for not providing Down syndrome children with the 
necessary care.
I mentioned earlier the finding of Lippman and Wilfond (1992) about the differences 
between the information given about Down syndrome in the screening context and that 
given to parents who have given birth to a child with Down syndrome. One can only 
imagine the feelings of the parents in a situation in which the screening test has been 
negative and still a child with Down syndrome has been bom. However, the life of the 
child need not be miserable, as was demonstrated in a documentary film describing such
17 This view has been presented by Bernadette Modell, who has been cited by Marteau and Drake 1995
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1Xa family. Santeri, a boy with Down syndrome, was bom after negative serum, nuchal 
translucency and ultrasound screening tests. When he was a few months old, his parents 
were interviewed. Santeri’s father described the initial shock the parents experienced 
when their son was bom, but added:
Afterwards it feels rather strange that Down syndrome is so widely 
screened for ... It is, of course, the most common chromosomal 
aberration ... Somehow we had a picture in our minds that it must be 
the most serious or terrible thing because it is so much screened for.
Actually it was a surprise for us how normal life can be, at least with 
a small boy with Down syndrome.
Santeri’s mother gave her own interpretation of what had happened:
Santeri decided to cheat us in these tests and show that there’s 
enough room in the world for a guy like him. “I don’t want to go 
away”, was his message.
This case history is a beautiful example of an individual whose life will probably be 
happy although his parents were originally determined not to have an intellectually 
disabled child if the screening tests had revealed such.
Empirical research or case studies do not, of course, settle the issue of possible 
discrimination against the disabled. It is possible, however, to picture some negative 
outcomes on the lives of the disabled. The following potential causes of increased 
discrimination have been presented: 1) a decrease in the numbers of disabled people and 
2) a change for the worse in social attitudes towards the disabled (Gillam 1999).
18 A documentary shown on Finnish TV, channel 1 on 17 March, 1999; my translation
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The number of disabled people will not, however, decrease significantly in the 
foreseeable future. Disability in general is, to a great extent, due to factors other than 
genetic or prenatal circumstances, and current prenatal screening methods detect only a 
few causes of disability. In addition, the trend to have children at an older age may dilute 
the effect of screening on the birth prevalence of, for example, Down syndrome.
Moreover, the mere reduction in the number of disabled people cannot directly cause 
increased discrimination since such a causal link would mean that an increase in the 
number would necessarily bring about less discrimination.
In general, the extent of discrimination against disabled people has decreased 
significantly over the past 20 to 30 years (Gillam 1999). A negative change in the 
attitudes due to prenatal screening is, however, possible. The birth of a child with a 
disability will increasingly become a matter of conscious choice, and in this 
environment parents who take that choice may be seen as acting irresponsibly. This 
situation may lead to some people being considered accidents that should never have 
happened. The attitudes of part of the medical community (see the preceding section 
‘Medical View’ Argument) show that the fears of some disability activists should be 
taken seriously. But even so the change is not always inevitable. There is no necessary 
connection between discriminatory outcomes and prenatal screening. It is plausible to 
think of disability as an accident without thinking of a disabled person as an accident.
I have so far dealt with the empirical or practical aspects of the discrimination 
argument. An analysis at the conceptual level has recently been presented by John 
Harris, who argues against a necessary connection between prenatal screening and the 
quality of life of the disabled (Harris 1998b). In many questions related to the ethics of
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prenatal diagnosis, I disagree with him (see Chapter 8), but in this question I find his 
main idea plausible.
Harris points out that we should not confuse two questions: 1) is it wrong to prefer a 
non-disabled person to a disabled one and 2) is it wrong to prefer to produce a non­
disabled individual rather than a disabled one? With Harris, I answer without further 
argumentation ‘yes’ to the first question, although there are, of course, examples in real 
life where non-disabled persons are preferred to disabled ones.
The second question is more problematic, and Harris modifies it by dividing it into 
seven sub-questions: Is it wrong to prefer to produce a non-disabled child and attempt to 
achieve that preference:
a) by wish fulfilment
b) by behaviour modification
c) by postponement of conception
d) by therapy (including gene therapy)
e) by selecting between pre-implantation embryos
f) by abortion
g) by infanticide
It is probable that there would be wide agreement in the answers to questions a) through 
e). There is obviously nothing wrong in wishing to have a non-disabled child (a). The
f
modification of maternal behaviour (b), for example, the use of alcohol during 
pregnancy, or the postponement of conception (c), for instance, in the case of on-going
I
cancer therapy, are also easily acceptable means of avoiding disability. Again, if there is
I
a safe form of therapy (d), like the diet in PKU, there should be no moral problems in
1I
; trying to avoid disability. The same holds true for pre-implantation techniques (e), if 
they are safe and accepted in general.
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The really controversial questions are f) and g). I shall deal with the general moral 
issues of abortion and infanticide more in the chapter on moral status and concentrate 
| here on abortion as a method to avoid disability.
| If abortion on demand is accepted, the moral status of the foetus is somehow 
considered lower that that of an infant or child, even in the case of any foetus, with or 
without a condition leading to disability. If, on the other hand, abortion is prohibited 
because the foetus is granted the same moral status as an infant or child, this prohibition 
is not dependent on the disability status of the foetus.
Screening for PKU is considered unproblematic because there is a relatively easy way 
to prevent intellectual disability from developing in these children. If there were a 
similarly easy way to prevent disability in children with Down syndrome, there would 
hardly be any parents who would say no to such therapy. The problem is that there is no 
such therapy.
The point here is that there is no necessary connection between the means of trying to 
avoid disability and the way living disabled people are treated or respected in a society.
I The disagreements over the legitimacy of aborting disabled foetuses are disagreements 
(over the legitimacy of abortion, not disagreements about attitudes towards disability or 
disabled people (Harris 1998b).
There are thus no empirical or conceptual reasons for a necessary connection between 
screening for disability and the lives of the disabled. The fears of disabled people are 
! not, however, unjustified. The signals society gives in the context of screening (e.g., in
f
! emphasising economic savings as a justification for screening) may have a negative 
impact on the lives of the disabled. In addition, some hidden attitudes of the medical
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community may have a similar effect, and the possibility should not be ignored. Morally 
acceptable use of prenatal screening and diagnosis precludes that these possible negative 
effects be acknowledged and countered as far as possible (Gillam 1999).
6.8. Concluding remarks
Intellectual disability is the common denominator in a great majority of cases in which 
prenatal diagnosis and screening take place today. I have pointed out several problems 
with these practices and their justifications and shall summarise them briefly here.
Informed consent for prenatal diagnosis is difficult to obtain in practice; at least so far 
there are serious shortcomings. Medical and other health care personnel do not share a 
uniform view on this issue either, and the tests have often turned into a routine, which 
may be difficult to resist.
Prenatal screening and diagnosis are sometimes responses to the requests of pregnant 
women. The influence of consumers on the development of these technologies is, 
however, difficult to document, and it has been suggested also that the availability of 
prenatal screening and diagnosis creates these requests. Important modifiers of practice 
are also expert attitudes and the way tests are offered. The concept of risk is a central 
issue, but it is often poorly understood and can also be used in a manipulative manner to 
influence the uptake of tests.
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There is evidence of both correct and false reassurance being given to women by 
prenatal testing. Evidence also indicates that there are psychological problems related to 
false positive results and that women poorly understand the tests they undergo.
Prenatal diagnosis has created a possibility to control reproduction in a powerful way 
that is unique in history. The control, however, is not necessarily with the pregnant 
women. The medical community decides what conditions are severe enough to be 
sought for and considered for termination. How this activity is financed varies from 
country to country, and evidence shows a willingness on the part of insurance companies 
to take control.
Justifying prenatal diagnosis and screening by referring directly to public health has 
not been popular during the past two decades, and earlier overtly paternalistic views on 
the regulation of reproduction have disappeared. Direct or indirect references to public 
health, and especially economics, are, however, common. There seems also to be a 
hidden collective view shared by many physicians about the ‘right’ behaviour of women 
in the context of prenatal diagnosis. This view has also been expressed repeatedly by 
one of the inventors of DNA, James Watson, who in 1993 opined that: ‘...[genetic 
testing] would make possible the routine diagnosis of vast numbers of genetic 
conditions, which should be eliminated by abortion ... it is a true act of moral cowardice 
to allow children to be bom with known genetic defects’ (Lucassen 1998, p. 1004). In a 
more recent contribution to Time magazine, Watson wrote ‘There is, of course, nothing 
pleasant about terminating the existence of a genetically disabled foetus. But doing so is 
incomparably more compassionate than allowing an infant to come into the world 
tragically impaired’ (Watson 1997, p.86). The author did not specify the terms
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‘genetically disabled’ and ‘tragically impaired’, but a message like this from a great 
authority in the field reveals something of a common hidden attitude.
There is no necessary connection between the practices of prenatal screening and the 
quality of life of the disabled who are either already among us or who are bom in the era 
when prenatal diagnosis is possible. On the other hand, the attitudes of society and the 
medical community may negatively influence the lives of these people, and the fears 
expressed by the disability movement should be taken seriously.
The new inventions in prenatal diagnosis and screening have no doubt helped a 
multitude of families with their extremely difficult reproductive decisions. At the same 
time they have created a new set of moral problems that must by faced by the medical 
and scientific community, the families and society as a whole. One crucial setting in 
which these problems are faced is genetic counselling, and it will be my next topic.
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7. Genetic counselling
Genetic counselling is ‘what happens when an individual, a couple or a family asks 
questions of a health professional [the genetic counsellor] about a medical condition or 
disease that is, or may be, genetic in origin’ (Clarke 1994, p.l). The focus may be back 
in time (e.g., when a family is seeking an explanation for what has happened in the past) 
or forward in time (e.g., when a couple wants to know about their reproductive options). 
The ‘patients’ or clients are generally healthy, and with a few exceptions the whole 
clinical genetic practice is not involved with therapy. As Angus Clarke expressed it: ‘We 
dispense words, not tablets’ (Clarke 1997a, p. 165). Clarke is a clinical geneticist himself 
and thus an ‘insider’. The American sociologist Charles L. Bosk has given an 
‘outsider’s’ view, which summarises some of the tensions of the process: ‘Genetic 
counselling as a service is generally a matter of transferring information to individuals 
who request it, and then leaving those individuals alone to make the tragic choices based 
on that information’ (Bosk 1992, p.xix).
Counselling centres were started in the United States as part of the eugenics movement 
already in 1915. This was not, however, counselling in the above sense; instead it 
coincided with the prevailing eugenic ideology. In the 1930’s interest in genetic 
counselling declined because of the greater emphasis on the role of the environment in 
human behaviour (Hoedemaekers 1998). Later, after World War II, genetic counselling 
in the above sense was developed partly as a reaction against eugenics (Chadwick and 
Ngwena 1992).
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The process of genetic counselling can be divided into five phases (Clarke 1994). 
Firstly, the counsellor listens to the clients and tries to determine what their questions 
are. Secondly, the diagnosis of the affected individual is confirmed or clarified as far as 
possible. Sometimes the definitive diagnosis is not found, and the only conclusion may 
be that the condition appears to be inherited as a recessive trait and thus the probability 
of recurrence in future pregnancies is 25%.
Thirdly, existing information is communicated to the clients. If possible, the 
background and education of the clients are taken into account. The third phase may end 
the process, but often the clients also wish to discuss the implications of the information 
they have received. The discussion is the fourth phase, and the focus can be for example, 
on the consequences of either continuing a pregnancy or terminating it. It may also 
concern the therapeutic options available for the condition in question.
The fourth phase often ends the counselling process, but sometimes a fifth phase 
follows in which post-counselling is given by the counsellor. It may be supportive by 
nature, or sometimes it may even involve active participation in the care of patients, if 
the counsellor is at the same time a specialist in that area.
The background of the counsellors is often in medical genetics, but, to a greater 
degree, particularly in the United States, a specific profession of genetic counsellors has 
developed. People coming into the field may have a background in for example, nursing 
or social work. Only a few clinical geneticists with a medical background have formal 
training in psychotherapy or counselling in a broad sense (Clarke 1997a). The content of 
the counselling process certainly depends on the background of the counsellor, but Bosk
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(1992) may have been right in stating that the emphasis in genetic counselling is quite 
clearly on genetics as a science, rather than on counselling as a relational process.
7.1. Goals
The goals of clinical genetics in general are far more numerous than those of genetic 
counselling in particular. The difference has not been obvious to the activists of the 
disability movement, who argue that the whole discipline has been established to avoid 
the existence of people like themselves.
In addition to the provision of information about the present pregnancy and future 
reproductive risks and options, the following activities are covered in the field of clinical 
genetics19:
1. To cooperate with other specialists in setting an early and precise diagnosis of 
the condition in question.
2. To cooperate with other specialists in the screening for complications of a 
genetic disease.
3. To provide social and practical support for individuals and families with a 
genetic disease.
4. To take part in research aiming at new specific therapies for genetic diseases.
In his article about the role of genetic counselling, Angus Clarke (1993, p.47) also 
mentioned the following:
5. ‘The reduction of “handicap”, itself a social construct, by working to minimise 
the stigma associated with disability and handicap, hoping to develop the self­
esteem of affected individuals’
19 modified form Clarke 1993
142
While the clinical genetics community probably agrees with points 1 to 4, point 5 is 
more controversial, and at least at the practical level it is not experienced as a central 
activity among geneticists.
The goals of genetic counselling are narrower and they concentrate for the most part 
on the future reproductive options of the clients. The following two key roles are 
identified in all the definitions: the communication of factual information and aid given 
to couples to help their decision-making (Marteau et al. 1994b).
The contradiction between the public health model and reproductive autonomy model, 
which were discussed in the previous chapter, is obvious also here. Although many 
geneticists would like to divorce themselves from the former, it may not be possible. 
There is, namely, a logical connection between genetic counselling as part of medical 
genetics and the incidence of genetic disease (Chadwick 1993). The fact that a screening 
programme has been established shows that it is considered good by both society and the 
medical community and that it is considered undesirable to have a genetic disease.
Giving a role to public health genetics does not imply, however, that any means can be 
used to achieve better genetic health among a population. Here there is a role for 
reproductive autonomy, which can be seen as a condition that determines the way 
objectives of public health genetics are pursued (ibid.).
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7.2. When is genetic counselling successful?
The success of a medical activity can be measured in many ways. The outcome may be 
lives saved, life-years gained, quality-adjusted life-years gained, money saved or 
satisfaction of the patients gained. Genetic counselling is unique in the sense that none 
of these methods fits well as a measure of its success.
The number of selective abortions after prenatal diagnosis would be a simple numeric 
outcome, which could, although with methodological difficulties, be translated into 
financial savings attained. Choosing this measure would represent the public health 
model of prenatal diagnosis in its purest form. As we have seen, however, as the only 
justification for prenatal diagnosis and screening, the public health model seriously|
overlooks the autonomy of the clients or patients involved. The empirical evidence
i
I referred to suggests that, even without such a numeric outcome as an explicit measure, 
some clinicians think in terms of the public health model and also transfer their thinking 
to their clients.
If the public health model does not provide a measure of the success of genetic
I
I counselling, what are the alternatives? The lives gained through the possibility for
|
I prenatal diagnosis, the general workload of the units giving counselling, or client
| satisfaction are possible outcomes (Clarke 1990).
! It may be true that, in many cases, couples would reject the idea of having more 
children without prenatal diagnosis, and thus, as a result of this activity, there is a ‘gain’ 
of healthy children. Their number is, however, beyond any quantification, and, even if it 
were possible to estimate it, the task would be to compare the number of lives thus
j
i
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gained with the potential number of lives with disability that are avoided. It is hard to 
imagine what the unit of measurement would be in such comparisons. What is more 
important, however, is that monitoring the success of genetic counselling this way would 
entail imposing a value judgement upon particular reproductive behaviours (Clarke 
1997a). This, again, would be an expression of a public health model, which would not 
respect the autonomy of individual clients.
Could the workload of a genetic counselling service serve as criterion for success? 
Certainly it would describe the activity but not in terms of the goals, had they been 
explicitly set or not.I
Client satisfaction could easily be measured by, for example, questionnaires, but as a
I measure of the success of genetic counselling this procedure is highly questionable. For
i
| example, should only the actual clients be asked about genetic counselling or should the
I
! general public be regarded as potential clients? And if the clients would showi
[
| satisfaction, it would be restricted to the activity whose content has been determined by
|
| the medical community, not by the general public. What about the dissatisfaction
i
| associated with the lack of available information or with unwelcome informationi[
| (Clarke 1997a)? Part of these problems could be solved by adopting the ‘retrospective
I assessment of satisfaction’ approach suggested by Angus Clarke (ibid.). Genetic
t
! counselling would be evaluated with following three questions:
I
1. Were you satisfied with the service provided at the time? Was the 
service efficient and convenient to use?
2. What changes have occurred in your expectations of the genetic 
counselling service since your referral?
3. With hindsight, how satisfied are you with your experience of the 
genetic counselling service? If you went through a diagnostic 
process, was this of any use or value, even if no diagnostic certainty 
was achieved? Did the service meet the expectations that you now 
think you ‘should’ have had at the time of your referral?
This rather complicated approach has the advantage of acknowledging the possible 
mismatch between the client’s initial expectations and the actual possibilities the service 
can provide. While this approach may succeed in measuring a certain aspect of the 
outcome of genetic counselling quite well, a global outcome measure for the entire 
process of genetic counselling may be unattainable (ibid.), and, no matter how the goals 
of genetic counselling are expressed, its impact on reproductive outcome is small. 
Precounselling reproductive intentions, rather than counselling, determine the outcome 
in families seeking counselling (Kessler et al. 1989).
7.3. Directive or non-directive counselling?
The principle of non-directiveness was presented already in the early days of genetic 
counselling. The term was borrowed from the general approach to counselling in the 
client-centred therapy developed by Carl Rogers in the 1940’s (Clarke 1997b). Although 
non-directiveness was accepted generally as a principle, the practice of genetic 
counselling was something else (Michie et al. 1997a). For example, one of the pioneers 
in British clinical genetics, C.O. Carter, adopted the practice of encouraging parents with
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low or moderate risks (less than 1 in 20) by saying that ‘in your place I would be 
prepared to take the risk’ (Carter et al. 1971). The discussion section in a paper, also 
from the early 1970’s, describing a consumer’s view on genetic counselling opens by 
stating: ‘Genetic counselling is preventive medicine and should be so regarded’
(Leonard et al. 1972, p.437). The paper was written by professionals in the field, not by 
representatives of consumers.
Follow-up studies done in the 1960’s and 1970’s indicate that counselling at that time 
was quite directive. The outcome of genetic counselling was measured in terms of, for 
example, whether the clients had accepted the counsellor’s conclusions or whether the 
reproductive outcome was the one suggested by the counsellor (Michie et al. 1997a).
During the past 15 years non-directive genetic counselling has more unanimously been 
considered as an aim. For example, the Code o f Ethics of the National Society of 
Genetic Counsellors (in the United States, cited by White 1998) states the following:
The counsellor-client relationship is based on values of care and 
respect for the client’s autonomy, individuality, welfare and freedom.
The primary concern of genetic counsellors is the interests of their 
clients. Therefore, genetic counsellors strive to:
Respect their client’s beliefs, cultural traditions, inclinations, 
circumstances, and feeling.
Enable their clients to make informed independent decisions, free of 
coercion, by providing or illuminating the necessary facts and 
clarifying the alternatives and anticipated consequences.
Non-directiveness is an aim on this side of the Atlantic as well, although it has been 
admitted that, in connection with prenatal diagnosis, it may be unattainable (Clarke
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1991). In a cross-cultural study among 1053 medical geneticists in 18 nations, a great 
majority (92-94%) regarded nondirective approaches to counselling as appropriate 
(Wertz and Fletcher 1988). More directive approaches were preferred in two East- 
European countries (Hungary and the German Democratic Republic), but the study was 
done in the 1980’s and later political changes have possibly decreased the differences.
Before turning to the contents of the concepts ‘directive’ and ‘non-directive’, I should 
first mention three issues. Firstly, the situations in which genetic counselling take place 
are very different, depending on the initiator of the process. If the client has contacted a 
genetic service for advice, the setting resembles a standard clinical encounter between a 
physician and a patient, and the issue is very much the same as with paternalism. By 
asking for advice, the client expresses a wish and may implicitly or explicitly give up a 
part of his or her autonomy. If, however, the initiator of the process is society in the 
form of a screening test, then a certain amount of ‘structural’ directiveness is introduced. 
Merely making prenatal screening and diagnosis available may send the message that 
they should be used (Clarke 1997b). Then it is not only the values of the counsellor that 
should be considered, but also the values of society and professional bodies that have 
made the screening possible. The environment may be directive, and a more directive 
mode of counselling may be needed to counteract the directiveness of the environment 
(Hoedemaekers 1998).
Secondly, a few words should be said about the reasons why non-directiveness has 
become such a standard or cornerstone of genetic counselling. The first reason is 
obvious. It is the strong position autonomy has in current health care ethics. Secondly, 
as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, genetic counselling developed partly as a
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reaction to the abuses of human genetics in Europe and North America during the first 
half of this century (Clarke 1997b). Thirdly, an emotional explanation may be that non­
directiveness may help the clients keep an emotional distance from the decisions they 
make (ibid.) and also help them maintain distance from the politics of second trimester 
abortion (Bosk 1992). Fourthly, it has also been suggested that the principle of non­
directiveness can be viewed as an attempt to avoid the difficulty of defining a general 
goal or objective of genetic counselling (Michie et al. 1997a).
Thirdly, the very idea of non-directive counselling contains an internal contradiction. 
In Bosk’s words: ‘A commitment to non-direction requires a certain reticence to explore 
issues that patients keep closed. Yet a commitment to decisions that “patients are 
comfortable with” requires a certain amount of unpleasant prying if only to assure that 
the comfort presented is genuine’ (Bosk 1992, p. 123).
What, then, do we actually mean when we talk about directiveness and non­
directiveness? It is worth noting that a definition of either of these terms has been 
missing from the discussions about the nature of genetic counselling. The underlying 
assumption seems to be that the terms are understood in a uniform and non-problematic 
way.
In a recent empirical study on directiveness in genetic counselling an operative 
definition of directiveness was provided: ‘Directions or advice that the counsellor 
suggests to the client in regard to specific behaviours or making decisions. Directions or 
advice about the client’s views, attitudes or emotions’ (Michie et al. 1997a). The 
statements of the counsellors were further classified into the categories advice, 
evaluation and enforcement. Examples are statements like ‘It’d be sensible if you spoke
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to Michael and Carol about this’ or ‘We would recommend that you had the ultrasound 
screening’ for advice, ‘That is what we would consider quite a high risk’ for evaluation 
and ‘I think you’ve made the right decision’ for reinforcement.
Some methodological issues are problematic in this study, but the results show that all 
consultations contained at least two directive statements. There were large individual 
differences in rated directiveness, and, interestingly, there were more evaluative 
statements in the consultations conducted by counsellors who had received counselling 
training than in the consultations by those who had not received it. On a scale from 0 to 
6, none of the counsellors rated themselves at the extremes (i.e., totally directive or 
nondirective).
The degree of directiveness may vary according to the seriousness of the condition in 
question. In a recent European study a directive approach was adopted by many when 
the condition was lethal (e.g., anencephaly) or relatively minor (e.g., cleft lip). 
Nondirective approaches were related to late-onset disorders (e.g. Huntington’s disease) 
and disorders with variable expression (e.g., sickle cell disease) (Marteau et al. 1994b).
These studies demonstrate clearly how the discussion on the directiveness of genetic 
counselling has so far taken a rather simplistic view of the issue and ignored the 
complexity of the flow of information and feelings that take place in the encounter 
between the counsellor and the counsellee.
In fact, non-directiveness itself as a goal may turn problematic. In an empirical study it 
was found that the more neutral the counsellor was perceived to be, the higher the 
counsellee perceived his or her own risk to be (Shiloh and Saxe 1989, cited by Michie et 
al. 1997a). One possible explanation was that, when the counsellor was perceived as
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non-directive, he or she was also perceived to be concealing bad news. In addition, 
directive counselling is no more effective than a non-directive approach in deterring 
high-risk couples from having children (Lancet 1982).
The idea of non-directive genetic counselling may be considered confusing by many 
parents who expect something else. The issue was addressed in a Finnish study on 
families having received genetic counselling between 1972 and 1981 (Somer et al.
1988). Firstly, 25 % of the respondents stated that they had been encouraged to have 
more children and 2 % felt the opposite. Secondly, when asked whether they wanted to 
hear only the facts or also the doctor’s advice about having more children, 42 % 
expressed a wish to hear both.
According to a British study, patients came to genetic counselling expecting 
information (79%), explanation (63%), reassurance (50%), advice (50%) and help in 
making decisions (30%) (Michie et al. 1997b). Thus a considerable degree of 
directiveness was expected also by the counsellees in this study. In another study by the 
same group, none of the measures of directiveness was associated with counsellee 
satisfaction with information, mood, or the extent to which counsellee expectations were 
met (Michie et al. 1997a).
The clients may not be the only ones who are not happy with the idea of non-directive 
counselling. Some counsellors have expressed their awareness of a discrepancy between 
non-directiveness and the needs of the people they work with (White 1998). In addition, 
the expectation of unconditional support for the clients’ decision - even if it is felt to be 
unethical - can be highly stressful for the counsellor (ibid.).
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As already noted, genetic counsellors do not regard themselves as totally non­
directive, although non-directiveness is a commonly shared ideal. Many studies have 
been done on the differences between counsellors in the degree of directiveness. Men 
have been shown to be more directive than women (Wertz and Fletcher 1988), 
obstetricians more directive than geneticists, and the latter more directive that genetic 
nurses (Marteau et al. 1994a). However, the extent to which these reported differences in 
attitude reflect ‘real differences in practice rather than awareness of the “professionally 
correct” responses on questionnaires’ is uncertain (Clarke 1997b, p. 184).
What people expect is, of course, very much related to social and cultural factors, and 
it reflects the general expectations they have towards health care personnel. The 
question of directiveness in genetic counselling can be seen as a part of a larger issue, 
namely paternalism in health care.
As with paternalism, it is far too simple to regard directiveness as a one-dimensional 
on-off phenomenon. The encounter between the doctor and the patient is so complex 
that genuine non-directiveness may be as unattainable as non-paternalism.
7.4. What is good genetic counselling?
Fully directive genetic counselling violates the autonomy of clients or patients in such a 
way that it is clearly unacceptable. Fully non-directive genetic counselling cannot be 
attained, and, even if it could be, the clients or patients would not necessarily be satisfied 
with it. They want a counsellor who has a set of values and is not a mere provider of
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information (Wertz 1997). This trend has even been noted in two national reports on 
genetic screening, one by the Nuffield Council and the other by the Danish Council, 
which mentioned moral counselling (Hoedemakers 1998).
Some professionals and lay advocacy groups have also criticised the notion of non­
directiveness. Examples of the latter are some organised consumer groups that have said 
that professionals may tell consumers what they themselves would do if they were in the 
consumers’ position (Wertz 1997). An example of the former is Seymour Kessler, a 
pioneer in training genetic counsellors, who in a 1996 meeting of the National Society of 
Genetic Counsellors pointed out that clients can be poorly served by mere provision of 
information in the absence of constructive help and guidance (Wertz 1997). He argued 
also that telling clients that you ‘will support whatever decision they make’ may actually 
be highly directive in that clients want to be able to say: ‘I disagree with you. I am going 
to take my own course’ (ibid.).
Therefore, it has been suggested that we should avoid such problematic words 
altogether. For example, White (1998) suggested a reconfiguration of autonomy in the 
context of genetic counselling. She argues that autonomy has been interpreted as a 
negative right, the clients’ right to non-interference in decision-making. Instead, it could 
be viewed as a positive right, the right to a maximally enhanced decision-making 
capacity.
White characterises her new approach as ‘dialogical counselling’. The term dialogue 
is to be understood here broadly; it may involve conversing with another person, 
consulting an authoritative text or creating an internal debate. A dialogue requires at 
least two ‘voices’.
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In dialogical counselling the counsellors are responsible for ensuring that decisions are 
as fully informed and carefully deliberated as possible. The counselling procedure 
retains many of the features of the standard non-directiveness-oriented counselling. 
While the latter focuses on biomedical matters, the former focuses on clients’ values, 
experiences and circumstances (ibid.). Counselling remains nonprescriptive, but it is 
possible for the counsellors to introduce unsolicited information or challenge what they 
believe are questionable choices (ibid.). Hoedemaekers (1998, p. 129) also called for a 
‘joint search for a morally excusable decision’ and asked whether the individual 
autonomy and decision-making of (future) patients are really taken seriously if they are 
not confronted with (possibly) diverging views. Good genetic counselling does not take 
place in a moral or social vacuum. In White’s words: ‘ “Good” decisions are defined as 
those that are fully informed and well reasoned, and in which client’s goals, values and 
circumstances are optimally balanced - in a state of ‘reflective equilibrium’ - with their 
moral and social implications’ (White 1999, p.20).
7.5. Concluding remarks
The Nazi legacy and related fears of eugenic associations led to the development of 
genetic counselling more than half a century ago. In spite of the vigorous efforts to take 
distance from eugenic ideas, the tension still exists and will so in the future. A logical 
connection prevails between genetic counselling and the incidence of genetic disease.
By establishing a screening programme and related counselling services, society aims at
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reducing the incidence of the disease in question. Enhancing autonomy cannot serve as a 
primary goal but, it can instead, form a condition, that determines the means used for 
setting goals. In fact, the use of patient autonomy as the primary goal may turn into 
patient abandonment (Bosk 1992).
The same tension is reflected also in the difficulties found in measuring the success of 
genetic counselling. If the clients’ decisions are as fully informed and carefully 
deliberated as possible, the success is maximal from the point of view of the clients and 
the counsellor. However, from a more general point of view there seem to be no good 
means with which to measure the success of genetic counselling.
The nature of the counselling process itself has varied with time, and today’s practices 
show considerable variance between countries and individuals. Non-directiveness is an 
ill-defined ideal, and it is questionable whether it can or even should ever be attained. 
Good genetic counselling respects the autonomy of clients but considers also the moral 
and social implications of their decisions.
Since a great deal of intellectual disability is genetic in origin, the issues discussed in 
this section are actualised in the encounters between health professionals and lay people. 
But should ID always be prevented? And why should it be prevented? That is the topic 
of the next chapter.
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8. Why should intellectual disability be prevented?
In the chapter on prevention I briefly discussed the general reasons that have been 
presented as a justification for the prevention of ID. This chapter examines each of the 
issues in detail. The arguments considered are 1) the eugenic argument, 2) the foetal- 
wastage argument, 3) the family burden argument, 4) the societal burden argument and 
5) the quality of life argument.
But before going to the individual arguments something must be said about a common 
factor behind arguments 3, 4 and 5, namely, the issue of preventing suffering. With 
different stress, these arguments seem to take it for granted that ID causes suffering by 
the individual, the family or society. It is also assumed that this suffering should be 
avoided if possible. Behind these arguments seems to be the utilitarian idea that we are 
morally obliged to diminish or at least not increase the total sum of suffering in the 
world.
But what is suffering, and is it always an evil that should be avoided? Does ID as such 
always increase the amount of suffering in the world?
The word ‘suffering’ can mean a lot of things, ‘from an absence of happiness to 
enduring extreme pain’ (Hauerwas 1986, p.30). Cassell (1995, p. 1899) has defined 
suffering as ‘a specific state of severe distress induced by the loss of integrity, 
intactness, cohesiveness, or wholeness of the person, or by a threat that the person 
believes will result in the dissolution of his or her integrity’. Suffering is always
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individual, and it involves self-conflict. It has a temporal element in that there seems to 
be no suffering without the idea of a future (ibid.).
Obviously, a conceptual distinction should be made between physical distress or pain 
and suffering. They overlap, but it is possible to be in pain without suffering and to 
suffer without pain. Essential to suffering is meaning, and sometimes suffering can be 
controlled merely by changing the meaning of the pain (ibid.).
Is suffering always an evil that should be avoided? At least in some religious traditions 
suffering is not considered intrinsically wrong. Suffering may reveal a greater depth of 
human experience and meaning to the sufferer, and after the experience the person may 
also have a greater concern for the suffering of others (ibid.). But, of course, this is only 
afterwards, and it does not provide general justification for not preventing suffering.
In addition, a distinction can be made between suffering that merely happens and 
suffering that is a requisite for a goal. The former is more a matter of fate, and the latter 
a matter of choice, although the distinction may not always be so obvious (Hauerwas 
1986).
Discussions about suffering in the case of an intellectually disabled child often do not 
specify the nature of suffering but, instead, remain vague. For example, Baby Doe’s 
father (see Chapter 1), who had sometimes worked closely with Down syndrome 
children, was convinced that ‘such children never had a minimally acceptable quality of 
life’ (Kuhse and Singer 1985, p. 12). In a similar way a pregnant mother may say that she 
does not want to bring into this world a child that would inevitably suffer. Both seem to 
take it for granted that, for example, Down syndrome necessarily causes the person and 
the family to suffer. I shall return to the issue of quality of life later in this chapter and to
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Down syndrome in later chapters, but it is worth noting here that many families consider 
the suffering caused by the selective termination of a foetus with Down syndrome 
greater than the suffering caused by the birth of such a child.
John Harris’ starting point in his treatise on the morality of selective termination is that 
it is wrong to bring avoidable suffering into the world, but he does not explain what he 
means by suffering (Harris 1998b). Neither does he consider the details of the 
alternatives (e.g., the actual life of a family with a Down syndrome child). The total 
amount of happiness may be beyond quantification, but, even if it would be possible to 
measure and compare the ‘happiness units’, it is not at all obvious that the selective 
termination option would win. Thus the situation is not so clear even inside the 
utilitarian framework.
Suffering from having an intellectually disabled child resembles the suffering of 
parents who are childless against their own wishes. In both cases the cause of suffering 
is a lost chance. Childless parents have lost the chance to see the growth and 
development of their own offspring. Parents with an intellectually disabled child have 
lost the chance to see their child develop like the majority of children do. Depending on 
the severity of the disability, they will perhaps not see their child become independent, 
marry, have their own children, and so forth. Instead, they will witness slow or 
prolonged development with an upper limit caused by the condition behind the 
disability. This suffering is related to the view we have of man and life: ‘ “retardation” 
might not “exist” in a society which values cooperation more than competition and 
ambition’ (Hauerwas 1986, p. 161).
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Of course, the condition behind disability may also cause physical pain either by itself 
or through procedures (like shunt operations) that are needed. Physical pain is not, 
however, the central issue in the context of suffering from being intellectually disabled 
or having an intellectually disabled child. If it would be, eliminating it would be a 
solution, and prevention would lose its meaning
8.1. Eugenic argument
Eugenics has already been dealt with in the chapters concerning prevention and prenatal 
diagnosis. It was concluded that 1) the public health genetics of today can be defined as 
a form of eugenics, if the latter is understood as deliberate control of the perpetuation of 
human traits by social pressure, and 2) the application of prenatal diagnosis and 
selective abortion is dysgenic, not eugenic, when the total effect on the human gene pool 
is considered. The magnitude of this dysgenic effect is, however, very small.
The eugenic argument can be formulated as follows. A normal or healthy human 
genome can be exactly or approximately defined. There is something bad or undesirable 
in certain genetic conditions that deviate from this norm. The elimination of these 
conditions, defined as ‘genetic diseases’, can be considered a legitimate goal.
The eugenic argument assumes thus that ‘genetically normal’ or ‘genetically healthy’ 
can be defined. As we have seen in the chapter on the definition of ID, the concept of 
‘normal’ is highly ambiguous.
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A naturalistic view on health and disease equates the normal with the natural (e.g., 
Boorse 1975). It seems to assume that a species norm for a genotype can be identified. 
However, with the exception of identical twins, we all have unique genotypes, and it is a 
matter of convention which of them is considered normal and which abnormal or 
undesirable. In fact, virtually every one of us carries a small number of deleterious 
recessive genes and is, in Paul Ramsey’s words, a ‘fellow mutant’ (Boss 1993, p. 156).
In addition, the interaction between one’s genotype and the environment is, in many 
cases, a crucial determinant of health and well-being. A gene for sickle-cell anaemia was 
once advantageous in protecting from malaria; in present-day America it is no longer so.
As Canguilhem (1978, p. 138) noted, strictly speaking ‘there is no biological science of 
the normal’. Physiology, for example, is a science of biological situations and 
conditions called normal. This normal is a polemical concept that ‘negatively qualifies 
the sector of the given which does not enter into its extension while it depends on its 
comprehension’ (ibid., p. 146). It refers to a norm which ‘draws its meaning, function, 
and value from the fact of the existence, outside itself, of what does not meet the 
requirement it serves’ (ibid., p. 146).
‘Genetically healthy’ is also a vague concept. It would seem to refer to a person whose 
‘total genetic make-up ... is such that it predisposes to and effectuates a state of perfect 
physical and mental health, perfect adaptational capacities in the individual, in the 
present as well as later in life, and that it does not contribute to genetically based health 
risks in future children’ (Hoedemaekers 1998, p.89). The meaningfulness of such a 
concept is questionable, because it isolates the individual from the environment and also 
from history, being thus an example of geneticisation. (See chapter 3.) Even if we knew
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the complete genetic profile of a person, we would have very limited information about 
his or her health. Knowledge about gene-environment interaction would add something 
to this situation, but we would always have a far from complete picture of the role genes 
and gene-environment interaction play during the whole life-span of the individual in 
| different environments.
The eugenic argument could also refer to the genetic health of a population or human 
| species in general. This is not a very helpful concept either, since it is hopelessly narrow
i
I and reductionistic. Populations live in very different environments and conditions, and it 
is hardly possible to say that population A is genetically healthier than population B.
The eugenic argument is essentially utilitarian. References to the good of future 
generations carry the utilitarian message of the greatest good for the greatest number.
| Sometimes this message is clear, as in an editorial in the Canadian Medical Association
I
| Journal in 1927: ‘How long will it be before we recognise that our children, too, have a
[
[ right to be free; free from a heritage which weakens their minds or cripples their bodies’
I (cited by Caimey 1996, p.791). Sometimes, especially in the Nazi doctrine, reference is
I
j made to a less clear good, that of a larger whole: ‘Individualism as a basis for medical
j  practice has been recognised as a false path. The patient is not an individual with
!
i
i
[ particular demands; he is only one part of a much larger whole or unity: of his family,
I
! his race, his Volk’ (professor Verschuer in 1934, cited by Hubbard 1986, p.233).
| No science can provide complete answers to questions such as when does a deviation 
from the common gene constitute a genetic disease and when is it merely an interesting 
variation (Schwartz 1996). A ‘normal’ or ‘standard’ human genome will never be
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discovered, but it may be invented. To describe this standard then as the master race is 
an obvious consequence (ibid.), and the idea of the Volk would be there again.
Could the gene pool have some intrinsic value in itself? Or could perhaps some 
characteristic of it, like variety, have intrinsic value? Answers to these questions depend 
on the way we answer to the question of the value of nature in general: is it valuable in 
itself or only for living and future people? This, of course, is a major unsettled 
philosophical issue that cannot be addressed here. Some pragmatic remarks can, 
however, be made.
The influence of human activity on the (human) gene pool will be minute in the 
foreseeable future. As has been mentioned earlier, the total effect of prenatal diagnosis 
and screening may be dysgenic in the sense that the relative number of carriers of 
recessive genes leading to certain diseases may increase, while the homozygotes would 
be selectively aborted. This possibility shows the vagueness of the discussion: a 
favourable development in the health of the population may not necessarily correlate 
with changes in the gene pool of that population.
If human activity would some day result in less variety in the (human) gene pool and 
this lost variety were related to diseases overcome, the result could hardly be seen as bad 
development (assuming that no force would be used to achieve the change). The setting 
changes dramatically if the variety lost goes beyond genes related to diseases (Chadwick 
et al. 1998).
The power of the eugenic argument depends thus on how various terms are understood 
and how the good of an individual is weighed against the good of the community. The 
latter can be further understood as the present community or some hypothetical future
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community. The argument is powerful only if agreement can be reached concerning 1) 
which conditions are serious enough to allow preventive measures at the population 
level and 2) the balance between the interests of the individual (e.g., autonomy) and the 
community (e.g., economics). The issue is thus very much the same as in the discussion 
concerning the public health argument and the reproductive autonomy argument. [See 
Chapter 6]
8.2. Foetal-wastage argument
A great majority of all conceptions never survive to birth. Close to two-thirds of all 
pregnant women lose their embryos during the first trimester and more miscarry during 
the latter two trimesters. The frequency of chromosomal aberrations among these 
spontaneously aborted embryos or foetuses is far higher than among live bom babies. 
According to the foetal-wastage argument, induced selective abortion is simply a 
continuation of this natural process (Boss 1993). Leon Kass (1985, p.96) thinks that 
‘This standard, ... is one that most physicians and genetic counsellors appeal to in their 
heart of hearts, no matter what they say or do about letting the parents choose’. In fact, 
the argument has also been used to support abortion in general: ‘If Nature resorts to 
abortion to maintain genetic stability by discarding as many as 3 in every 4 conceptions, 
it will be difficult for anti-abortionists to oppose abortion on moral or ethical grounds’ 
(Roberts and Lowe 1975, cited by Murphy 1985).
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Behind the argument there seem to be two assumptions. Firstly, nature seems to be 
able to differentiate between embryos or foetuses that have the possibility for full human 
life after birth and those that do not. Secondly, nature or natural is considered the 
standard from which we can infer how things should be.
The first assumption is partly true. It is not true, however, that the more serious (from 
our point of view) a condition is, the more frequently spontaneous abortions occur. 
Turner syndrome (45, X) is usually considered to be a relatively mild condition. Modem 
hormone replacement therapy leads to normal pubertal development for girls with this 
syndrome, leaving relatively short stature and infertility as the only characteristics to 
indicate the lack of an X chromosome. Today, even infertility can be overcome with 
donated eggs. On the other hand, Edwards syndrome (trisomy 18) is a very serious 
condition with defects in multiple organs and death shortly after birth. Yet the 
proportion of Turner syndrome embryos and foetuses which spontaneously abort is 
apparently much higher that the respective proportion with Edwards syndrome. Even if 
we consider ourselves as successors of the work of nature, the latter’s view on the 
seriousness of conditions would be in conflict with our common sense.
In addition, from an evolutionary point of view, nature works in ways that do not 
necessarily eliminate genotypes that decrease mental or intellectual fitness. Fragile-X 
syndrome is a common genetic disorder causing ID, in males while the heterozygous 
women have no or only mild symptoms. However, there is direct evidence of increased 
reproductive success among these women (Nesse and Williams 1994). The PKU gene 
seems to reduce the likelihood of miscarriage and perpetuate itself despite causing 
disease (ibid.). If some genes increase the susceptibility for schizophrenia, these same
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genes are probably also advantageous in combination with certain other genes or in 
certain environments (ibid.).
A more severe problem with the foetal-wastage argument, however, is the second 
assumption, according to which what happens in nature is good as such and the goal of 
| medicine should be, at least in this respect, to enhance a natural process. The assumption 
| raises questions about the relationship between nature and morals and also between
I nature and medicine.
|
| ‘Nature’ and ‘natural’ have been used with very many meanings. To cite Leon Kass 
j (1996, p.22) concerning our intellectual confusion about what nature truly is:
I Whose nature do we wish to bring to the aid of ethics: the nature of
Aristotle (purposive) or Lucretius (atomist and hedonic) of Seneca 
(rationally lawful) or Descartes (rationalistically mathematical) or 
j  Hobbes (passionate and dangerous) or Rousseau (bountiful and self-
j  lovingly free) or Darwin (historical and competitive) or Nietzsche
| (will to power) or Whitehead (thoroughly organic)?
I
| Today, in our culture, nature primarily has one of four possible meanings. Firstly,
ij
i  nature can be understood as everything that there is or that takes place in the physical
!
I world of experience (Honderich 1995, Karjalainen and Hayry 1992). To be natural is to 
! be part of nature. We humans are nothing special although we may differ from other
I
I animals because of our cognitive abilities. For those who think that nothing exists
|
| outside nature (supernatural, the Creator, God, etc.), there cannot be anything non-
i
natural (i.e. whatever we humans do is by definition natural). Those who think that there 
is something outside nature must consider man’s role in relation to nature and the 
supernatural. These issues are, of course, beyond the scope of this thesis, but the 
question remains of whether nature, as God’s Creation or not, is necessarily good.
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Secondly, nature can be understood as the living world as opposed to the non-living. 
Many philosophical problems follow (e.g., of definition or demarcation). From our point 
of view the question of the goodness of nature is similar to the one already presented.
Thirdly, nature, and especially the organic world, can be set off against humans and 
the consequences of their work. Natural is everything that happens independently of 
human activity or is subconscious human activity. This view, too, leaves open the 
question of whether nature is good as such or only inasmuch it has been altered and 
cultivated by humans.
Fourthly, nature (or Nature) can be understood as a subject: it takes revenge if you do 
wrong. This type of view is common in some original cultures but it is also often 
referred to in our cultures as an argument to support, for example, some alternative 
forms of medicine.20 The only way to find out what is wrong, however, is to act, wait 
and see. If a disaster follows in one form or another, we have acted unnaturally. It is 
obvious that also this view of nature fails to help us in deciding exactly how we have to 
act in particular situations.
Whether nature can ever help us with moral issues is, of course, a large philosophical 
question, and it cannot be settled here. The tradition of natural law or naturalism is old in 
philosophy, but there has hardly been a philosopher who has claimed that nature is 
necessarily good. Whether G.E. Moore was right or wrong in stating that ‘good’ is 
necessarily a ‘non-natural’ quality is still debated. Today there is at least one field of 
inquiry and action, environmentalism, in which nature is considered the standard for 
proper behaviour (Callahan 1996).
20 The concept of alternative medicine is far from clear, and there is a large gray area between 
conventional or school medicine and alternative or complementary medicine
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The supporters of the foetal-wastage argument seem to assume that nature is good, at 
least with respect to this particular issue of spontaneous abortions. This conclusion does 
not, however, follow directly from any of the four formulations of what nature is. And 
even if we accepted that nature serves as a moral guide in this issue, there is no obvious 
reason why we should stop here. Why not enhance other natural processes in which 
beings that are considered not able to lead a ‘full and independent’ life are abandoned or 
destroyed? What other phenomena in nature are good as such, and what could be the 
distinctive criteria for something to be considered good? Exactly when is it good to 
interfere in the processes of nature?
Another problem with the second assumption behind the foetal-wastage argument 
concerns the relationship between nature and medicine. If we see ourselves just as a part 
of nature, then everything we do, also in medicine, is natural, independently of the 
question of whether it is right of wrong. If we see ourselves as having a distinctive 
position, then our medicine is, by definition, interfering with nature. In most cases 
medicine in fact somehow interferes with the natural way things go, unless, for example, 
in terminal care we let ‘nature take its course’.
This interference can take place in several ways. Sometimes medical intervention acts 
against natural processes (like antibiotics), and sometimes it enhances natural processes 
(like thyroid hormone replacement in hypothyreosis). The aim is to restore a state (as in 
the treatment of an infection) or to make possible a state (as in the treatment of 
congenital hypothyreosis) or to alleviate symptoms. The enhancement of natural 
processes can take place at the individual level (hormone replacement) or at a communal 
level (adding iodine to salt), where individuals benefiting from the procedure cannot be
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specified. Selective abortion could also be seen as an enhancement process, but not in 
the same sense, since what is enhanced is an ill-defined and inconsistent ‘principle’ of 
nature taking place during early pregnancy.
It seems obvious to me that the foetal-wastage argument, at least in its present form, is 
weak and cannot provide justification for the prevention of intellectual disability.
The general idea of everything in nature being good would lead to odd implications, and 
the particular idea of certain spontaneous abortions being good leads us to ask why this 
and not some other natural process should be considered good. It may be that the 
supporters of the argument base their view also on a value judgement about the lives of 
individuals with a certain genotype or phenotype. This question will be addressed in the 
following chapter. But before that, I still have three arguments to deal with.
8.3. Family burden argument
The family burden argument can be presented in two forms, as a more general version 
referring to rights and as a narrower utilitarian version comparing the family 
consequences of accepting a handicapped child or aborting it as a foetus. According to 
the general version, parents have the right to determine both the qualitative and the 
quantitative character of their families (Kass 1985). This stance is similar to the standard 
liberal argument for abortion. In the context of ID the narrower formulation is, however, 
commoner. Accordingly, if the parents believe that the birth of a child with certain
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characteristics will cause suffering and sorrow to themselves and to their other children 
and drain their time and resources, they have the right to prevent the birth.
Below I first consider the utilitarian version of the argument. In the latter part of this 
chapter I deal more generally with the issue of parental choice of, for example, the sex 
of an offspring. It may be worth noting that the prenatal technology needed to examine 
the characteristics of the foetus is available only to a minority of the world’s families. In 
many developing countries it is available only to a very small minority who can afford 
it, and the major reason for its introduction may have been sex selection, not the 
prevention of physical or intellectual handicaps.
Depending on the degree of the disability and the number of additional handicaps, the 
burden an intellectually disabled child lays on a family can be anything from minute to 
substantial. The discovery of disability in a child of any age is always a shock, but a 
mildly intellectually disabled child with no additional handicaps may later bring only 
minor changes to family life. On the other hand, the care of a severely intellectually 
disabled child with, for example, cerebral palsy and epilepsy may be extremely time 
consuming and exhausting, both physically and mentally.
No doubt, an intellectually disabled child always brings about a crisis in a family, but 
the impact is not entirely and straightforwardly negative. There are both families that 
have been weakened and families that report to have been emotionally enriched by the 
presence of a disabled child. It is important to note that the matter in each case is 
uncertain and the experience may strengthen as well as weaken the family. And, of 
course, as Bosk (1992, 56) has pointed out, ‘chronic sorrow’ and ‘successful
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normalisation’ are only analytically distinct. Empirically, it is possible to imagine the 
same person having each feeling closely connected in time.
The burden on the family is, to a large extent, a culturally determined construct and 
cannot be separated from the social structure of society. Health care arrangements 
(private or public), mothers’ work outside the home, and the infrastructure of services 
for the intellectually disabled are some important factors contributing to family well­
being. While in the United States the hardship experienced by families with an 
intellectually disabled child is largely determined by economic factors, only a relatively 
small percentage of families in Northern Ireland feel that they can not accomplish a 
viable marital relationship, a satisfying parental relationship or their basic aims in life 
(Boss 1993).21
The burden on the family is expressed in several ways. Firstly, having an intellectually 
disabled child is an obvious risk for both the marriage and the relationships between the 
parents and the other children in the family. Secondly, whatever the arrangements of 
care, the parents often experience feelings of guilt. They may feel guilty of the mere fact 
that they have brought a handicapped child into this world or they may feel guilty of 
placing the child in an institution. Thirdly, the burden on the family is expressed 
materially, as extra economic costs caused by the special care arrangements needed for 
the child.
Much empirical research has been done during the past few decades to explore well­
being in families with intellectually disabled of otherwise handicapped children. The 
lives of families with a child with Down syndrome are discussed in chapter 10, and I
21 Boss (1993) cites the following book: Burton L. The Fam ily Life o f  Sick Children. London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul 1975.
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shall summarise here only the results of a recent, large Finnish study that examined the 
lives of 647 families with an intellectually disabled child (Italinna et al. 1994).
• Most families managed to get along with the care of the child without large 
problems. A quarter felt only minor stress; on the other hand also a quarter felt 
major stress.
• Parents’ pessimism and worries about the future of the child increased as the child 
grew older.
• With a few exceptions, parents’ stress correlated with the degree of the child’s 
disability.
• Parents’ stress correlated with the quality of their relationship with each other.
• If there were other children in the family, the parents were less worried about the 
future of their intellectually disabled child.
• The amount of unofficial help from friends and relatives was small but very 
important.
• A majority of parents felt that parenting an intellectually disabled child had 
brought several positive things into their lives.
The amount of guilt parents feel after either aborting or accepting a child with ID may 
be substantial and long lasting. It is obviously very strongly related to both the 
psychological characteristics of the parents and the support provided by the health care 
system and society. Because parents often feel guilty whatever they choose, the result 
does not serve as support of the family burden argument - neither does it refute it.
The economic load on the family can be enormous, especially in countries like the 
United States and in families with incomplete insurance coverage. It has been estimated 
that 70 % of families with a chronically disabled child in the United States have 
significant financial problems as a result of the child’s disorder (Boss 1993). Many of 
the costs are hidden (i.e., days lost from work, special diets, travel costs, etc.). In 
countries, where medical care is subsidised, the situation is different, and the economic 
burden on families is far less important.
171
We can conclude that the psychological and economic burden on families with an 
intellectually disabled child varies substantially and cannot be dealt with in vacuum, 
without the structure of society and, particularly the supportive services provided for 
these families being considered. Thus the utilitarian argument has not proved to be 
generally true. It is a good argument only in particular cases, in which the burden of a 
handicapped child on the family can reasonably be expected to exceed the burden 
caused by abortion.
8.3.1. Parental autonomy
The more general version of the familial burden argument claims that parents have the 
right to determine both the qualitative and the quantitative character of their families. 
Strong support for parental involvement comes from the fact that it is the parents who 
live with the child 24 hours a day for maybe years or decades, depending on the severity 
of the physical condition. It is the parents who concretely bear the psychological and, in 
many cases, economic burden.
One key issue is the question about the limits of parental autonomy. If, namely, only 
the parents are to decide what qualities they accept in their children, then we have to 
consider at least two kinds of difficult cases: the case of undesired sex and the case of 
deliberately accepting an abnormal child.
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8.3.2. Sex selection
John Harris, arguing from a mostly utilitarian point of view, does not consider the 
issue of sex selection problematic: ‘Either such traits as hair colour, eye colour, gender 
and the like are important or they are not. If they are not important why not let people 
choose? And if they are important, can it be right to leave such important matters to 
chance?’ (Harris 1998a, p. 191). He also reminds that ‘having a preference for producing 
a child of a particular gender by no means necessarily implies discrimination against the 
alternate gender any more perhaps that choosing to marry a co-religionist, a compatriot, 
or someone of the same race or even class implies discrimination against other religions, 
nations, races, or classes’ (ibid., p. 192-193). A prerequisite for this kind of thinking is, 
of course, that abortion on demand is accepted up to the gestational age where the 
determination of sex is possible.
Harris does not deal with sex selection in relation to any particular society. It may, 
however, be illuminating to do so. Prenatal diagnosis for the determination of sex only 
is, as is well known, a common practice, for example, in India. The country is afflicted 
with the ‘son-syndrome’, and the birth of a female child, especially if she is not the first, 
is a calamity (Kusum 1993). A son will continue the name of the family and take care of 
the parents in their old age. According to the Hindu religion, a sonless father cannot 
achieve salvation. A daughter, on the other hand, is a constant burden to her parents, and 
a woman who has only daughters has to bear social embarrassment and even family 
harassment (ibid.). A traditional solution to the problem has been female infanticide, 
which still takes place and is even supported by some doctors.
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Prenatal determination of foetal sex began in India in the mid-seventies and soon 
became a flourishing business. For example in 1987-1988 some 50 000 sex 
determination tests were recorded in Bombay only. Of the 8000 abortions preceded by 
[ amniocentesis in six Bombay hospitals in 1986, 7999 were female foetuses (ibid.). After 
many years of heated discussion and campaigns a bill banning the selective abortion of 
I female foetuses was passed in 1994 (Imam 1994). Later reports show, however, that, in 
| spite of educational and economic improvements, the practice continues (Nielsen et al.
: 1997, Khanna 1997).
Five arguments to support prenatal diagnosis purely for sex determination have been 
presented in the Indian discussion (Kusum 1993).
Firstly, it has been argued that the status of females will improve when their number 
; diminishes. This argument resembles the one presented in the context of intellectual 
! disability: if, through selective abortion, there will be fewer intellectually disabled 
| people, those surviving will be better off by since they will have more resources. Both 
arguments are peculiar. The first seems to assume a turning point at which the disrespect 
of females turns to respect. How far should they go in India and should the government 
adopt this as an official policy to improve the status of women? The similar argument 
about the status of the intellectually disabled also makes a wild assumption of the use of 
certain resources only for them. Taken to an extreme, if various programmes for the
|
; prevention of ID were highly successful, the last intellectually disabled person on earth 
would be really well off.
Secondly, the practice has been supported as a family planning measure. Without it 
couples desiring to have a son would go on trying and having daughters, thus adding to
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the family size. While it may be true that the size of many families is smaller because of 
the availability of the practice, it is, however, a side effect, not the primary motivation 
for families. Accepting this argument also sends the message that the underlying 
discriminatory attitudes against women are accepted because of favourable side effects.
Thirdly, the argument has been presented that women should be left the final choice of 
the fate of their foetuses. Because women are entitled to a general right to decide about 
their pregnancies, choosing termination on the basis of the sex of the foetus should have 
no special position. In the Indian context, however, the argument turns into a farce, 
when women do not enjoy freedom ‘even in the most intimate matters of their life’ 
(Kusum 1993, p. 155). This argument resembles closely the one that has been put 
forward in the developed countries to justify selective abortion. It is the strongest 
argument for the practice and I shall return to it later.
Fourthly, it has been argued that banning sex determination tests would lead to 
widespread underhand practices with apparent dangers to the lives and health of women. 
This stand, again, is similar to the argument that has been used to justify the legalisation 
of abortion. Both arguments are, however, weak because they speculate something that 
will not necessarily happen. Their form is also so general that, with similar arguments, 
one could justify almost anything, like ‘we should legalise drugs because banning them 
will inevitably lead to crime and misery’.
The fifth argument is related to the fourth one and states that the law would not be a 
very effective instrument to bring about change in the social attitudes of people. 
Although presented by Kusum as an argument of the protagonists, this is not really an
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argument to support the practice but a pragmatic statement about the relation of law and 
practice.
The first argument against prenatal sex selection is based on the unbalanced sex ratio
| that would follow, or has in fact been reported already in India. A fear has been 
expressed that, if the number of females continues to fall, there will be an increase in 
crimes like rape and incest, and the reproductive burden of women will increase. As has
j already been stated, however, the exact opposite was speculated to support the practice.
; It could as well be speculated that the imbalance would, in the future, lead to selective 
abortions performed on male foetuses. On a more theoretical level, it is not obvious that 
the ratio between the number of males and females has any intrinsic value.
The second argument against the practice refers to the health hazard it creates for
[ women who cannot bear the hazards of the repeated test-abortion-test cycle. But what
[
| would be the alternative? With the current social attitudes a woman with repeated
[
| pregnancies without testing risks her health even more than the one who chooses testing.
The third argument against prenatal sex selection states simply that it is against the 
law. This is, of course, a valid argument only for those who agree with the law.
To conclude, most of the arguments presented either for or against the practice are not 
convincing. The third argument in support of the practice is, however, a strong one. If 
abortion is accepted as a general right of women, then there are no good reasons to
I demand justification in particular cases. In fact, in countries where girls are not wantedi
|
for cultural reasons, parents can refer also to the suffering the child herself will face if 
she survives. If we in the West wish to give parents a wide autonomy to decide about 
their offspring, we cannot justify our resentment about sex selection in a developing
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country. This is not, of course, to say that the situation in India, for example, is 
satisfactory and should be accepted. What I wish to argue is that a general concern about 
women’s position is highly justified, but an isolated concern about the practice of sex
I selection is not necessarily that.
i 8.3.3. A duty to abort?
What about cases in which a woman or a couple deliberately accepts a child with a 
physical or intellectual handicap? John Harris, for example, has argued in this context 
that it can also be wrong not to terminate a pregnancy (Harris 1998a). He writes in a
! general way about ‘bringing avoidable suffering into the world’ and does not deal with
j  details of handicaps or syndromes. He admits that behind his argument there is the
[[
| assumption that replaceability is unproblematic. The issue of replaceability has been
I
I
| discussed widely in bioethics and accepted by many utilitarian philosophers (e.g., Parfit,
j
i Harris, Kuhse and Singer) since Hare brought it up in the 1970’s (Hare 1976).
The main idea is that ‘the next child in the queue’, that is, the (probably healthy) child 
that would be bom if the present defective foetus or infant were not in its way, may have 
important interests that overcome the interests of actual foetuses or infants. The next
; child in the queue is an example of ‘possible people’, who will exist if we act one way,|
| but who will not exist if we act another way (Parfit 1976). Hare presents a case in which
1i
j the interests of a foetus with an abnormality and a possible child of the same parents, 
Andrew, are compared. Andrew would be bom later, if a handicapped child were not in
177
his way. Hare does not specify the nature of the abnormality: ‘I am deliberately not 
specifying any particular medical condition, because if I do I shall get my facts wrong’ 
(Hare 1976, p.366). Because Andrew has ‘a high prospect of a normal and happy life’
| (ibid, p.369), the harm that would be done to him by stopping him from being conceived 
; and bom would be much greater than that done to a foetus or unsuccessfully operated 
newborn by killing it [Hare is somewhat unclear here; he seems to refer to some surgical 
| condition, possibly something like spina bifida, although he declined to specify the 
| medical condition earlier.] In short, Hare presents a utilitarian argument: when the death 
of a disabled foetus or infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects 
I of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the former is killed.
The replaceability argument is probably counter-intuitive for most people, but it can 
also be shown to be severely insufficient for many rational reasons.
Firstly, I have discussed the replaceability argument so far only in the context of
I physical or intellectual disability. There is, however, no logical reason to limit the
j
t argument to such cases. To show the arbitrariness of the argument, let us look at a 
family living in a poor developing country. They are expecting their third child, and the 
prospects for the child will be poor in many respects. The woman has been told, that due 
to a uterine malformation, she will not be able to have more children than three. For 
some reason the family will be able to move to a developed country, and their life will 
be wealthier and more secure in many ways. This move will not, however, be possible 
for the next two years. The present pregnancy is at an early stage and could be 
terminated without seriously risking the woman’s possibility to carry another pregnancy 
to term. According to the replaceability argument we should consider the rights of the
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‘next child in the queue’ (i.e., the possible child to be bom in the new country). Would 
Hare, Harris and other supporters of the replaceability argument demand that this 
pregnancy be terminated in the interests of the possible child who would be bom in the 
new country?
Secondly, what would be the position of newborns with a known condition leading to 
ID or physical disability? At least Kuhse and Singer, who support the argument, also 
support infanticide in cases in which the newborn baby is severely handicapped.
Because it is not a person, it does not have a right to live and is therefore morally in the 
same category as foetuses. Let us imagine again a family, this time one with a newborn 
child with Down syndrome. Since Kuhse and Singer think that the prospects of this child 
having a happy life would be poorer than those of a child with normal chromosomes, it 
would again be logical for them to suggest the killing of this child in the interests of a 
possible child to be bom into this family later.
Thirdly, the proponents of the replaceability argument ignore totally the emotional 
crisis, which the abortion of a defective foetus brings about. The intensity of the crisis 
varies from minor to major. Barbara Katz Rothman, the author of The Tentative 
Pregnancy, tells an example of the latter:
She had had her abortion and gone right back to work. She was a 
physician, as a matter of fact. And then one afternoon a couple of 
weeks later, she couldn’t take it any more. She just started crying out 
of nowhere. Leaving the office and walking for hours, she found 
herself wandering in a bookstore at one point and, oddly enough, 
found my book. Standing in the store, she cried, recognizing herself 
and her grief in these women. She took a couple of months off, 
allowed herself time to recover from her loss, allowed herself time to 
understand her loss as real, genuine, and worthy of grief rather than 
purely of gratitude. (Rothman 1994, p.269)
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Fourthly, although, for example, Harris admits that replacing a foetus that will be 
disabled with one that will not be disabled may not be unproblematic, he gives the 
impression that a woman should have particularly good reasons not to have termination 
in such cases. I respond by citing a young woman who has an intellectually disabled 
brother with fragile X syndrome and is now pregnant. Her brother’s general intellectual 
| level resembles that of a 5 or 6 year-old child. He cannot read or write but he is good at 
; cooking and baking. Being a carrier of the syndrome, she had a DNA test during her first 
pregnancy. The male foetus did not have the fragile X syndrome. In a television 
interview a few years later, now also a mother of a girl, she was asked whether she 
would have chosen abortion if the first test would have shown the syndrome. She 
I replied22:
i
f
Well, now I feel that, no, I would not have. And I also had the feeling then that I 
would not necessarily want an abortion. I had already had one miscarriage before 
my first pregnancy; also it frightened me in the beginning. I didn’t necessarily 
agree with my husband, but he said that we would look at the situation after the 
tests. If it looked as if the child would be intellectually disabled, we would look 
and think carefully about it. I agreed with him that we should carefully think about 
what we would do, but, at that stage I was so emotionally involved that I couldn’t 
have had an abortion. I had my brother and I had cared for him. Therefore, I didn’t 
feel it would be as terrible a burden as my husband thought it might be.
1 This narrative reveals how complex the whole situation is and how crudely the idea of
I(
replacement simplifies the issue. Moral judgements are made on the grounds of abstract
|
concepts like personhood, possible people or replaceability and particular contexts, in 
which decisions are made, are ignored or inadequately considered (Vehmas 1999a,
22 My translation of a transcription from the program “Human factor” in TV2 Finland, 25 April, 1998
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1999b). We saw, for example, that Hare deliberately did not specify the medical 
condition. That creates a problem because, in real life, the foetus or the infant has a 
history, a family and a diagnosis, all of which are highly relevant to the moral 
! judgements about its life. In Rayna Rapp’s words: ‘It matters whether one is African- 
: American, Polish- or Irish Catholic, middle-class or working class or working-poor. But 
; it also matters whether this is a first or a fourth pregnancy, whether you have 
experienced difficulties in becoming and staying pregnant, whether you had a cousin 
with Down or a neighbor who had hemophilia’ (Rapp 1994, p.229).
Fifthly, ID is still a special case. While we can assume that many syndromes or 
conditions causing gross physical handicaps certainly bring about suffering, this is not 
so with conditions causing only ID. I shall return to the quality of life issues in more 
, detail later, but here it is important to note that, if an intellectually disabled person 
; suffers from the disability per se, the suffering could be mediated through the meaning
t!•
\ that his or her environment has given to the disability.
I
To conclude, parental autonomy has become an important value in many Western 
societies, and at the same time liberal abortion policies have been introduced in these 
societies. If abortion on request is generally accepted, I do not find any convincing 
j arguments against prenatal sex determination. In addition, if parental autonomy is 
respected, it should also include the possibility to bring a physically or intellectually
E
handicapped child deliberately into this world.
I
8.4. Societal burden argument
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According to the societal burden argument, the intellectually disabled never become 
productive or otherwise benefit society. Instead, they are a burden, and, therefore,
; preventing states leading to ID and births of foetuses with conditions leading to ID is 
justified, if that prevention does not bring about a greater burden in one or another form.
It is obvious that the group is very heterogeneous with respect to productivity, but,
| excluding the mildest cases, it is certainly true that material productivity will never 
I exceed the costs of the care these people need. Generally, the unit of measurement in the 
discussions on social burdens is money, other social burdens or goods being far more 
difficult to quantify.
[
j
i 8.4.1. Cost-benefit analyses
|\
Monetary costs can (often) be measured and compared, and, therefore, it is 
understandable that money has been the unit of measurement in numerous cost-benefit 
analyses concerning the prevention of ID. Such analyses have been performed since the 
1970’s, and the screening for disorders like Down syndrome and fragile X syndrome has 
been shown to be cost-effective in several studies. These kinds of analyses are, however, 
problematic in many ways.
Firstly, the accuracy of the calculations can be questioned. Many assumptions must be 
I made about, for example, the uptake of tests and the proportion of women willing to 
abort after a positive diagnosis. Even more difficult to estimate than screening-related
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costs are probably the costs to society for caring for the intellectually disabled in 
question. It is obvious, for example, that a person who is never able to work creates 
considerable costs for society. On the other hand, there are programmes and legislation,
I that attempt enable persons with handicaps to function like other people, be employed
I
and be self-sufficient. The recent trend to close massive institutions and integrate the 
intellectually disabled into society probably decreases the economic burden also. In 
j  addition, most of the disorders leading to ID are extremely variable in their expression.
| The validity of the calculations is further confounded by the great variance in the 
status of intellectually disabled people in society. For example, in Finland, it was 
practically a rule in the 1950’s and early 1960’s that a baby with Down syndrome was 
placed in an institution. Nowadays there are no children with Down syndrome in 
institutions, the great majority living in their own homes. Those few who are abandoned
, by their parents are cared for in foster homes. Thus the economic burden to society
|
during childhood years is substantially smaller than during the years of early
j
institutionalisation.
Secondly, not all costs have been considered in the calculations. While it is often said 
i that a normal child will replace an aborted defective child, costs or benefits related to
I this replacement have not been taken into account. What is even more important, the
[
| costs and benefits related to the unavoidable miscarriages related to amniocenteses have
; not been considered. If the saved lifetime costs of an avoided intellectually disabled
Ij
individual are considered a benefit, then the lost lifetime contribution of the potential 
individual lost in the miscarriage should be considered as a cost. It is obvious that a 
complete cost-benefit calculation is impossible. And, even if it were, the problem is far
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from solved. If, for example, the costs to society for caring for a certain group is shown 
to be more expensive than a prevention program, exactly how much more expensive 
would it have to be to justify prevention? At least in the earlier analyses the hidden 
 ^premise seemed to be that prevention is justified if it can be shown to save money, 
however small the difference.
Thirdly, a new feature in a recent large summary of antenatal screening for Down 
' syndrome was that formal comparisons of the cost of screening and the cost of lifetime 
care were not made at all, even though otherwise extensive data on the cost- 
effectiveness of the screening were provided (Wald et al. 1997). The justification was, in 
the words of the report: ‘ ... because the reason for screening is not to save the costs of 
care. The purpose is to give couples the opportunity to avoid having a child with severe 
abnormality, not to make financial savings to the health services’ (ibid., p.226). This 
statement brings us back to the tension between the public health model and the
tt
reproductive autonomy model, which was discussed in the chapter on prenatal diagnosis.
i
j The researchers seem to have abandoned economic justification for prevention overtly,
i  but this attitude does not resolve the issue completely, since the logical connection
f
between screening and the incidence of the particular condition remains.
Societal burdens that are not quantifiable in monetary terms are more abstract and 
, seem to escape quantification in general and comparability in particular. This
I
I discrepancy brings us to the so-called incommensuralibity problem. I shall return to it
f
; shortly after presenting examples of the non-economic adverse social effects of a genetic|
screening programme.
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8.4.2. Examples o f  adverse social effects
Sickle-cell anaemia is inherited as a recessive trait, and it has a highly variable clinical 
\ expression, from full life with minor symptoms to painful crises, organ damage and 
; early death. The prevalence of the gene is high among black populations.
Several states in the United States implemented mandatory screening programmes for
i  sickle-cell disease in the early 1970’s. The programmes were even considered an
|
f attempt at genocide against the black population. Irrespective of the validity of the 
claim, they were said to divide the black community over the desirability of testing 
: (Whitten 1973).
The programmes also raised concern due to the great influence they had on screening- 
positive carriers, many of whom were discriminated against for purposes of marriage,
| employment and insurance (Boss 1993). Carriers also often experienced their status
t
| inappropriately, being told that they had a mild form of sickle cell anaemia, when, in
f
| fact, carrier status implies difficulties only in some special circumstances like hypoxia
I
under anaesthesia or flying at high altitudes in unpressurized aircraft (Behrman and 
Vaughan 1987).
Still other problems occurred with the programmes. They included inaccurate 
diagnoses by some physicians, when individuals with the trait were told only that they
|
| ‘had’ sickle-cell anaemia. Some medical institutions performed the test routinely,
i
j without prior consent, and the programmes were often established without a counselling 
component. As Whitten (1973, p.318) has remarked, simply determining and informing 
a person of the possession of the sickling gene is potentially worse than not testing at all.
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8.4.3. Incommensurability
|
At first sight, it would seem obvious that a plurality of moral values implies the 
impossibility of solving ethical dilemmas. Moral commensurability has, however, been 
the aim of many thinkers both in the utilitarian and Kantian traditions. Recent virtue 
theorists (e.g., Nussbaum) have argued for the vanity of this quest and have, in general, 
criticised the tendency of modem moral philosophy to concentrate on the general 
features of human life, thus ignoring the particular aspects of the human situation 
(Hallamaa 1994).
The meaning of the term incommensurability needs some clarification. In his Well-
\
f
being (1986) James Griffin discusses incommensurability and distinguishes several
ii
; forms of it.
In a strong sense of the word it could mean that two items cannot be compared 
! quantitatively at all (i.e., they cannot be fit onto any scale of measurement). In a weaker 
sense it could mean that no amount of one sort of item can equal, in some respect of 
I quantity, a certain amount of another. In addition, when we speak about the 
incommensurability of values, we should clarify what we mean by ‘values’ in this
I
t context. If our understanding of ‘value’ is very broad, incommensurability between
j
values is inevitable.
rI
i The strongest sort of incommensurability is incomparability, where two values are so 
; far from each other that they seem unrankable. We do not, however, argues Griffin, find
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values that are strictly incomparable. We should not exaggerate the difficulty in ranking 
values. We can and do compare, for example, pain and accomplishment, although they 
cannot be measured on the same scale and the comparison may be difficult. If the pain is
|
great and the accomplishment minor or vice versa, we have an easy choice. A human 
life has no equivalent, but keeping the speed limits where they are inevitably leads to 
deaths on the roads.
| The next strongest form of incommensurability allows a comparison of values, but 
there is one trumping value that outranks the others. Could autonomy or liberty serve as 
such a trumping value? No, since most of us would sacrifice some liberty or some 
autonomy to avoid great pain or some other kind of catastrophe in our lives.
A weaker form of incommensurability would seem to follow from the problem of 
: weighing values. When we think that it takes a great deal of happiness to outrank a fairly 
small amount of misery, we seem to use two distinct scales. But, argues Griffin, neither 
; of these scales is the ultimately important one. Behind them is a single scale, on which
fI\
prudential values are ranked, and the special weighing disappears.
Thus incomparability and trumping are too strong, and weighing is a distraction. Is 
; there any form of incommensurability for Griffin? Yes, there is, but not so that some
f
types of values outrank other types. But we do, for example, rank a certain amount of
iI
; life at a very high level above any amount of life at a very low level. This attitude, leadsI
i
to the general formulation of incommensurability: enough of A outranks any amount of
iI
j B-
How is all this relevant for the societal burden argument? If we believe in Griffin’s 
argumentation, we should not, without careful scrutiny, accept statements about the
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i
impossibility to compare the burden an intellectually disabled child brings to society and 
the burden of trying to prevent that disability.
There are, of course, easy cases in which the former greatly outweighs the latter.
j  Preventing ID due to congenital hypothyreosis costs money and causes short-term 
anxiety to parents whose child tests falsely positive. After an adequate explanation these 
parents easily accept this minor psychological harm as a price for the possibility to catch
i the true positives in due time.
1 Much harder are the cases in which the burden of accepting intellectually disabled 
children and the burden of screening and terminating them prenatally must be compared. 
In a society which accepts abortion for some reason, a comparison has already been 
made. We cannot claim incommensurability between these burdens unless we deny the 
moral possibility of abortion totally.
[ Commensurable or not, the non-economic burdens at the societal level are rather
’ abstract and not as easily definable as at the level of the family. However, there is no
|
' doubt that such burdens exist and they should be considered.
I
| Beyond quantification have been said to be such potential consequences of screening
! as possible conflicts between a pro-screening majority and a minority of women or
[j  families who refuse testing (Kass 1985). Obviously they would be difficult to quantify, 
but would such a conflict be incommensurable in the preceding sense? We can imagine
i
r
] other analogous situations in which the interests of a majority and a minority clash: if a 
minority group thinks that it is against its ideology or religion to pay taxes, the majority 
overrules its belief. Here we see the difficulty of claiming the superiority of a general 
value like autonomy. In the taxation example economic autonomy is obviously
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commensurable, and there are limits to it. However, in the screening example, 
reproductive autonomy is incommensurable in the preceding sense. At least in our 
present Western societies no amount of societal advantage would outrank the 
i reproductive autonomy of women to say no to prenatal screening. There are, of course, 
more subtle pressures, but overt coercion is out of the question.
If social worth is considered a sufficient criterion for establishing a prenatal screening 
; programme for conditions leading to intellectual disability, it is also justified to ask why 
the issues should not be broadened and discuss the infanticide of the newborns whose 
diagnoses were missed prenatally. Or why it should not be broadened further and apply 
the social worth criteria later in life and consider active euthanasia for these individuals? 
The latter questions are important, but I shall leave them for the moment and return to 
; them in the chapter on the moral status of foetuses and the intellectually disabled.
! I have now considered various aspects of the societal burden argument and conclude
i
[
\ that it alone has thus not proved to be strong enough to justify the prevention of ID.|
| Cost-benefit calculations may never be accurate enough to form a basis for prevention, 
and, even if they did, there remain important social values that should be considered.
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8.5. Quality of life of persons with intellectual disability
One way to formulate the quality of life argument goes like this: Individuals with ID 
often have a low quality of life. Especially those who have associated physical 
handicaps may have an extremely low quality of life, in some cases even to the extent 
that life can be considered worse than death. These kinds of lives are not worth living; 
therefore preventing states leading to such lives is justified.
There are several questions involved here. Firstly, what do we understand by quality of 
life? As usual, there is no agreement among philosophers and social scientists about the 
criteria for a good quality of life. Secondly, can quality of life be adequately assessed? 
And if it can, what is the best way to do it for the intellectually disabled? Thirdly, does 
i  the quality of life argument provide general justification for the prevention of ID?
[|
8.5.1. What is quality o f life?
The term ‘quality of life’ was originally introduced in the 1950’s to criticise policies 
aiming at unlimited economic growth (Musschenga 1997). The critics saw that material 
values only could not suffice in making people’s lives satisfactory. A decade later the 
term proved useful also in the medical context, when it became necessary to find 
measures for success that were not quantitative. In the field of social science the rival 
term ‘well-being’ was and has been also widely used, but in medicine and health care 
‘quality of life’ became the term of choice (ibid.). In fact, the end of the 20th century has
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witnessed a quality of life movement with whole textbooks and a speciality journal 
dedicated to the subject (McLaughlin and Bjomson 1998).
With reference to ID, issues of quality of life have been raised in two contexts: firstly, 
in the context of prevention, usually in the form of selective abortion. Quality of life has 
also been cited as justification for withholding medical treatment from infants with 
severe disabilities and even for euthanasia. Secondly, quality of life has been discussed 
and researched in the context of the lives of intellectually disabled persons (e.g., when 
changes have occurred in their living or working conditions).
Traditionally, quality of life has been considered an entity that can be measured in 
terms of objective or subjective indicators. Among the first, social indicators such as 
nutrition, air quality, incidence of disease, crime rates, health care, educational services, 
divorce rates, and the like can be used. The second possibility is to define quality of life 
as a subjective measure of perceived satisfaction. In fact, several articles in the AAMR
I
book on quality of life (Schalock and Siperstein 1996) stress the nature of quality of life
f
! as a subjective experience. It may or may not be something that people think about, and 
generally thoughts are devoted to quality of life mostly during ‘the highs and lows of 
life’ (Taylor and Bogdan 1996, p. 16).
The distinction between ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ is not, however, entirely 
unambiguous, and it resembles the philosophical distinction between ‘needs’ and
ff
‘wants’, which is not a settled issue (Allardt 1993). Subjective indicators of quality of 
life tell about people’s wants. Objective indicators, however, may refer to both needs 
; and wants. In empirical social science the distinction between objective and subjective 
standpoints is a concrete dilemma. When, for example, housing standards are measured,
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one could rely on objective measures like the space available or one could ask the 
respondents whether they are satisfied with their housing conditions (Allardt 1993).
The nature of quality of life as an entity has also been questioned. Schalock (1996) has 
suggested that it should be seen more as a process or flow or an organising concept. 
Taylor and Bogdan (1996) borrow the distinction between the sensitising and definitive 
concepts suggested by the sociologist Blumer. The latter refers precisely to what is 
| common in a class of objects, while the former lacks the specification of attributes.
i
Quality of life would be a sensitising concept, and a qualitative approach to research 
would be preferable to a quantitative approach.
Some sceptical voices in the ID field have questioned the whole concept of quality of 
life on various grounds. The origin of the concept is rooted in the concern to encapsulate 
the well-being of populations rather than that of individuals. The use of the term has also
I
become charged, thus inhibiting rational debate. Some writers have even cautioned
f
against the use of the quality of life term altogether (Luckasson 1990, cited by
F
Borthwick-Duffy 1996, p. 108, Hatton 1998).
ii
[ The term ‘quality of life’ may be rather recent, but the issue is not. The concept of 
| happiness is not equal to quality of life, but the present discourse on the latter has its 
' roots in the earlier discourse on the former. Classical utilitarianism was interested in the 
(maximisation of happiness, roughly the same as subjective quality of life, and, for it,
I
how happiness was distributed in society was irrelevant. Present-day utilitarianism is a
F
i
| ‘complex cluster of moral theories based on the principle of maximising welfare’ (Gillon
i
I
1994, p.22) and a general discussion on utilitarianism is beyond this thesis. In Gillon’s
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words: ‘simplistic criticisms based on simplistic accounts of the theory are 
inappropriate’ (ibid.).
The quality of life issue can be approached also from other perspectives than strictly
i
utilitarian ones. According to Amartya Sen, essential is not what people have but what 
they do with what they have. Thus he has suggested the ‘capability approach’, which is 
concerned with people’s actual abilities to achieve various valuable functionings as a 
part of living (Sen 1993). ‘Functionings’ represent parts of the state of a person - in 
particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. Sen has 
also presented the idea of a pluralistic approach to a good life in which each component 
could be thought of as an independent vector. These components may be broadly 
comparable between individuals (objective measures) even though the resulting 
aggregate understanding of the goodness of a person’s life is highly individual and 
subjective (Coulter 1997).
t
| Sen’s approach has much in common with the empirical work done on the quality of 
life in social sciences. Relevant for our purposes may be the basic needs approach
|
; categorised by the catchwords Having, Loving and Being. This approach combines both
1
: subjective and objective aspects of well-being and has been generally developed in 
Scandinavia, especially by the Finnish sociologist Erik Allardt.
|
! Having refers to the material conditions necessary for survival and for avoiding misery
i
. (Allardt 1993). It covers such needs as nutrition, air, water, protection against diseases,
!i
and the like. Empirically, it is measured by indicators denoting economic resources,
!
housing and working conditions, health and education.
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Loving stands for the need to relate to other people and to form social identities. The 
level of need satisfaction in this area is assessed by measures denoting attachments to 
family and the local community, relationships with workmates, active patterns of 
friendship and the like.
Being stands for the need to integrate into society and to live in harmony with nature. 
Personal growth and alienation represent the positive and negative aspects of Being, 
respectively. Empirical indicators measure, for example, the extent a person can 
participate in decisions and activities influencing his or her life, opportunities for 
leisure-time activities, meaningful work and so forth.
Allardt’s Having-Loving-Being distinction resembles in turn the conceptual 
framework developed in the ID context (Hughes and Hwang 1996). Although the 
researchers found 44 different definitions of quality of life, they were able to identify 15 
dimensions that were present in most of the definitions. In the same book researchers
I
from Wales aggregated these dimensions into a model of three dimensions: objective life
f
conditions, subjective feelings of well-being and personal values and aspirations (Felce 
! and Perry 1996). They ended up with the following definition (p.68):
Quality of life is defined as an overall general well-being that 
comprises objective descriptors and subjective evaluations of 
physical, material, social, and emotional well-being together with the 
extent of development and activity, all weighted by a personal set of 
values.
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These dimensions interact with each other and are potentially interdependent. Thus, for 
example, a change in a person’s values may initiate changes in satisfaction and 
precipitate changes in objective circumstances.
|
The definition of quality of life cannot be separated from the purpose that the 
definition is needed for. The objective descriptors may obtain more weight if the 
purpose of the study is to compare a group of intellectually disabled persons with 
another group of non-intellectually disabled persons. On the other hand, subjective 
evaluations will be crucial, if the life of a person or a group in place X is compared to 
later life in place Y. As with the AAMR definition of mental retardation, this one is also 
too wide to define exact categories. Thus it might perhaps be best regarded as a 
framework that allows several applications depending on the particular purpose of the 
use of the term.
!
t
i
8.5.2. Assessing quality o f life
. Before going to the actual measurement or assessment of quality of life, I shall consider
! shortly the purpose of this activity. At least three different purposes can be identified
i
. (Hayry 1990).
| Firstly, the purpose may be related to the fair allocation of scarce health resources. In 
| situations in which not all those in need can be treated, medical personnel should choose
E
f
, to treat the patients who benefit most, in terms of both the quantity and the quality of 
their remaining lives. The unit of comparison can be a patient, a treatment, a physician, a
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hospital, an illness, a branch of medicine and the like. An inherent ethical problem with 
this motivation for the measurement of the quality of life is its ageist, as well as racist
t and sexist, nature. The young could easily be preferred to the old, and, since race, sex
i[f
and social status are determinants of health, these factors could also be employed in 
allocation decisions. The ‘quality of life’ concept in the context of resource allocation 
seems to serve mainly as a camouflage for purely economic decision-making (ibid.). 
Secondly, the purpose of the measurement may be to facilitate clinical decision-
i
making. A typical example would be a consideration of whether a particular medical 
procedure would produce better quality of life for an individual. The introduction of 
quality to quantity considerations has, of course, been a progressive move in the 
assessment of various therapies, but QALYs (quality-adjusted life-years) are also 
accompanied by obvious problems. If various forms of treatment for an individual
f
patient are compared, the main ethical issue is who determines the quality in question.
j
\ Thirdly, the assessment of quality of life may be associated with assisting patients
f
!
. towards autonomous decision-making concerning their own lives. The issue of 
autonomy is an obvious problem in the context of ID, and in most cases proxies or care
p
givers assist in the assessment.
From the preceding discussion, it should be obvious that there cannot be a single 
indicator of the quality of life of a person. The objective descriptors are relatively easy
i
to measure and can, in most cases, be quantified and thus compared. Assessing the
f
subjective aspect of quality of life is far more problematic, and the association between
I
life conditions and subjective well-being can be weak. The following problems occur if 
only subjective quality of life is assessed (Felce and Perry 1996).
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Firstly, reports of subjective well-being may be more a reflection of a person’s internal 
j temperament than of external conditions. Significant changes in life conditions may 
I induce only temporary changes in reports of well-being.
Secondly, satisfaction is a measure of comparison. A slave who is satisfied with 
obtaining some freedom is still a slave. Empirical research has shown that residents from 
a range of living environments, which differed markedly as to objective characteristics, 
expressed equally high satisfaction with their circumstances. This finding shows the 
importance of including both subjective and objective standards in the assessment of 
quality of life.
Cultural factors should also be considered when the quality of life of an individual or a 
group is assessed. The role of values may differ significantly from culture to culture and, 
for example, the concept of loneliness may be interpreted and experienced quite 
differently in individualistic and collectivist cultures (Keith 1996).I
[
j The effect of culture has been shown in empirical research. For example, the quality of 
life scores of Tongans living in the United States more nearly resembled those of people
f
with ID than those of American adults without retardation (ibid.). There is an obvious
it
parallel here to the measurement of IQ. Ignoring cultural factors creates a bias that easily
it
results in systematically lower scores among test subjects who come from a culture
I
different from the one the test has been developed for.
I
| ID brings about some specific methodological issues in the measurement of quality of
i
[
life. The principal problem in comparisons with non-intellectually disabled people is the
1I
difficulty to determine the individual’s perspective and values (Coulter 1997). 
Acquiescence, a strong tendency to say ‘yes’ to most questions, and a low consistency
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of answers to multiple-choice questions are two examples of such measurement 
problems. The significance of the former has been, however, questioned in some recent 
research (Matikka and Vesala 1997).
I There are alternative solutions to the methodological problems. Identifying optimally 
effective questioning techniques, correcting statistically for response bias, using proxies 
and, in general, using multiple methodologies increase the validity and reliability of the 
assessment (Heal and Sigelman 1996).
A different approach to the assessment of quality of life has also been developed to 
overcome the shortcomings of cross-sectional studies or longitudinal studies with only 
two or three points of measurement. The ethnographic approach aims at a relatively 
continuous measurement in which the researchers attempt to comprehend and interpret 
the phenomena under study as faithfully as possible (Edgerton 1996). The researchers 
have prolonged contact with the people in question and become, if only relatively so, a
I
natural part of their lives. This kind of methodology has, for example, shown that
I
younger people with intellectual disability who are new to life in community settings are
r
unhappy much of the time. On the other hand, these same people become happier as
ifi
they grow older and their lives stabilise. In addition, ethnographic studies suggest that a 
, subjective sense of well-being may derive more from personal attributes than from the
E|
, impact of the environment (ibid.).
i
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8.5.3. Quality o f  life and intellectual disability
| What, then, is the position of the quality of life argument?
| The issue is far more complicated than the formulation of the quality of life argument
I
would suggest. Saying that ‘individuals with ID often have a low quality of life’ does 
not mean much unless several details are clarified.
I Firstly, what is understood by ID here? Does the claim refer to anybody who scores 
below -2SD on a standardised IQ test or to anybody who meets the criteria of the 
AAMR definition (see Chapter 2)? In both cases it is obvious that the group is too 
heterogeneous for such generalisations. If we look at the definition given earlier for 
quality of life, no reason can be found as to why ID per se would decrease the quality of 
life of the individual. The very mildly intellectually disabled or so-called borderline 
cases may be the only ones who suffer from their inferior intelligence, not being able to
f
manage in the open work market and feeling rejected by their peers. On the other hand,
|
, they do not feel that they belong to the world of the intellectually disabled. The suffering
i
these persons experience reflects the attitudes of the environment to a great degree and
i
I
does not originate from low intelligence as such. It is easy to imagine, for example, a
[
I
 ^rural community in which such a person could find his or her place and would not suffer 
any more than the others. We can also imagine some suffering at the other extreme of
i[
the IQ distribution: a highly intelligent child or youngster might as well suffer from
tI
, rejection by peers.
Secondly, what exactly is meant by quality of life and how has it been measured?
Does the claim refer to objective or subjective standards, have cultural and value issues
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been taken into account and so forth? If objective standards have been used, what are 
they, and, if the intellectually disabled have been found to score lower than the non- 
intellectually disabled, what is the link between disability and low scoring? The possible 
causality should also be questioned if subjective standards have been used: do those who 
are unhappy feel bad because they are intellectually disabled or because they have been 
poorly cared for (Rose-Ackerman 1982). In addition, it can be questioned whether 
burdens external to the individual should be counted in calculating one’s quality of life 
at all (Boss 1993). These burdens can be considerable in the form of a lack of socio­
economic or familial support to establish a minimally satisfactory life. Counting these 
external burdens would, however, lead to problematic conclusions, since it would then 
be logical to consider selective abortion also in cases in which the prospect of the foetus 
without a diagnosed condition leading to disability would be miserable due to 
unfavourable social conditions.
Thirdly, claims about low quality of life with the intellectually disabled should include 
an explanation about the comparison group. Low when compared to whom? Low at 
point t in time or low for a lifetime? Research literature on quality of life in the 
intellectually disabled population is abundant, but the object of the studies has seldom 
been to compare the intellectually disabled population with a non-intellectually disabled 
population. Instead, the studies often evaluate quality of life in changing living 
conditions or in relation to particular procedures. I have come across only one paper in 
which the quality of life of the intellectually disabled was compared with that of the 
general population (Matikka 1999). After acknowledging the methodological 
difficulties, the author concluded that, in general, the intellectually disabled are as
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satisfied with their lives as the rest of the population. The former did, however, 
experience physical violence and stress more often than the latter.
Fourthly, if research shows a lower score for an intellectually disabled population, 
what is the magnitude of the difference and what is the relevance of the magnitude? In 
the afore-mentioned American study the mean scores for non-Tongans without 
retardation, Tongans without retardation and non-Tongans with retardation were, 
respectively, 99.8, 90.6 and 90.9. The differences were certainly statistically significant
i
if the sample size was not very small, but it is worth asking how relevant the difference 
was, for example, from the point of view of prevention.
The second part of the quality of life argument referred to those who also have 
physical handicaps and stated that they may have an extremely low quality of life, in 
some cases even to the extent that life can be considered worse than death.
ID is often accompanied by physical handicaps, which may cause considerable
II
suffering. The suggested justification for selective abortion in these cases refers to
I
| survivability or the possibility of a pain-free existence. The former issue poses the 
problem of the length of ‘normal’ life that is considered worthwhile. Is it 6 months, as in
I
Tay-Sachs disease, or 40 years, as in Huntington’s disease? Or should we perhaps 
consider the ratio of ‘normal’ to ‘abnormal’ years? And, in the end, there always
I
remains the question of whether the individual actually suffers in such way that it would 
| overcome the desire to continue life.
When trying to imagine what an intellectually disabled person feels, we may too easily 
think what we would feel if we suddenly developed similar mental and physical
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characteristics. This, of course, does not tell anything about the feelings of the actual 
person, who, in most cases, has had the qualities for a lifetime.
In addition to the afore mentioned reservations concerning quality of life and its 
measurement, there is another fundamental issue that I have already briefly mentioned, 
namely, the question of whether the concept should be used at all in the context of ID.
In a recent article this question was approached seriously, although the author 
acknowledged also the obvious shortcomings of abandoning the concept altogether
|
(Hatton 1998). He presented two critiques of the ‘emerging quality of life consensus’ 
with which he obviously refers mainly to recent work within the AAMR, which is 
presented mainly in the two volumes already mentioned (Schalock et al.1996 and 1997).
According to the first critique insuperable problems arise when one attempts to assess 
subjective quality of life. The first of these problems is the disenfranchisement of people 
. with severe intellectual disability. If one has little or no communication skills, it is 
hardly possible to assess the genuinely subjective quality of life. The second problem
i
[
arises from the meanings different participants bring to quality of life assessments.
II
! There is evidence suggesting that people with ID may regard quality of life interviews as
|^
 a test of their fitness to remain in their community-based houses rather than as research 
 ^interviews about their life that will have no potentially negative consequences (Hatton 
11998). The third problem relates to the afore-mentioned question of the stability of
f
subjective quality of life. If subjective well-being is largely influenced by personality, 
major long-term alterations dependent upon improvements in objective life 
 ^circumstances are not to be expected (ibid.).
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According to the second critique the quality of life approach, which generally claims 
j to liberate people from a medical model, may paradoxically serve to extend professional 
' control over the lives of people with ID (ibid.). The history of services for the people can
sI
usually be characterised by significant improvements in the form of de­
institutionalisation and integration. There is an alternative interpretation, however, 
which claims that changes in service provision reflect, at least in part, battles for 
professional dominance rather than advances that liberate people. The change may have 
brought an increased professional grip over their lives. Abandoning the quality of life 
approach, as well as many other forms of measurement and assessment applied to people 
with ID, would, according to this critique, lead to benefit for these people. For example, 
the rights to privacy, dignity and control over one’s own life would be increased.
Although abandoning difficult concepts like quality of life (or ID altogether) may 
sound attractive, it also creates obvious problems. If we accept historical relativism and
i
consider progressive development only as a sign of change in the balance of professional
I!
dominance, then the attempts to do anything progressive lose their meaning (ibid.).i!■
!
Practical consequences may also result from this kind of view. The intellectually
I
disabled will no longer be labelled, but they may become invisible and disempowered in 
many important contexts, like economics, politics, welfare and health (ibid.).
Abandoning issues of quality may also lead to a one-sided enhancement of issues of 
quantity. How important both are is reflected in an article and a related editorial in the 
American Journal o f Public Health in 1996. The article reported a study in which the 
predictors of mortality among severely disabled children with ID were assessed. Own 
home residence and community care facilities were associated with a 25% increase in
mortality when compared with institutions (Strauss et al. 1996). The accompanying 
editorial discussed possible methodological flaws and stressed the lack of outcomes 
other than mortality (Durkin 1996). As the editorial notes, ‘no advocate for children or 
for public health in general would recommend institutionalisation as a strategy for 
reducing mortality in children without mental deficiencies’ (ibid., p. 1360). Quality of 
life may be difficult to measure and hard to compare, but it is perhaps an even more 
! important outcome than pure mortality. And last, but not least, it may be in fact 
; impossible or extremely difficult to avoid totally the notion of quality of life. We might 
try to do so but still implicitly refer to it (Hoedemaekers 1998).
The quality of life argument is commonly referred to in discussions about selective 
abortion and the prevention of ID in general. As we have seen, the content of the term 
i ‘quality of life’ has often not been specified and even the whole concept has been
I
| criticised as questionable. The argument is often used loosely, without details about the|
I measurement or comparison in question being specified. Obviously, it is not meaningful 
I to refer to the quality of life of the whole intellectually disabled population, as it is
I questionable to refer to any particular characteristic of that population which even
|
escapes exact definition. Measuring and comparing quality of life may be meaningful 
with reference to small subgroups with relatively similar mental and physical 
characteristics. Even then one should carefully consider the causal origin of the
it
| associations found. Stanley Hauerwas (1986, pp. 171-172) may have been right when he 
wrote: ‘Perhaps what we assume is not that the retarded suffer from being retarded but 
rather, because they are retarded, they will suffer from being in a world like ours’.
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8.6. Concluding remarks
We have seen that very different arguments have been presented to support the 
prevention of ID. Some of them focus on the individual, some on the family and some 
on society. Some arguments consider suffering, some economic good. In the medical 
context they are often presented superficially, ignoring the complexity of some more-or- 
less hidden assumptions behind each argument. I shall now briefly consider the strengths 
and weaknesses of each of the arguments in justification of prevention at the level of an 
individual or society.
The greatest weakness of the eugenic argument is the vagueness of terms like 
‘eugenic’, ‘genetically normal’ and ‘genetic health’. Since there is apparently no 
standard human genome to be defined by science, drawing the demarcation line between 
I ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’ will always be a value judgement. The argument also seems to 
assume an unproblematic notion of what is the common good. There is an obvioust
I
utilitarian rationale according to which greater good will be achieved automatically if|
. humankind is able to rid itself of certain faulty genes. In the final analysis the question is
f
! very much about the balance between the good of the individual and the good of society. 
Both can be measured in terms of many different indicators (e.g., economic, health-
[
related or autonomy-related), the weighing of which results in different policies.
I
| The problem with the foetal wastage argument lies in its assumptions about nature and
|
.natural. As we have seen, nature is not consistent in selecting which embryos or foetuses 
have good prospects for life. Nature does not necessarily eliminate genes leading to ID,
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as the example of the reproductive success of fragile-X women shows. In addition, the 
j  supporters of the foetal-wastage argument have failed to demonstrate why natural should 
, be considered good in general or with respect to spontaneous abortions in particular. The
s
goals of medicine are manifold and the achievement of these goals may entail 
enhancing, restoring or acting against natural processes.
The family burden argument may be more successful than the two previous ones, if 
two conditions are met. Firstly, familial reproductive autonomy is given high value, and, 
secondly, a psychological or economical burden is accepted as a justification for 
abortion. However, we should separate two issues, the general justification for the 
prevention of ID (e.g., in the form of introducing nationwide programmes) and 
justification in particular cases. In the former case, the argument is weaker because 
there is substantial variation in the psychological and economic burdens and especially
I
the economic burden is highly determined by the nature of the health and social services 
available in a particular society. In the latter case, if obvious burden can be anticipated
[
in a particular family, the argument is strong. If a society accepts abortion on request,
fff
there are no convincing arguments to deny it from parents willing to influence some
Ii
qualitative features of their offspring. This statement does not, however, mean that
i
^health care providers should have a duty to perform prenatal diagnosis on any kind of 
request. The other side of respecting parental autonomy is supporting parents’ right to
t
i
give birth to children who will be intellectually or physically handicapped. The
|
, replaceability argument, according to which parents would in some cases have a duty to
|
j abort a foetus with a condition known to lead to ID, was shown to be weak because it 
ignores the particular contexts of real life, where decisions are made.
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The societal burden argument was shown to be problematic for several reasons. Cost- 
benefit calculations, which have been overtly or covertly used to justify prevention 
programmes may perhaps never be accurate enough to form a basis for prevention. The
i
tI
recent means of justifying screening, not in terms of cost-effectiveness but instead in 
terms of the enhancement of reproductive autonomy, does not abolish the economic 
issue, since it is highly improbable that a cost-meffective screening programme would 
be established only to enhance autonomy.
!
I Non-economic societal burdens are more difficult to measure, but they are real and do 
not necessarily escape commensurability totally. Even a value like autonomy can be 
commensurable in the sense that some amount of autonomy may be considered worth 
sacrificing if enough of something good is gained. However, no amount of societal 
good, at least in present Western societies, can be considered enough to outrank the
|
specific autonomy of pregnant women to say no to prenatal screening or testing.
| Finally, the quality of life argument was also shown to be problematic in many ways.
I
f The concept of quality of life is far from clear and has been used in many meanings
I
f
referring to subjective or objective aspects of an individual’s life or sometimes a 
combination of these. Despite these difficulties much research has been done in this
|
respect and something can be said about the quality of life of intellectually disabled 
persons.
i
| Firstly, it has not been shown that the intellectually disabled in general would have a
i
■ considerably lower quality of life than the rest of the population. In fact, the existing
I
: empirical evidence points out that the differences are minor. Secondly, it may be that it 
is not meaningful to refer to the quality of life of the whole intellectually disabled
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population. Thirdly, even if a subgroup or an individual can be shown to have a 
 ^markedly low quality of life, we must be careful with conclusions about causality, since 
the low quality may not be a necessary consequence of ID but of environmental origin.
9. Moral status and intellectual disability
9.1. What is moral status?
The concept of moral status is used widely, yet there are no clear-cut definitions for it.
People, animals, things, ideas and the like are referred to as having moral status. It may
be low or high and it can be compared (i.e., there are various degrees of moral status).
Moral status can also be thought of as intrinsic or conferred.
The vagueness of the concept of moral status is obvious when one looks at the
following examples:
X has moral status —> It is always wrong to destroy X 
X has moral status —» It is prima facie wrong to destroy X 
X has moral status —> X has a right to respect (life, help, care, etc.)
X has moral status —» Y has a moral obligation with regard to X
Although moral status seems to escape an exact definition, it is plausible that people in 
general think along the following lines. If something has moral status it is worthy of 
moral consideration (Edwards 1997), and we have, or can have, moral obligations 
towards it (Warren 1997).ff
| The concept of moral status can be thought of as ‘a means of specifying those entities
I
towards which we believe ourselves to have moral obligations, as well as something of
!
what we take those obligations to be’ (ibid., p.9). The concept is general by nature. We 
usually ascribe moral status to members of a group, not merely to specific individuals
f
(ibid.).
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A wide consensus seems to prevail about the moral status of many things and beings.
| On one hand, stones and other inanimate objects are usually considered to have no moral 
| status at all (ibid.); on the other hand, adult human beings with normal intelligence are 
considered to have full moral status. This consensus has not been or is not, however, 
complete.
Firstly, in some philosophical schools, the idea of moral status or its generality is 
rejected. Moral nihilism denies the possibility of moral principles. According to ethical
I
egoism each moral agent has obligations only toward itself, and moral subjectivism sees 
claims about moral matters as a matter of individual opinion (ibid.).
Secondly, there are examples of cultures and philosophies in which some inanimate 
things like stones are considered sacred, which is obviously a form of moral status 
(ibid.).
[
I Thirdly, not all adult human beings with normal intelligence have been or are given
E
full moral status. Until the 20th century women were given lower moral status than men
[
(by most great names related to the history of Western philosophy. In our time race or 
sexual orientation are examples of traits used to deny full moral status.
[
I have so far deliberately used the example of ‘adult human beings with normal 
j intelligence’ and thus not mentioned the main topic of this chapter, namely, the 
relationship between intelligence and moral status. As we have already seen in Chapter
i
5, attitudes towards ID have varied from neglect to respect. Intelligence has been and is 
| used as a criterion for full moral status. Thus, in addition to racism and sexism, there is 
something that might be called intelligism (Vehmas 1999a). This chapter focuses on the 
question of whether this intelligism can be morally justified.
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9.2. Criteria for moral status
The moral status of a being or a thing can be based on its intrinsic or relational 
properties. Philosophical theories about moral status can refer to a single property or to 
several properties as a basis for moral status. Mary Ann Warren (1997) calls the former 
uni-criterial theories, and she suggests a multi-criterial account for moral status. I find 
her criticisms about the uni-criterial theories plausible and will review them briefly,
[
concentrating, however, on theories with special relevance to the main topic of my 
thesis.
Intrinsic properties that have been proposed as single criteria for moral status are life, 
sentience and personhood. They all look attractive in presenting a relatively clear and
i
simple criterion for moral status. A closer look reveals, however, problems with each.
9.2.1. Life
. Life as the only criterion for moral status leads to serious problems. Firstly, it is not 
obvious what should be counted as a living thing and is thus worthy of moral respect
i
(Warren 1997). Secondly, if we wish to continue living at all, it is not, in practice,
!
possible for us to give equal moral status to all living things. Each time we brush our
f
|
teeth, for example, we obviously destroy millions of living organisms.
f
I
While having life does not seem to work as the only criterion for moral status, it could 
work better as one of the criteria for moral status. If having life guarantees some moral
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status, then any destruction of life -  however primitive - would require some 
justification. Below I present the multi-criterial account for moral status, and having life 
will be one of these criteria. But first let us go to the important issues of sentience and 
personhood.
9.2.2. Sentience
According to Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary one meaning of sentience is 
‘capacity for sensation or sense perception’. In the philosophical context, however, the 
word is used in a somewhat narrower sense, referring to ‘capacity to suffer or experience 
| enjoyment or happiness’ (Singer 1993, p.58).
i
[ For the philosopher Peter Singer, the limit of sentience is ‘the only defensible 
boundary of concern for the interest of others’ (ibid., p.58). Furthermore, ‘If a being is
|
| not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to
[t
be taken into account’ (ibid., p.57-58).
I shall leave aside the discussions about animal consciousness and their general 
capability to feel pain. For me, it is simply plausible, for example, from the evolutionaryt
point of view, that at least so-called higher animals can feel pain in a way that is 
equivalent to or greatly resembles the human experience.
I
| Strictly speaking, we cannot be sure which animals are sentient. In the same way, of
!
. course, I  cannot be sure whether any other human being is sentient or whether my car is 
or is not sentient. There is, however, evidence that supports the claim that a particular
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entity is sentient in the preceding sense (Warren 1997). Having a nervous system and 
sense organs indicative of perceptual ability, responding to noxious stimuli in certain 
ways (crying, howling, moaning, escaping, etc.) and the presence of neurochemicals 
! that, in humans, are related to experiences of pain and pleasure are examples of such 
evidence. For the purpose of my thesis, it is not important where we draw the line 
between sentient and non-sentient animals, but the preceding evidence suggests that at 
| least mammals and birds are sentient (ibid.).
According to Singer (1993), the principle of equal consideration of interests is a basic 
moral principle. And ‘an interest is an interest, whoever’s interest it may be’ (ibid., 
p.21). The importance of one’s interests does not depend on his or her abilities or other 
characteristics apart from the characteristic of having interests. Sentience is the only 
relevant factor here; for example, sex, race or species are not. Non-sentient organisms
i
; may have needs, but they do not feel pain or pleasure and cannot ‘mind’ what happens 
j to them (Warren 1997).
There is a special group among sentient beings, the members of which are self-aware 
and capable of reason - persons. The lives of persons are more valuable to themselves 
than the lives of other sentient beings to themselves. Thus killing a sentient being is 
wrong, but killing a person is more seriously wrong than killing a non-personal sentient 
I being (Singer 1993).
Et
| This very brief description of Singer’s views cannot, of course, do justice to his work,
I
which has been developed over decades and presented in several books and articles. I[
|
: hope, however, to have presented the main idea in such a way that its problems can be
i
I understood in the light of the criticism that follows.
At least three kinds of problems arise from sentience as the only criterion for moral 
status. Firstly, the view ignores the benefits of ascribing moral status to non-sentient 
living things and plant or animal species. Even from a strictly utilitarian point of view 
this stance may lead to greater happiness for a greater number of sentient beings.
Secondly, and more important from the point of view of my thesis, Singer seems to 
; consider the moral status of beings in relative isolation, as if their relationships with the 
| world outside would be almost irrelevant. Singer, as well as some other utilitarian 
[ bioethicists (e.g., Harris), emphasise that emotions should not have an essential role in 
I our moral judgements. This view has been challenged in feminist ethics and the ethics of 
care (Warren 1997). Our moral obligations cannot be understood in isolation from our 
; human intuitions and feelings (Noddings 1984). An obvious example is the care of 
i  parents for their children. In Noddings’ words, ‘A philosophical position that has
j
! difficulty distinguishing between our obligations to human infants and, say, pigs is in 
some difficulty straight off. It violates our most deeply cherished feelings about human 
goodness’ (ibid., p.87).
Thirdly, equal consideration of the interests of all sentient beings precludes activities 
essential to human health and survival (Warren 1997). This preclusion is obvious at least 
in the case of small invertebrate animals, most of which are ‘neither cute nor cuddly’. 
They are seriously harmed through ordinary domestic and agricultural activities, and 
even acting as a peaceful gatherer of wild plant foods would require putting human 
interests sometimes ahead of those of other sentient beings (ibid.).
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9.2.3. Personhood
The concept of person has been very central in bioethical discourse during the past three 
| decades. The history of the concept is long, ‘starting in Roman antiquity, maturing in the 
Christian Middle Ages and consolidating in Modem Times’ (Welie 1998, p.210).
Originally the Latin term persona referred to the mask used in Roman theatre. In later 
; Roman times it began to denote the particularity of individuals. According to Welie, it 
: was Boethius who presented the first formal definition of personhood: ‘the person is the 
individual substance of a rational nature’ (Boethius cited by Welie 1998, p.212). Later, 
in the Middle Ages, the term began to refer also to dignity and legal duties.
No single exact definition of ‘person’ exists in modem bioethical discourse. In any 
, case, being a person carries a strong conceptual link to having full moral status (Warren 
| 1997). Being ‘alive’ or ‘sentient’ is at least to some degree a scientific question, but 
whether one is a person is not a scientific but a philosophical question.
In our everyday speech we use the term ‘person’ rather loosely and with different 
I meanings. For example, we do not usually refer to animals as persons. On the other 
hand, people who, strictly taken, do not yet or no longer have the capacity for moral 
agency are referred to as persons in our everyday speech (Warren 1997).
In philosophy, however, the terms ‘person’ and ‘personhood’ have been given specific 
i meanings, depending on the context and frame of reference of the writer in question.
II
1 Martyn Evans has claimed that, in philosophical and public debate, unfamiliar 
interpretations of ordinary concepts (like ‘person’) may ‘gain an influence which they do 
not deserve -  partly because of the mystique and authority which is attracted by any idea
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that sounds technical’ (Evans 1996, p.24). This technical term is then used as though it 
could settle moral issues in an objective, pseudo-scientific way. Evans also presents a 
collection of recent definitions of ‘person’ or ‘personhood’ and summarises their 
essential features as follows:
1. ‘The person’ as a value-free description (at least, initially)
2. Personhood as a sign of being valuable
3. Personhood as the chance of feeling valuable
4. Personhood as cognitive capacity
5. Personhood as cognitive and affective capacity
6. Personhood as moral wholeness
7. Personhood as possession of neurological structures
8. Personhood as really useful, or, as the benefit of the doubt
9. Personhood as the ground of conscious identity
10. Personhood as individual humanity
11. Personhood as the possibility of consciousness
12. Personhood as conscious mental life
13. Personhood as metaphysical, first and foremost
r
\
i The list clearly demonstrates the wide variety of meanings these concepts have had in
I
| contemporary philosophy. It also helps us to see that the question ‘What is a person?’ is
[
not empirical but is instead conceptual(ibid-).
These conceptual issues do not arise in a vacuum but do so because of a need for a 
I definition that can be applied to a particular problem (ibid.). Evans argues further that at 
| the root of the conceptual disagreement (of the definition of ‘person’) is a moral
Ij
I disagreement about how in fact different individuals ought to be treated.
I
f Jaana Hallamaa ended up with very similar conclusions in her thesis The Prisms o f
\
| Moral Personhood. ‘Person’ is not a theoretically ‘innocent’ concept. It ‘includes an
I
I implicit normative aspect in the sense that it states what is morally important and 
relevant and what can be left to one side.... Person as a moral term implies our central
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normative commitments, it does not offer a neutral ground for solving moral 
disagreements’ (Hallamaa 1994, p.257)
It was probably Michael Tooley who introduced the radically new definition of the 
concept of person that has been used by several utilitarian thinkers later (Tooley 1972). 
For Tooley the concept of a person is ‘a purely moral concept, free of all descriptive 
content’ (ibid., p.40). To be a person means the same as to have a serious moral right to 
life. An organism possesses a serious right to life only if it possesses the concept of a 
self as a continuing subject of experiences and other mental states and it believes that it 
is itself such a continuing entity. It follows that foetuses, newborns, and severely 
intellectually disabled or demented humans are not persons in this sense but that adult 
individuals of some higher species of primates are. Obviously the most problematic 
conclusion would be that, in a conflict situation, we should prefer the life of an adult 
. chimpanzee to the life of a newborn human being. I strongly doubt whether Michael
i
i
Tooley would be willing to go this far in practice.
Different strategies have been used to avoid this difficulty. Engelhardt, for example, 
introduced the concept of a social person. These individuals, because of their capacity to 
interact in social roles, are accorded some of the rights of persons strictly (Engelhardt 
1986). Thus personhood is no longer the sole criterion for moral status; instead, other
I criteria referring to the world outside are introduced as well.
1
| Apparently, then, the most serious problem in using personhood as the only criterion
|
for moral status is the same as the afore-mentioned second problem related to the
j
concept of sentience. Judgements about moral status are made in isolation, as if the
|
i
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world outside and the relationships between the individual in question and his or her 
environment would be irrelevant.
This can be seen as an example of the problems of an individualistic philosophy in
[
| bioethics in general and an individualistic approach to ID in particular.
Jos Welie has written an extensive critique of the libertarian approach to bioethics,
I which, according to him, ‘implies the denial of the significance of fellowship for the 
theory of ethics. It overestimates the freedom and manipulative powerfulness of humans 
while underestimating the positiveness of intersubjective care.’ (Welie 1998, p. 194). 
Welie does not write about the intellectually disabled in particular, but his general 
criticism about the trumping status of autonomy in modem bioethics has obvious 
implications for their status, too. Welie himself turns to continental philosophers like 
Levinas, Heidegger and Marcel in building up a new foundation for clinical ethics. 
Steven Edwards has argued that the low moral status often accorded to people with ID[
j
derives from individualism (Edwards 1997). He identifies two main components in theI
; individualistic position, the ontological view concerning the nature of the self and the
i
normative view concerning the nature of a moral agent.
According to the ontological component of individualism, ‘the existence of the self 
; and the identity of the self does not depend upon the existence of anything else beyond 
, the self (ibid., p.34). An obvious classic of this kind of thinking is Descartes, but 
Edwards mentions also John Rawls as a contemporary example of ontological 
individualism. The normative component of individualism states that the ideal moral
Iii
: agent is fully autonomous, thus being able to make his or her own decisions about a 
! good life.
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Both of these aspects of individualism refer to independence in their own ways. The 
self is an independent entity if its existence does not depend on the existence of other 
selves (ibid.). One is socially independent if one does not need the concern and care of
fj
others. This has obvious implications for the status of the disabled, who, if any, are in 
many ways dependent on other people in their daily lives.
The issue of dependence can, however, be seen in a totally different light. Instead of 
the disabled being considered a marginal group, they can be seen as distinctively human 
because of their dependence on other people (Vehmas 1999b). Earlier, I referred to Jos 
Welie’s book, in which he discussed the issue more generally. The particular chapter in 
which he brings in Heidegger and Marcel is titled ‘Solitarity or Solidarity?’, which 
captures nicely the essence of the philosophical dispute. Steven Edwards, in his turn, 
seeks the answer in the philosophy of Charles Taylor, whose view of self is radically at
I
odds with the individualist view (Edwards 1997).
| 9.2.4. Relationships and moral status
j Being alive, sentient or a person are intrinsic properties of individuals (i.e., it is logically 
possible to have them without reference to the existence of other beings). Moral statusi
, has also been based on relational properties like an entity’s social and ecological
lt
| relationships or the relationship of caring (Warren 1997).
\i
According to some representatives of environmental ethics, all our moral obligations
ii
arise from the fact that we are members of communities, biological or social (ibid.). One
possible line of argument claims that the autonomy of a short-lived individual should 
not be preferred to the dynamic life form of its species, genetically persisting over 
millions of years (Honderich 1995). The so-called deep ecologists want to preserve the 
integrity of the biosphere for its own sake, irrespective of the possible benefits for 
humans (Singer 1993). The emphasis is not on living organisms but is instead on entities 
like species, ecological systems or the whole biosphere. Furthermore, the deep 
ecologists think that the value we place on our own lives should be placed on the life of 
every living thing.
Again, this kind of thinking adds some important aspect to our moral understanding, 
but it is problematic to justify basing the moral status of entities solely on, for example, 
the role of the species of these entities within a social or biotic community. Firstly, as 
; Singer remarked, we have a strong intuition that ‘the rights to “live and blossom” of 
normal adult humans ought to be preferred over those of yeasts, and the rights of gorillas
i
|
over those of grasses’ (ibid., p.282). Secondly, the relationship between the moral status
I
f
of a species and individual representatives of that species is not clear. Thirdly, neither is
I
it clear where the border is between entities that can or cannot be regarded as ‘holistic’. 
An atom could well be considered a holistic system if we were in the size class of 
quarks. On the other hand, in the size class of the Milky Way, the holistic system would 
probably be the whole Universe.
Another line of argument that refers to relationships as a basis for human morality can 
be found in the feminist ethics of caring (Noddings 1984). According to it, the 
■ traditional approach to ethics that begins with a discussion of moral principles, 
judgement and reasoning is not the best starting point. Instead, moral status is seen as a
i
i
i
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function of caring, a fundamental emotional relationship that is feminine by origin. 
Reason sets priorities and helps us to determine the ways to meet the needs of those we 
care for; the motivation to care is, however primarily emotional, not rational. We are ‘at 
| the centre of concentric circles of caring. In the inner, intimate circle, we care because 
we love’ (ibid., p.46). When we move outward in the circles, we encounter first those for 
; whom we have personal regard; further on are those we have not yet encountered.
Noddings illustrated the femininity of this approach by citing some examples from the 
literature, one of which is the story of Abraham and his son Isaac at the Moriah 
Mountain. According to her, a woman could not have written this Biblical account, 
where God asks Abraham to sacrifice Isaac. A mother would not have acted as Abraham 
did, nor would a Mother-as-God have demanded what this Father-God did.
The caring ethics sees us related at the very heart of our being: ‘My very individuality
i
is defined in a set of relations. This is my basic reality’ (ibid., p.51). We are free to reject 
I the impulse to care, but it may not lead to happy consequences. We are not naturally
I
“ alone but are instead in a relation or in relations from which we derive nourishment andIi
!
courage.
Noddings’ theory contains important elements that should be considered when the 
| moral status of a being is evaluated. It does not, however, work alone. At least the
| following problem arises: if moral obligations depend on the individual’s possession of
1
specific empathic capacities, what about the persons who lack such capacities 
completely? Do they have moral obligations at all, and, if they do, how can these
I
| obligations be justified? If moral rules and principles are totally rejected, we are lost in
j
cases in which empathy does not guide us (Warren 1997).
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9.2.5. A multi-criterial approach to moral status
All the earlier-mentioned uni-criterial theories contain important insights, but they do 
not provide necessary and sufficient conditions (i.e., an adequate definition of moral 
status). In the following discussion, I present a brief description of a multi-criterial 
account of moral status by Mary Ann Warren (1997). I find it a plausible and powerful 
tool with which to examine the moral status of various beings and entities. I present the 
seven principles of moral status with only short comments on each. In the rest of this 
chapter I apply this account to various groups of human beings, in particular foetuses, 
newborns, children and adults, with potential or actual ID.
1. The Respect fo r  Life Principle: Living organisms are not to be killed or otherwise
|
! harmed, without good reasons that do not violate principles 2-7.
\
\
This principle gives at least some moral status to all living things. However, beings that 
, have a stronger moral status than can be based upon mere organic life do no wrong if 
they harm, for example, some microorganisms while taking care of themselves or 
preparing food or the like. Later principles specify factors that define what counts as a
|
sufficiently good reason for harming a living thing.
!
i
I 2. The Anti-Cruelty Principle: Sentient beings are not to be killed or subjected to pain 
or suffering, unless there is no other feasible way o f furthering goals that are (1)
consistent with principles 3-7; and (2) important to human beings, or other entities 
that have a stronger moral status that can be based on sentience alone.
Death is a greater harm to sentient beings than to non-sentient beings. ‘Pain is pain, no 
matter who feels it’ (Bonnie Steinbock, cited by Warren 1997, p .153). The principle 
does not require us to treat all sentient beings as our moral equals, but it demands a 
stronger justification for harming organisms that are sentient than what is required in the 
case of non-sentient organisms. It is likely that sentience is a matter of degree. The 
intensity of the experience of pain probably does not differ, but beings that are subjects 
of their lives have more to lose than mentally less sophisticated beings.
3. The Agent’s Rights Principle: Moral agents have fu ll and equal basic moral rights, 
including the rights to life and liberty.
This principle probably has long-term value for humans although applying the principle 
may not always maximise happiness. Language is a pre-requisite for moral agency, 
because moral concepts and principles require it. Most human beings are therefore 
obvious moral agents, but some higher primates may be such, too. On the other hand, 
newborns or profoundly intellectually disabled persons who do not have language are 
not moral agents in this sense.
4. The Human Rights Principle: Within the limits o f their own capacities and o f 
principle 3, human beings who are capable o f sentience but not o f moral agency 
have the same moral rights as do moral agents.
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Principle 3 does not imply that only moral agents have basic moral rights. Principle 4 
gives these rights to human beings that are not yet, will never be nor are any longer 
moral agents. Human beings become moral agents only through a long period of 
dependence upon human beings that are already moral agents. ‘Persons essentially are 
second persons, who grow up with other persons’ (Annette Baier, cited by Warren 1997, 
p. 164). Therefore, it is impractical to deny full moral status to, for example, newborns. It 
' is, of course, also emotionally offensive to most people. The issues of infanticide and the 
moral status of the intellectually disabled are dealt with later in this chapter.
5. The Ecological Principle: Living things that are not moral agents, but that are 
important to the ecosystems o f which they are part, have, within the limits o f
j principles 1-4, a stronger moral status than could be based upon their intrinsic
i
I properties alone; ecologically important entities that are not themselves alive, such
I
as species and habitats, may also legitimately be accorded a stronger moral status
f
than their intrinsic properties would indicate.
According to this principle some plants and animals have a stronger moral status than 
’ their intrinsic properties would suggest, because their species is ecologically important 
and endangered by human activities. The principle also allows more than instrumental
■ value for, for example, earth, air, water and biological species.
[
!
i
; 6. The Interspecific Principle: Within the limits o f principles 1-5, non-human membersI
o f mixed social communities have a stronger moral status than could be based on 
their intrinsic properties alone.
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We usually feel that we have stronger moral obligations to animals that we have 
established social relationships with. Although they are not fully moral agents, they 
resemble such in their behaviour. They may, for example, show affection, loyalty,
|
courage and patience. Something that resembles a promise is made when a relationship 
between a human being and, for example, a dog is established.
; 7. The Transitivity o f  Respect Principle: Within the limits o f principles 1-6, and to the 
extent that is feasible and morally permissible, moral agents should respect one 
another's attributions o f moral status.
This principle allows some moral status for entities that would not have such according 
to principles 1-6. A graveyard is an example of such an entity.
|
9.3. M oral status before birth
Although the development in genetics has been astonishing during the past several 
; years, no therapeutic breakthroughs have taken place. A great number of conditions
| leading to more-or-less severe ID can be diagnosed prenatally, but almost always the
I
' options are either to abort the foetus or accept the condition in one’s offspring. If 
. induced abortion is totally banned on moral grounds, the prevention of these conditions
i
is ruled out. If, on the other hand, a human being is thought to gain moral status only 
when capable of valuing his or her own life, there are no moral problems with 
preventing such conditions. These extremes are not subscribed to by many, since their
practical implications are hard to accept and there are also theoretical problems involved 
with both positions.
These problems arise from trying to solve the moral problems of abortion by referring
[f
to some criteria the foetus either meets or fails to meet. There are, however relevant 
relational properties, especially the dependence on the body of a sentient moral agent. 
The moral status of this agent is also at stake and so may be the position of the entire 
human species. Applying the multi-criteria approach may help to clarify the issue.
9.3.1. Embryos and young foetuses
I used the terms ‘embryo’ and ‘foetus’ a few times in the previous chapter without 
defining them. In general, ‘an embryo’ refers to the first stages of development after
t
fertilisation, in the human species it usually refers to the first two months. Thereafter it 
| is called ‘a foetus’. This terminology is, of course, a matter of convention, and
j sometimes the terms pre-embryo and embryo proper are also used. By a ‘young foetus’ I
I
! mean a foetus until about 26 weeks of gestation. The reason for the use of this term is 
empirical and will be explained later.
Embryos and young foetuses have some moral status according to the Respect for Life 
Principle. They are not, however, moral agents and cannot have the status the Agent’s
j *
Rights Principle would allow. Embryos are not sentient and the Anti-Cruelty Principle 
| cannot be applied to them. The possible sentience of foetuses needs more scrutiny.
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Obviously we cannot know for sure whether a foetus is sentient (i.e., able to suffer or 
experience enjoyment or happiness). Much is, however, known about some of its 
physiological reactions and at least something can be inferred from that information.
|
Firstly, young foetuses lack the necessary structures to feel pain. First sensory 
experiences are not possible until the thalamo-cortical tracts have developed (26th 
gestational week). Evoked potentials are not possible until the 29th gestational week, 
and therefore we can only speculate about possible pain between weeks 26 and 29 
(Vanhatalo 1999).
Secondly, the activity of the frontal cortex is needed for the cognitive dimension of 
pain. The area is activated during the first year of life. Therefore, the pain we feel may 
not be equal to the pain a newborn feels (ibid.).
Thirdly, the foetus, however, reacts to painful stimuli much earlier. The first reactions
i
to somatic stimuli appear at 7.5 gestational weeks. These reactions can be strong and
i
i
non-specific, and they can be similar to reactions to non-painful stimuli (ibid.).
i
| Fourthly, hormonal, metabolic and autonomic responses to painful stimuli can be
i
\
controlled with analgesics. Such control has been shown in premature babies in surgery 
: or intensive care (ibid.).
All this information implies that foetal pain may not be the only relevant factor here. It 
' seems obvious that foetuses are not sentient before 26 weeks, but even before that some 
sensory stimuli may be harmful to the development of the foetus. If it is aborted, it
if
cannot be said to have suffered, but, if it continues life, it can have been harmed.
! So far we have discussed the principles referring to the intrinsic properties of the
It
foetus. They are not, however, the only relevant principles here. The Transitivity of
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Respect Principle states that moral agents should respect one another’s attributions of 
moral status to the extent that is feasible and morally permissible. Since some people 
i regard foetuses as having full moral status, respect for these people gives at least some
f
moral status to foetuses and embryos. However, this moral status is limited by the moral 
rights of women according to the Agent’s Rights Principle (Warren 1997).
Does it matter what the foetus looks like? The answer is partially yes, on the following 
grounds. A young embryo does not look human, in fact it resembles animal embryos, 
like worms, tadpoles or pigs (Richardson and Reiss 1999). Only later does it begin to 
look more human. When foetuses reach the limit of viability, they look very much 
human. This does not bring sentience or moral agency to them, but it does raise strong 
feelings in most people. Seeing one’s offspring in the screen of an ultrasound machine is 
a strong experience. Again, according to the Transitivity of Respect Principle these 
more-human-looking foetuses should have a higher moral status than the less-human-
I
 ^looking ones. This principle also explains the common view that the moral status of the 
foetus becomes gradually stronger. But, at least until they are sentient, their moral status 
is lower than that of their mothers, due to the Agent’s Rights Principle.
Does it matter whether the embryo or the young foetus is a future person with ID? 
Such embryos and foetuses do not differ essentially in their morphological 
characteristics from those with potentially normal intellectual development. In their
f
i
genetic characteristics these two groups differ: one group carries a potential for normal, 
the other for more or less compromised intellectual development.
They should, however, have some moral status according to the Respect for Life 
Principle. Although some people think that the moral status of intellectually disabled
persons is lower than that of non-disabled persons, the Transitivity of Respect Principle 
does not work in that direction. I take it for granted that moral agents’ respect for ‘one 
another’s attributions of moral status to the extent that is feasible and morally 
permissible’ refers to positive moral status. The principle does not mean that the moral 
status of an entity would be a bit lower with every person willing to give it such a low 
status.
9.3.2. Older foetuses
If the afore-cited scientific reasoning about the prerequisites for sentience is correct, the 
foetus becomes sentient at about 26 gestational weeks. Thus it reaches an important
[
milestone in moral status, and the Anti-Cruelty Principle should be applied: it should not
I
be killed or subjected to pain or suffering, unless there is no other feasible way of
\
! furthering goals that are 1) consistent with principles 3-7; and 2) important to human 
i beings, or other entities, that have a stronger moral status than could be based on 
j sentience alone. The Human Rights Principle should also be applied: within the limits of 
| their own capacities and of the limits of principle 3, human beings who are capable of 
j  sentience but not of moral agency have the same moral rights as do moral agents.
I
Obviously it is the mother of the foetus who, in most cases, is the person with stronger
i
moral status and whose interests may be at stake. It is not perfectly clear what the ‘limits 
i of their own capacities’ mean in the Human Rights Principle, but at least being situated
j
inside an agent with full moral rights limits the capacities of the foetus. Although the
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moral status of the foetus has become stronger with advancing age, it is not equal to that 
of its mother. If it were, decisions would be difficult in situations in which carrying on a 
pregnancy seriously risks the life of the mother.
There is a grey area in gestational age during which the foetus is probably viable 
outside its mother, but (if the preceding scientific reasoning is correct) not sentient. The 
lower limit of viability is currently at about 24 weeks, although there are a few 
exceptions at 23 or even 22 weeks (of course, the estimates of gestational age are not 
exact). What should we think about such foetuses?
Viability has been an important milestone with reference to foetal rights. For example, 
in the famous Roe v. Wade decision, the United Sates Supreme Court established 
viability as the point after which states may prohibit abortions that are not deemed 
necessary to protect the life or health of the woman (Warren 1997).
r
The concept of viability is somewhat ambiguous. Sometimes it refers to a point in time 
| when the foetus may survive outside the womb without any special neonatal intensive 
I care. On the other hand, it may refer to a possibility to survive with the help of such
j  intensive care (ibid.). This ambiguity is not, however, decisive. Although it is true that|
the great majority of the now surviving babies bom before 26 weeks would die without 
special care, there have been occasional cases in which they have survived even before
I
today’s technology was available.
There are several reasons why the foetuses in this grey area (viable but not yet 
sentient) should have a rather strong moral status, at least to the point that abortion is 
‘ prohibited without obvious threat to the mother. Firstly, the moral status of the foetus
i
has become gradually stronger with advancing age, for example, its appearance being
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very human. Secondly, viability would introduce obvious moral problems into the 
abortion procedure itself. There would be three options: kill the foetus inside the womb, 
kill it outside the womb or do nothing except take it out. The first two would violate 
strongly the ethics of the medical profession, which, according the Transitivity of 
Respect Principle, should be considered here. The third option would result in a few 
foetuses surviving after all -  very probably with severe handicaps if not taken to 
intensive care. Of course, aborting viable foetuses, taking them to intensive care and, if 
they survive, giving them up for adoption would be an option, but then one could 
seriously ask why not give the foetus a few more weeks for a better chance to survive 
without handicaps.
9.4. Moral status after birthiiI
1
Birth does not make a difference with respect to moral agency. The newborn baby is no
, more a moral agent than the foetus inside its mother’s womb. Both are to be respected
i
j according to the Respect for Life Principle, the Anti-Cruelty Principle and the Human
■ Rights Principle. The Transitivity of Respect Principle also adds something to the moral
|
status of both groups.
Birth does, however, make a crucial difference when the interests of the foetus or 
, newborn and the interests of the mother are compared. Protecting the interests of the 
, individual before birth always compromises the interests of the mother; after birth the 
two individuals are physically separated and such compromising does not take place.
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Also, a newborn baby immediately acquires a social role that differs from the role of 
the foetus just a few minutes earlier. Thus, while the intrinsic properties relevant to 
moral status do not change at birth, there are highly relevant changes in some relational 
properties.
The concept of ID can not be applied to newborns or young infants. However, these 
children sometimes have conditions that lead to ID later in childhood. This development 
can often be predicted with high probability, but also in these cases the degree of 
disability remains uncertain.
There are no obvious factors that would make the moral status of these children lower 
than that of children with no known condition probably leading to ID. The issue of 
infanticide has, however, been raised in this context.
r
iI
|
9.4.1. Newborns and young infants
Newborn babies are surely not persons in the sense that Michael Tooley defined 
personhood. According to him, they do not have a serious right to life because they lack 
an essential feature, namely, ‘the concept of a self as a continuing subject of experiences
1
I
and other mental states’, neither do they believe that they are themselves such
I
continuing entities (Tooley 1972, p.44). Tooley does not discuss the relevance of ID to 
moral status, but it does come up, for example, in the work of Peter Singer and Helga 
Kuhse, who more or less directly stress the relevance of intelligence to moral status 
(Kuhse and Singer 1985, Singer 1993). The issue of active and passive euthanasia is one
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of the central topics in both books, but I shall concentrate only on the discussion 
concerning intelligence and its relevance to moral status.
Kuhse and Singer (1985) describe the case of Brian West, who was bom in 1980 with 
Down syndrome and oesophageal atresia (i.e., no connection between the back of the 
mouth and the stomach). He was operated on soon after his first birthday, but without 
the consent of his parents. Still, oral feeding could not be attempted until he was almost 
two years old. It was never very successful, and Brian died of brain damage due to 
severe breathing problems in December 1982. During his short life Brian spent a lot of 
time in hospital and in intensive care, had several operations and obviously suffered a 
lot. Afterwards it is easy to think that his life would probably have been better if it had 
been short and without the operations. The outcome, of course, was not obvious at the
ttime of the decision to operate.
\
j
There are many burning ethical issues here, and it is especially tragic that there was no
i
| consensus about treatment choices between Brian’s parents and the doctors in charge.
j What is important for my issue here is the reasoning of Kuhse and Singer about the
I
relevance of Down syndrome to treatment decisions.
According to them it was relevant in two ways. Firstly, physical characteristics related
I to Down syndrome, like poor muscle tone and increased susceptibility to infections of
Ir
: the upper respiratory tract, were probably associated with the outcome. The former may
[
; have complicated swallowing in the new reconstructed oesophagus, and the latter may 
have contributed to Brian’s additional complications after surgery. Brian’s father also
|
i suggested that the reduced intellectual capacities of a child with Down syndrome may
|
have compromised his learning to eat after surgery.
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Secondly, Kuhse and Singer wrote:
But, quite apart from these medical factors, Down’s syndrome is 
surely relevant to the decision to operate because it means a reduced 
potential for a life with the unique features which are commonly and 
reasonably regarded as giving special value to human lives. ... It 
might be justifiable to run some risk of the kind of misery Brian 
experienced, if there were a fair chance of a reasonably normal life; 
the same risk might not be justifiable if the best that could be hoped 
I for was the reduced potential of the life, of someone with Down
I syndrome .(ibid., p. 143)
These words indicate that (future) ID as such means lower moral status to Kuhse and 
Singer. Letting such a child die is more justifiable than letting a child with (future) 
normal intelligence die. And, to take one step further, because there is no crucial 
difference between killing and letting die, killing a (future) intellectually disabled infant 
is more justifiable than killing a child with (future) normal intelligence.
I
| While one can hardly question the misery of the life of Brian West, there are other
t[
points where Kuhse and Singer’s views are questionable. Firstly, the assumption that the 
' quality of life related to ID per se must be lower than the quality of life with normal
f.
intelligence is clearly wrong. I am not aware of empirical research comparing the quality
|
j of life of people with Down syndrome to that of other intellectually disabled individuals 
, or people with normal intelligence. However, the commonly held view that Down 
syndrome is associated with a joyful and positive character may well be true. In fact, if it 
, is true, a utilitarian should prefer the life of an individual with Down syndrome to the 
life of someone without this syndrome.
| Secondly, the reasoning of Kuhse and Singer seems to imply that the value of life
I
: decreases gradually with decreasing intelligence. What would then be the lower limit of
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intelligence that would guarantee full moral status? What about the individual with 
subnormal intelligence but not ID (according to current definitions)? What about 
■ extremely intelligent individuals and their quality of life?
Thirdly, the context in which one is bom and lives is very important for one’s 
happiness. Simo Vehmas (1999b, p.l 15) has presented the following clarifying example 
(for which he acknowledged John Lizza):
Suppose A is a boy without intellectual disabilities who grows up in 
an impoverished environment with bad familial and social 
relationships, whereas B has Down syndrome but grows up in an 
excellent environment with good social and familial support. Which 
one has the prospects for a more satisfactory life? Probably the child 
with Down syndrome, especially if the other child grew up in a 
neighbourhood where statistics showed that a high percentage of the 
; young males end up in prison or dead. Would Kuhse, Singer and
I Rachels think it permissible to kill infants bom in impoverished
| environments because the prospects for their lives would be much
! worse than for those bom in a more affluent environment?
[
j
| How does this all look in light of the multi-criteria approach to moral status? We have
\
I
: seen that foetuses can gain moral value from sources other than their intrinsic capacities 
\ only. In addition, birth is a significant milestone, after which the moral status is even 
| stronger. The newborn or a young infant gains moral status from many sources. The 
. Respect of Life Principle, the Anti-Cruelty Principle, the Human Rights Principle and
(the Transitivity of Respect Principle all guarantee the moral status of these people
|
j
although they cannot yet be claimed to be moral agents and have rights according to ther
[i
Agent’s Rights Principle. ID is not relevant here. Of course the individual may have a 
physical condition that makes life miserable, and it can be seriously asked whether 
palliative and basic care with a short life is better than intensive and operative care with
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a (possibly) longer life. However, even though ID would be associated with this 
particular condition, it is the physical condition, not the intellectual capacity that is the 
major determinant of the quality of life of the individual.
j
9.4.2. Children and adults with intellectual disability
The concept of ID is not meaningful for young infants, neither can they be called moral 
agents. During late infancy or early childhood the individual gains moral agency, and it 
also becomes possible to test his or her intelligence. We have seen that possible future 
ID is not relevant to the moral status of a foetus, newborn or young infant. How is the 
k situation for older children and adults with actual ID? Does the degree of disability 
affect the moral status of an individual?
|
| Steven Edwards has introduced the concept of the Low Moral Status (LMS) claim,
i
I
| according to which human individuals with intellectual disabilities are accorded, justly 
I or unjustly, a moral status that is lower than that accorded to intellectually able human
' individuals (Edwards 1997, p.31). He presents four considerations as evidence in|
support of this claim.
f
[ Firstly, future ID is usually considered to justify the termination of pregnancy. This
s
j
. does not necessarily imply, as Edwards notes, that the moral status of children and adults 
! with ID is therefore compromised. It may, however, be so that, in practice, the treatment 
of foetuses with features associated with disabilities reflects the general attitude towards
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children and adults with such features. John Harris wrote in 1985 about this dilemma as
follows:
; Most people would not, I suppose, think that mentally or physically
handicapped individuals are somehow less valuable than others, and 
yet anyone who thinks that the detection of handicap in the foetus is a 
good reason for abortion, must accept that such an individual is, or 
will become, less valuable than one without such handicap, less 
valuable because less worth saving or less entitled to life. (Harris 
1985, p.7)
Harris returned to this issue more deeply in 1998 and, interestingly, he seems to have 
changed his views. As we saw in Chapter 6, he argues against a necessary connection 
between prenatal screening and the quality of life of disabled persons (Harris 1998b). 
Accepting the abortion of foetuses with certain conditions does not necessarily imply
L
that lower moral status should be accorded to bom individuals with such conditions.
i
| Although I agree with Harris here, it is still worth noting that, in practice, there may
r
i
I well be an association between attitudes towards these two groups.
Secondly, until recently, it was an accepted practice to let, for example, children with 
Down syndrome and associated gut malformations die instead of performing life-saving 
| operations. In the United States the so-called Baby Doe regulations clarified the 
j situation and condemned such practice. English law remained ambiguous on this subject 
, until 1990 (Edwards 1997).I
E
Thirdly, the notions of personhood popular among utilitarian philosophers (see the 
earlier discussion) may be thought of as supporting the lower status of individuals with 
ID. However, even if the extreme views on personhood were adopted, there would be
!
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implications only for the status of the profoundly intellectually disabled, who are a small 
minority of the population with ID. I shall consider their position in more detail later.
Fourthly, the terminology applied may carry implicit messages concerning moral 
status. Edwards mentions terms like ‘mentally subnormal’, ‘mentally retarded’ and 
‘mentally deficient’. The message of these terms is not, however, so obvious. The choice 
of term may reflect political correctness in a particular context rather than moral 
connotations.
The LMS claim, as presented by Edwards, describes the moral status accorded to 
individuals belonging to this group of people, rather than, to their actual moral status 
(i.e., the moral status which an individual may be thought to possess independently of 
the moral status accorded to him or her). I shall now consider the actual moral status of 
t these people in the light of Warren’s multi-criteria approach.
iI
It is obvious that the great majority of people with ID are moral agents, also persons in 
the sense of, for example, Tooley (possesses the concept of a self as a continuing subject
I
j  of experiences and other mental states and believes that it is itself such a continuing 
s entity (Tooley 1972, p.62)). Therefore, the Agent’s Rights Principle should be applied to 
them, and their basic moral rights should not differ from those with normal intelligence.
It was mentioned earlier that language is a prerequisite for moral agency, because 
moral concepts and principles require it. This may be so, but there is no clear-cut
t
i
! demarcation line between individuals who possess language and those who do not.
i
There are many examples of severely physically disabled individuals who have been 
thought to be profoundly intellectually disabled also, but whose cognitive abilities have
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turned out to be normal when adequate means of communication have become possible. 
Christy Brown, the author of My Left Foot is the most famous example.
Although the classification is difficult, there obviously are individual human beings 
that are not and will never become moral agents. The Human Rights Principle should be 
applied to them: ‘within the limits of their own capacities and of principle 3 (the Agent’s 
Rights Principle) ... they have the same moral rights as do moral agents’. Conflicts of 
interest similar to those between a foetus and its mother cannot take place here. 
However, situations can be thought of in which we have to choose between the rights of 
a human moral agent and a profoundly intellectually disabled human being. In such a 
case the rights of the former would weigh more, since the agent would have a stronger 
moral status due to the Agent’s Rights Principle.
Furthermore, a hypothetical case could also be thought of in which the rights of a non-
\
human moral agent and a severely intellectually disabled individual would be in conflict.
!\
I am not referring to E.T. or a future super-computer but to intelligent higher primates.
I
' Analogously with the preceding case, the rights of the moral agent should be preferred. 
However, the supporters of the non-human individual would bear the burden of proof of 
showing that the intellectually disabled individual definitively lacks the characteristics 
of a moral agent.
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9.5. Concluding remarks
The concept of moral status is useful and often referred to, although mostly indirectly or 
implicitly. We cannot escape comparing the moral value of entities and beings, although 
it sometimes creates difficult dilemmas.
In philosophical theory various properties have been proposed to form the basis for 
moral status. If a single criterion is used, the view easily becomes too narrow. I have 
found Warren’s recent multi-criterial account for moral status plausible and useful both 
in general and with reference to ID in particular.
Embryos and young foetuses gain some moral status from the Respect for Life 
Principle. The present or future life situation of the mother (or the family) may, 
however, sometimes justify the killing of the foetus, because the moral status of theri
mother is stronger than that of the foetus. Possible future ID does not make difference 
here.
Older foetuses that have reached sentience have higher moral status, since the Anti- 
Cruelty Principle should be applied to them. Again, future ID does not make a difference
II
here. In the few weeks’ grey area, when the foetus is viable but not yet sentient it should
i
have a rather strong moral status, at least to the point that abortion is prohibited without
I
obvious threat to the mother.
[
I The newborn or a young infant gains moral status from another principle. The Human 
Rights Principle guarantees them a higher moral status than foetuses can have. Still, ID 
is only a future possibility in this group and does not make a difference with respect to
iI
moral status.
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It is only in the group of children and adults with actual ID in which very low 
intelligence may be relevant to one’s moral status. While the great majority of
t intellectually disabled persons can be said to be moral agents in the full sense of the
I
term, some individuals with profound ID obviously lack the qualities necessary for 
moral agency. The Human Rights Principle should be applied to them, but in a possible 
conflict situation the moral status of a full moral agent would be stronger.
10. The ethics of prevention in practice: three syndromes
10.1. Down syndrome
Down syndrome (DS) was first described as a separate entity in 1866 in an article 
‘Some Observations on an Ethnic Classification of Idiots’ by British physician John 
Langdon Down (Booth 1985). He had observed that a large number of congenital idiots 
resembled Mongols and therefore he described them as Mongolian idiots.
Although the syndrome has carried Dr. Down’s name ever since, he was not, however, 
the first to associate intellectual disability and Mongolian racial characteristics. Already 
'in 1844 Robert Chambers had suggested a theory of degeneration, according to which 
the human brain goes through various stages of development from animal forms to 
I ‘Negro, Malay, American, and Mongolian nations and finally is Caucasian’ (Chambers 
 ^R. The Vestiges o f the Natural History o f Creation (1844), cited by Booth 1985, p.4).
| Chambers suggested that ‘parents too nearly related tend to produce offspring of the 
Mongolian type - that is, persons who in maturity still are a kind of children’ (ibid.).
| The ‘official’ history of DS is thus a little more than 150 years old. It is not clear
|
whether the syndrome had been recognised earlier, since histories of childbirth and
[
midwifery omitted children bom with physical impairments (ibid.). Almost certainly the
|
syndrome existed, however, long before its recognition.
| John Langdon Down not only described the physical characteristics of this group of
I
people, but also drew attention to the features of their personality:
|
i
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[
They have considerable powers of imitation, even bordering on being 
mimics. They are humorous, and a lively sense of the ridiculous often 
colours their mimicry. They are usually able to speak; the speech is 
thick and indistinct, but may be improved greatly by a well-directed 
scheme of tongue gymnastics. (Down 1866, cited in Carr 1995, p.l).
The view that there is a connection between DS and the Mongolian race was 
challenged by several researchers at the turn of the century, but influential writers were 
still revising and elaborating Chambers’ ideas about human development, in which the 
Mongoloid stage precedes Caucasian adulthood, in the 1930’s.
Direct observation of human chromosomes became possible in the 1950’s, and in 1959 
Lejeune first described a chromosomal abnormality for individuals with the syndrome. 
He noted that they had an extra chromosome 21, the total number being 47 instead of 46 
chromosomes, and the syndrome became known also as trisomy 21.
| The process that leads to trisomy originates during meiosis (a phase in cell division),
j
t
, when nondisjunction takes place and trisomic cells result. Nondisjunction may take
f
place also during mitosis (another phase in cell division) and result in mosaicism (i.e.,
i^
 the presence of more than one population of cells with different chromosome numbers in
5the same individual). Most (95%) individuals with DS have ‘regular’ trisomy 21, and
Ii
approximately 1% are mosaic, the remainder being the result of translocation, in which
|
two chromosomes have joined together (the extra chromosome 21 has joined to, for
\
example, chromosome 14) or an exchange of chromosomal segments between two 
different chromosomes has taken place (Kingston 1994).
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The incidence of disjunction is known to correlate with maternal age, but the reason 
for this correlation is unknown. It is thought to be due to some aspect of the ageing 
i oocyte, although it may occur at any age.
10.1.1. Characteristics
DS is characterised by typical facial features, short stature and intellectual disability. 
Congenital anomalies are present in several organ systems. For example, congenital 
heart disease is diagnosed in approximately 40% of the children, and malformations of 
the gastrointestinal tract in 12% (Pueschel 1990). Surgical treatment is possible in a
^great majority of the cases.r
The childhood years of an individual with DS may be complicated by infections, 
increased susceptibility to leukaemia and disorders of the thyroid glands. The high risk
I
, of leukaemia continues through life, but DS also means a decreased risk of solid 
, tumours in all age groups (Hasle et al. 2000).
In adolescence most individuals enjoy good health. In Carr’s follow-up study at ages
j  11 and 21 the severity of illnesses was more pronounced in the DS group but the number
1
of children who had suffered serious illnesses was comparable between the DS group
|
| and the control group (Carr 1995). However, significantly more children in the control
i
group had suffered a serious accident. The overall conclusion of Carr was that the
' differences between the groups were not as striking as expected. And the statement
!i
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referred to both subjective estimates of health (as ‘general health’ reported by the 
mother) and objective measures such as hospital appointments or medication.
Conceptions of intellectual capacity in DS have varied from time to time, and from 
the beginning of this century both pessimistic and optimistic views have been expressed. 
A common assumption has been that all are severely intellectually disabled (IQ under 
50), but this opinion is far from the truth. On the basis of several studies it has been 
estimated that the chance for an IQ figure above 50 is 30-55% (Booth 1985). People 
with DS differ from one another to an extent similar to that seen in a non-disabled 
population (Carr 1995).
The popular view sees people with DS as cheerful, friendly, affectionate and fond of 
music. There are methodological problems in addressing this issue, for example, the 
question of how far this kind of stereotype is self-fulfilling. Carr (1995) has summarised 
some recent studies according to which children with DS are seen as more affectionate, 
outgoing and more positive in mood but also as less persistent and distractible than non­
disabled children.
The life expectancy for a baby bom with DS has increased considerably. In 1929 it 
was 9 years and in 1947 it was still only 12 years. At that time only a few lived to be 
mature adults (Carr 1995). Today the situation is different. A Canadian report estimated 
in 1988 that about 44% and 14% of livebom infants with DS will survive to 60 and 68 
years, respectively (Baird and Sadovnick 1988). When compared with survival in the 
general population, the survival in this group is poorest during the first year of life. 
Thereafter, a plateau appears in the survival curve until the age of 44 years, after which 
survival falls more quickly than among the general population (ibid.). A few individuals
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survive, however, for a very long time, the oldest being reported to be 86 years of age 
(Carr 1995, p.4).
There is no specific therapy for DS, and to my knowledge no breakthroughs are to be 
expected in the foreseeable future. Some research is, however, in progress. A small open 
trial on four adults with DS was conducted in the United States to test the effect of 
donepezil, a cholinergic agent, on cognitive performance. The rationale behind the trial 
was the neuropathological and neurochemical similarities between DS and Alzheimer’s
1 disease and the effect of the drug on symptoms of the latter. The results of the trial were 
modest but the authors suggested that a larger placebo-controlled trial with cholinergic 
therapy was needed for persons with DS (Kishnani et al. 1999).
I 10.1.2. Epidemiologyr
iI
j As has already been noted, the probability of having a baby with DS correlates with
| maternal age. Various figures have been presented from different parts of the world, but 
everywhere the general trend of increasing prevalence with advancing maternal age can 
be found.
Table 10.1 shows the birth prevalence of DS in various age groups and the percentages 
of all births and DS births occurring in each group in England and Wales (Rose 1992). It 
also demonstrates the fact that most children with DS are bom to women under 35 years
|
| of age.
The effect of prenatal diagnosis on the birth prevalence of DS was small in the early 
days of prenatal diagnosis, when it was based on maternal age only. The introduction of
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serum screening has changed the situation in many areas, as table 10.2 shows. The 
influence of screening on the birth prevalence of DS is, of course, dependent on the 
detection rate and the percentage of women willing to have the test. Still, it depends on 
the abortion rate among women who have tested positive. The latter has been around 
90% in several studies.
Table 10.1. Maternal age and Down syndrome (DS) (England and Wales 1979- 
1985)*
Maternal 
age (years)
Prevalence of DS births 
per 1000 pregnancies
Percentage of all 
births in this group
Percentage of DS 
in this group
Under 20 0.4 9 5
20-24 0.4 30 17
25-29 0.5 34 25
30-34 1.0 19 27
35-39 2.2 6 18
40-44 5.1 1 7
45 or over 8.1 0.1 1
all ages 0.7 100 100
* adapted from Rose 1992
The highest reported detection rate has so far been 85% with a false positive rate of 
5% (Sheldon 1999). It can be expected that the tests will become more sensitive and 
more specific, and, if the uptake of the test does not decrease considerably, the effect of 
screening for the birth prevalence of DS will be larger than earlier. However, the number 
of individuals with DS will not decrease for decades because of the increase in life 
expectancy that has occurred during the past few decades.
247
Table 10.2. Results of prenatal screening for Down syndrome (DS) in Maine 
between 1980 and 1993*
Variable 1980-1985 1986-1990 1991-1993
Cases of DS expected 97 95 60
Cases of DS identified
By amniocentesis alone
No. of cases 9 20 10
No. of cases terminated 8 19 10
By serum screening
No. of cases 0 15 30
No. of cases terminated 0 10 27
After birth -  no. of cases 78 71 30
Reduction in prevalence of DS 7 23 46
among live births (%)
♦adapted from Palomaki and Haddow 1996
10.1.3. Development o f prenatal diagnosis
The first prenatal diagnosis of DS was made in late 1960’s, and the practice to offer the 
possibility for amniocentesis or chorionic villus biopsy for women 35 years of age or 
older was disseminated widely in the developed world during the following two 
decades. As early as 1973, it was proposed that complete prevention of the syndrome 
could be achieved by screening every pregnancy by amniocentesis (Carr 1995). Due to
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the obvious technical and, especially, ethical problems of such a programme, such 
complete screening has thus far not taken place anywhere.
Screening according maternal age turned out, however, to be ineffective, since the 
majority of children DS were and are bom to younger women, simply because they bear 
so many more children than older women. In 1987 it was reported that a low serum 
alpha-fetoprotein concentration of the mothers is a marker of risk for DS (Copel and 
Badaho-Singh 1999). Thereafter rapid progress has been made in the field, and several 
other serum markers have been introduced. The most commonly used markers are alpha- 
fetoprotein, human chorionic gonadotropin and unconjugated estriol. Second-trimester 
ultrasonography can also be used to identify affected foetuses. Many different protocols 
are in use, and in 1998 France was the only country to have a national screening 
 ^ programme for DS (Cuckle 1998).
i As has been noted earlier in the chapter on prenatal diagnosis and screening, the 
| ethical issues involved are far more complex than in screening for, for example, cancer, 
the gains and costs being hard to compare.
The economic cost of DS screening consists of ultrasonography, biochemical tests, 
consequent invasive tests, and the working time of obstetricians, midwives, general 
practitioners and genetic counsellors. The classic gain in the cost-benefit analyses has 
been the amount of money saved in the lifetime costs of caring for people with DS. It 
has recently, however, become unpopular or politically incorrect to present these 
| calculations (see Chapter 8).
i
A revealing example of tension between overt and covert justification for screening 
comes from an area in Finland, where serum screening was established in the mid-
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1990’s (Virkkula 1998). The political decision-makers were uncertain about the 
protocol, but became convinced after the clinical geneticist in charge had presented them 
with calculations of the costs of an individual with DS to society. There is nothing 
unique in such calculations, but the point here is that they were classified as confidential 
and became public only after research by a journalist. What followed was a heated 
discussion on the morality of screening for DS and calculating a price for human life. 
The clinical geneticist commented in the newspaper that it is easy to justify screening on 
medical grounds, but because political decision-makers understand only monetary 
issues, he had presented the calculations. It is not clear what he meant by ‘medical 
grounds’, but the statement seems to me to be another example of hidden common 
morality among the medical profession (see Chapter 6 on prenatal diagnosis).
Another cost is the rate of miscarriage after invasive procedures performed because ofr
| positive results in screening tests (Copel and Badaho-Singh 1999). As noted earlier in
\ Chapter 6, such costs are related to both amniocentesis and chorionic-villus sampling.
i
The whole problem will vanish only if, in the future, it becomes possible to detect foetal 
cells from maternal blood.
Different screening policies yield different rates of true positives, false positives and 
adverse effects. Every policy involving invasive procedures brings about miscarriages of 
foetuses with normal chromosomes. The trade-offs of current policies have been
I
|
| recently analysed in an article in the American Journal o f Public Health (Serra-Prat et
| al. 1998). The ratio of miscarriages to cases detected varied between 0.26 and 1.45,
i
| depending on the screening tools used and the cut-off point for the risk estimate above 
which diagnostic procedures were offered.
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A third cost of screening is the emotional burden imposed on parents by false positive 
results. It is commonly acknowledged that pre-test counselling is seldom adequate and 
that too many mothers-to-be have been ill-informed about the test. As Copel and 
Badaho-Singh (1999) have noted, ‘We have often done a poor job of explaining the 
meaning of screening tests to parents-to-be and of clarifying that a low positive 
predictive value does not mean that a test is inaccurate’.
What is the rationale behind the cut-off point used in serum screening for DS? A 
common cut-off point has been a risk of 1 in 250. A calculated risk lower than 1 in 250 
is considered low. Women whose risk is higher than 1 in 250 are offered definitive 
prenatal diagnosis. This cut-off point was originally selected for several reasons, all of 
which were not necessarily articulated explicitly.
\ Firstly, in the early days of prenatal diagnosis the resources for this activity were
\ scarce, and wide use would have been out of the question (Kuppermann et al. 1999).
I
I Obviously, this is no longer a valid reason for justifying a cut-off point in developed 
countries.
Secondly, economic cost-benefit analyses performed in the 1970’s were an important 
factor in defining the cut-off point for screening. Maternal age was originally the only 
criterion used, and it was concluded that offering amniocentesis to women 35 years and 
older would be cost-effective. Later, when serum screening was developed, the cut-off 
point of 1 in 250 was chosen because it roughly represents the risk of a 35-year-old 
woman. As noted, it is nowadays less common to refer to economic values when
| screening for DS is discussed. It is worth remembering, however, that earlier, one of the
251
main justifications for the cut-off point still in use today was cost-related (Kent and 
Doman 1996).
Thirdly, until the early 1970’s, the birth prevalence data on DS were usually presented
I
in 5-year risk intervals, and there seemed to be a sudden increase in risk at the age of 35 
years. This age seemed thus to be a reasonable age threshold for offering invasive 
testing (Kuppermann et al. 1999). Later research showed, however, that the risk 
increases linearly between 20 and 30 years of age and then logarithmically beginning at 
about 33 years of age. Because there is no point at which the risk ‘jumps’ to a higher 
level, 35 years is, in this sense, as artificial as any other age (ibid.).
Fourthly, balancing the risks for foetal abnormality and for procedure-related 
miscarriage has been used as a justification for a cut-off point of 35 years of age for DS
!
 ^screening. Thirty-five years is the age at which the risk for a chromosomal abnormality 
| in the foetus is roughly the same as the risk for miscarriage due to the prenatal diagnosis
f
i
; procedure (ibid.). After the introduction of serum screening the same logic has been
f
used as justification for the cut-off point of 1 in 250.
There is an implicit assumption in this fourth justification that the women (or couples) 
in question would give equal weight to both outcomes. Empirical research shows that 
they do not (ibid.). According to a Californian study most women (83%) assigned a 
lower utility to having a child with Down syndrome than to experiencing a procedure-
1
related miscarriage. On the other hand, there was substantial variation among women as 
to the preferences for these outcomes (ibid.). The researchers suggest that strict age- or
|
| risk-based cut-off points for determining the eligibility for prenatal diagnosis should be
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abandoned. Instead, prenatal diagnosis should be accessible to all women whose 
preferences indicate that such testing should be appropriate (ibid.).
10.1.4. Attitudes towards Down syndrome
The attitudes of medical professionals towards children with DS are far from uniform. In 
an interesting study, Wolraich et al. (1991) noted a difference between, for example, 
paediatric surgeons and paediatricians. The former gave significantly lower 
prognostications than the latter, when presented two hypothetical cases. The authors also 
pointed out that doctors’ prognostications of intellectually disabled individuals are lower 
than those of other professions and some are lower than actual outcomes (ibid.). Since 
; doctors are key actors in decision-making concerning these people, the consequences
i
| may be important.
Sometimes these consequences may be dramatic if the life of the child depends on an 
operation, as in the case of duodenal atresia. The following citation is from a report 
describing the legal investigation of one such case, in which the non-operated child died 
at the age of 17 days. The author, a paediatric surgeon, described the course of events 
and the legal process. The final paragraph represents, of course, his view alone and 
f cannot be generalised to all paediatric surgeons:
I firmly believe that, contrary to popular perception, a human being 
suffering from Down’s syndrome alone is a tragedy and a cause of 
great suffering both to the particular human being and for his parents
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and family members. Medicine is the servant of mercy. (Molenaar 
1992, p.40)
There is also evidence of suboptimal medical care for some individuals with DS. A 
survey in Great Britain revealed that the vast majority gets good care but some do not. 
The syndrome has been used, for example, as justification for denying treatment for 
hearing or sight problems (Mayor 1999). A study in France reported an excess of 
unexplained deaths among children with DS but no known malformation (Julian- 
Reynier et al. 1995), and an American study found 16 children with DS who had 
received bone marrow transplants during a time when the expected number of such 
children would have been 63. The authors discussed several explanations, including 
parental refusal based on a physician’s advice (Arenson and Forde 1989).
I"
I 10.1.5. Why should Down syndrome be prevented?
I
In the previous chapter I discussed arguments that have been presented to support the 
prevention of ID. These arguments were 1) the eugenic argument, 2) the foetal-wastage 
argument, 3) the family burden argument, 4) the societal burden argument and 5) the 
| quality of life argument.
t
| The first two arguments were shown to be vague and weak, and now I shall consider
|
; only the latter three arguments and their relevance to DS.
What can be said about the burden on families with a child with DS? In fact a lot, 
since empirical research has been conducted in several countries to address the issue.
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The general impression is that most families adapt well in their life with a member with 
DS (Carr 1992, Branholm and Degerman 1992). However, some families have great 
problems, which make them especially vulnerable. There are also research results that 
I may help to identify these vulnerable families (Gath 1990).
Obviously great variation exists in parental attitudes towards their offspring with DS. 
Maybe the words of a mother summarise the experience in most families. When asked 
about her opinion on abortion after amniocentesis, she replied:
If I hadn’t already had one it would be an easier decision but I’ve had 
W and she is classed as handicapped. But she’s lovely, she seems as 
normal as can be, so I couldn’t have an abortion after W, but if I 
hadn’t had her, my idea of being handicapped would be different.
(Shepperdson 1983, p.153).
Another issue that has been researched in families has been the influence of a childr
! with DS on the well-being of siblings. Here, too, the general impression is normality in 
| sibling interaction (Carr 1995).
The economic consequences of having a child with DS do not differ from those of 
having an intellectually disabled child in general. As noted in Chapter 8, they are highly 
dependent on the way health and social services are arranged.
The societal burden argument can refer to either economic or other costs of DS to 
society in general. In fact, screening for DS was shown to be cost-effective very early
i
|
I after the introduction of methods for prenatal screening. The cut-off point for high or
I
i  low risk (usually 1/250) still in use today was determined by the early cost-benefit 
analyses in the 1970’s (Kent and Doman 1996). Thus the economic justification for this 
screening has not disappeared although other values are nowadays emphasised.
|
f
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The non-economic burdens of DS on society are more difficult to grasp. Even in 
utilitarian terms it is not obvious that the amount of happiness created by a screening 
system is greater than the amount of happiness without such a system. If the general
I
j
; impression of persons with DS as joyful and positive is true, aborting foetuses with DS 
may in fact decrease the total happiness of a future world. Of course, these kinds of 
, statements are too speculative and, possibly all that can be reliably said is that we cannot 
determine the cost-effectiveness of screening in terms of happiness achieved.
The last argument considered here is the quality of life argument. I did not find studies 
that would have directly compared the quality of life with DS to life without it. One can 
also question the validity of such an approach. Aspects of Having and Loving (see 
Chapter 8) would be easier to compare, but aspects of Being would be more or less 
[ associated with intellectual performance. If questionnaires were used to measure quality 
I of life, the group with DS would at least partly be represented by parents or educators.
I The lack of such comparative data does not mean that nothing can be said about the 
quality of life of people with DS. Anecdotal evidence tells a lot. Comparative studies 
have been done among persons with DS, and the studies on family life describe 
indirectly also the lives of the members with DS. First, two very different stories.
Susanna and Tomi are a married couple, rare because they never argue, unique 
because they both have DS. They live quite ordinary lives: go to work, watch television 
j and listen to music in the evenings, go swimming and fight against overweight. They do 
j  not pay taxes because they go to a sheltered workshop, and they are also visited weekly 
| by a social worker. Both Susanna and Tomi can read and also write and calculate a little.
i
i
j  Their favourite television programme is The Bold and the Beautiful. (Palo 1995)
I
i
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Another story is anonymous, and it was presented in an article describing a study on 
the views of parents of children with DS on abortion and euthanasia. One mother said:
If I knew as I know now I’d have euthanasiaed (sic) her. It’s cruel for me and cruel 
for her. There’s no life for me while she’s here and none for her ... it’s not a bit of 
good, the country’s better off without them ... a handicapped mind and a 
handicapped body, it’s cruel. When a dog’s injured you put it down. (Shepperdson 
1983, p .154)
We do not know why the mother in the latter story felt so miserable. Maybe her 
daughter had diseases or physical handicaps associated with DS. Maybe the family 
received little or no social support. Maybe the daughter had especially low intelligence. 
Comparative studies show that adults with DS in family care are better oriented, more 
skilled and productive and emotionally stable and less disturbed than institutionalised 
adults with DS.
Studies on the quality of life in families with a member with DS have already been 
described. Their lives do not differ very much from the lives of other families. There is 
no reason to assume that the quality of life of the individual with DS would, in general, 
be very different from the rest of the family.
Why, then, should DS be prevented? The family burden and quality of life arguments 
have not turned out to give strong general support for the prevention of DS. Of course 
there may be vulnerable families in which the birth of a child with DS would bring about 
a burden extremely hard to bear. This statement cannot, however, be generalised to the 
claim that DS should always be prevented.
People with DS are a burden to society, at least in economic terms. In that sense the 
interest of society would be to have as few people with DS as possible. In the early
257
1970’s even compulsory screening was suggested, but it has, to my knowledge, never 
taken place. Reproductive autonomy has been considered a value that cannot be 
overridden by economics.
The medical discourse on prenatal screening for and diagnosis of DS has been 
dominated by issues like ‘where the cut-off point should be set’; ’what an acceptable 
risk for procedure-related miscarriage is’ or ‘what the uptake of the screening test is’. 
The main question, however, is ‘what should be done about Down syndrome’ (Lippman 
1999). Prenatal diagnosis is one, but just one, possible answer. True reproductive 
autonomy means true choice for women and couples, and it includes full support also for 
those who reject testing or decide to continue pregnancy even if what is looked for 
during the testing is found.
One way towards enhanced autonomy would be to abandon age- or risk-based cut-off 
points for determining the eligibility for prenatal diagnosis. As in the current systems, 
women would first choose whether to participate in screening at all. Those who would 
decide to be tested would then make their own decisions according to the test results and 
their own values. Of course, this system would necessitate extensive counselling, and 
the resources may not meet the demand in many societies. In Philip Kitcher’s words:
‘the transition to societies in which genetic testing is more prevalent will almost 
certainly multiply the number of situations in which “respecting the autonomy of the 
counseled” would be a bitter joke’ (Kitcher 1997, pp.78-79).
In practice, a mid-way solution could be something like the present system in a South 
Wales District in the United Kingdom, where the screening practices for DS were 
standardised and improved in the late 1990’s (Al-Jader 1999). The starting point for the
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quality improvement process was an earlier report that had identified sub-standard and 
variable practices. One of the keystones of the development process was that the 
opinions and the expectations of expectant mothers were asked. As a result of the whole 
process, the uptake of serum screening fell from around 95% to 75%. In addition, the 
number of amniocenteses decreased as women were able to think more clearly about 
their options and the limitations of the tests (ibid.).
10.2. Fragile X syndrome
It was noted about 100 years ago that ID is commoner among men than among women.
 ^ In 1943 Martin and Bell described sex-linked inheritance of intellectual disability in a
[
| family, and the cause of that disability was later called fragile X syndrome (fraX). This 
took place in the late 1970’s when a fragile site in the X chromosome of these people 
was found. The gene responsible for fraX was discovered in 1991 and DNA testing soon 
became possible (Peippo 1995, Murray et al. 1997).
FraX is caused by an abnormally high number of consecutive repeating cytosine- 
guanine-guanine (CGG) triplets in the DNA of the gene labelled FMR-1. The genotype 
is classified as normal, pre-mutational or full mutational, based on the number of theseI
[ triplets (Palomaki 1994). In the unaffected population the average number of these
I triplets is 30, in pre-mutation they number from about 55 to 199 and in full mutation 
there are 200 or more (Murray et al. 1997). Full mutation is associated with clinical
I fraX, and pre-mutation carries a high risk of expansion between mother and offspring
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(ibid.). Other defects in the FMR-1 gene are also possible, but they are thought to be rare 
(ibid.).
The association between full mutation and the fraX phenotype differs for men and 
women. Nearly all males with full mutation have the fraX phenotype, but only half of 
the females with full mutation have the genotype with learning disabilities, one fifth 
having a moderate to severe phenotype (ibid.).
FraX is inherited as an X linked disorder, but the inheritance pattern is not similar as in 
classic X-linked recessive disorders. In the latter, females are carriers and only males are 
affected. With fraX, both can be affected, although females to a less extent (ibid.). In 
addition, both males and females can be unaffected carriers. The children of unaffected 
female carriers are at increased risk of the disorder, but children of unaffected male 
carriers are not (ibid.). The latter, so-called ‘normal transmitting males’, have sons that 
are neither affected nor carriers, while all their daughters are unaffected carriers. The 
children of these daughters are at increased risk of the syndrome.
10.2.1. Characteristics
FraX is characterised by a mixture of physical, cognitive and behavioural features. 
General physical health is not impaired, although fraX is manifested in many organ 
systems. The affected males have typical a facial appearance, orthopaedic abnormalities, 
skin manifestations, cardiac anomalies and endocrine dysfunction (ibid.)
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About 80% of the males are moderately to severely intellectually disabled with IQ’s of 
less than 50. Most females with fraX have a borderline IQ’s between 70 and 85 (ibid.). 
There is no specific therapy for fraX, but there are several medical, educational,
|
psychological and social interventions that can improve the symptoms (ibid.).
10.2.2. Epidemiology
It is difficult to estimate the prevalence of fraX in populations because, for a reliable 
estimate, a very large sample of people would have to be tested. Another difficulty 
concerns the diagnostic methodology. After the introduction of DNA-based diagnosis
 ^the older cytogenetic methods were found to produce false positive results (Murray et al.r
i  1997).
I However, several studies have been performed, mainly testing young people with 
special educational needs. On the basis of these studies, Murray et al. (1997) estimated 
that the minimum prevalence is 1 per 4000 among males and 1 per 8000 among females.
10.2.3. Prevention
j
\ Because no specific treatment exists for fraX, primary prevention is possible only byL
! identifying females at high risk of an affected pregnancy. Once these women are found
jl
there are several options: prenatal diagnosis and selective abortion, avoidance of
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pregnancy, in vitro fertilisation of a donated ovum and pre-implantation diagnosis
(ibid.)-
Identifying females at risk could take place in three ways. Firstly, a pre-conceptual 
screening programme could target, for example, school leavers or attendees at family 
planning clinics (ibid.). Secondly, prenatal screening could be offered to pregnant 
women with the possibility for prenatal diagnosis for those testing positive. Thirdly, in 
so- called ‘cascade screening’, the relatives of an affected individual could be offered 
counselling and DNA testing.
10.2.4. Ethical issues
Why, then, should fraX be prevented? A response to the general arguments presented for 
prevention is essentially similar to that in the case of DS. Most people with fraX are an 
economic burden to society. With respect to the family burden and quality of life 
arguments, there is no general justification for prevention.
The process for screening for fraX differs, however, from that of screening for DS, and 
there are some ethical issues unique to the prevention of fraX.
Serum or ultrasound screening for DS yields a risk figure only, and the definitive 
diagnosis is possible only after an invasive diagnostic procedure. DNA testing of the 
mother definitively describes her status with respect to fraX: non-affected, pre-mutation 
or full mutation. In the first case her offspring will have no risk for fraX. Only if the
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father were a normal transmitting male, would possible daughters in this family have an 
increased risk for sons with fraX.
In the second case the foetus is at increased risk for fraX, the risk being greater for 
male than female foetuses. In the third case the mother may be unaffected or herself 
have some, usually minor manifestations of fraX. For her foetuses the risk would be 
similar to the second case.
I have already mentioned two examples of the ethical complexity of inheritance in 
families with fraX (Chapter 6 on prenatal diagnosis). In the first a clinical geneticist was 
talking about the difficulties of counselling in cases in which one relative had fraX. 
When describing a particular case of a healthy pregnant woman with the fragile X 
genotype, the geneticist said: ‘It would be hard to make her understand why, according
v to the view o f modern medicine, a foetus with the same genotype as the mother, should
! be aborted...’.
[
; The event took place about 10 years ago. When I recently described it to another 
clinical geneticist in Finland, she replied that today such comments would not be heard. 
However, the case serves as an example of hidden values in clinical decision-making 
and the uncertainty which pregnant women still have to face in actual practice.
In the second case a pregnant young woman with a retarded brother with fraX 
discussed her feelings of whether she would have chosen abortion if her first test had
f
i
I shown the syndrome. She was ambivalent but said that she would not necessarily want
I
| abortion in such a case. Because of her experiences with her brother, and taking care of 
him, she did not feel it to be such a terrible burden.
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It is easy, of course, to imagine another example, in which a pregnant woman has had 
very negative experiences with a brother with fraX. Maybe she would be convinced that 
she would have a male foetus with fraX aborted.
The parental uncertainty in screening for fraX is thus different from that in screening 
for DS. If the mother is found to be a carrier of fraX, either pre-mutation or full 
mutation, the parents have to make the first decision: whether or not go on to invasive 
testing. If the foetus is tested and found to have fraX, the parents then have to face the 
uncertainty of the prognosis.
In the medical literature the problem is sometimes addressed straightforwardly. The 
ethical dilemma concerns only or mainly cases in which the foetus is female. For 
example Palomaki (1994, p.69), has written:
.. .the inability to distinguish which of the female foetuses with a full
j mutation fragile X genotype will be affected represents a serious
ethical dilemma for the medical community and for the pregnant 
woman. Given this constraint, implementing fragile X screening 
would mean that nearly half of all women with a foetus identified as 
having a full mutation could be faced with making reproductive 
decisions based on only a 50% likelihood of the foetus being affected.
It is mainly for this reason that it is difficult to argue strongly in 
favour of initiating population based screening for fragile X at this 
time.
There are obviously two hidden messages here. Firstly, there are no major ethical 
issues in screening for fraX when the foetus is known to be male. Secondly, if the
! likelihood of a female foetus would not be 50% but, say, 95%, the ethical problems
i
| would be considerably fewer.
! What seems problematic to me is the assumption that it is up to the medical
i
I community to decide what likelihood is high enough to justify screening. While it is true
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that medical research tells us about the percentages, the conclusions drawn are based on 
value judgements in which the medical community can not claim authority over the 
families involved.
Pre-conceptual screening would eliminate the anxiety which prenatal screening easily 
provokes. However, few women take part in screening if it is offered pre-conceptually.
; Prenatal screening reaches a far greater percentage of women at risk. However, the 
| question of the aim of screening should be asked again. If the aim is to reduce the birth 
: prevalence of fraX, the obvious aim should be an uptake of 100%.
If, on the other hand, the aim is to offer families information for their own 
reproductive choices, an uptake of 100% raises questions about the validity of the 
counselling and consent processes. An obvious analogy would be a country in which the 
voting percentage is 100%. An uptake of 85% (which was reached in a study in Kuopio, 
Finland) shows that at least minimally satisfactory freedom of decision was reached. If 
| the real aim is to provide information, the uptake is in the end irrelevant and the success
i
I of the process should be measured in other terms.
ifi
f
![
10.3. Aspartylglugosaminuria
| AGU (aspartylglugosaminuria) is a recessively inherited lysosomal storage disorder 
caused by mutations in the aspartylglucosaminidase gene on chromosome 4 (Isoniemi et 
al. 1995). It is strongly enriched in the population of Finland. Over 200 patients have
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been identified there in contrast to approximately 40 cases in the rest of the world 
(Hietalaet al. 1993).
AGU was first described in the late 1960’s, and the strong enrichment of it in the
|
; Finnish population was reported in 1970. Estimations of the carrier frequency in Finland 
are in the range of 1:30 to 1:80 (Hietala 1998). Because AGU is a recessive disorder, the 
number of actual cases is, however, small.
10.3.1. Characteristics
The progress of AGU is very slow. The prenatal period and early infancy are often 
I uneventful, but recurrent infections and hernias may occur more often than in the
r
; general population. Usually the first sign of the disease itself is a delay or arrest in
ii
! speech development (Hietala 1998). Mental delay then progresses slowly through
iI
I childhood and adolescence, and typical physical characteristics like a coarse face appear. 
The degree of ID in adulthood is severe, but in spite of the accumulation of abnormal 
degradation products in many organs there are no obvious functional disturbances 
outside the central nervous system (ibid.).
The average life span of AGU patients in a large Finnish study was 37.6 years (Arvio 
1993), but the oldest reported patient has lived up to 69 years of age (Hietala 1998).
I There is no specific therapy for AGU. However, a trial with bone marrow 
transplantation (BMT) is in progress (Autti et al. 1997). Early histopathological, 
biochemical and radiological findings supported the success of the transplantation, but
266
the clinical follow-up of the patients could not demonstrate improvement (Arvio et al. 
2001).
10.3.2. Prevention
As with fraX, current possibilities for the primary prevention of AGU are based on the 
identification of carriers. Once the carriers are found the following options are available: 
avoiding pregnancy, selecting a spouse who is not a carrier, in vitro fertilisation of a 
donated ovum (in case of a female carrier), artificial insemination by a donor (in case of 
a male carrier), prenatal diagnosis and termination of affected pregnancies and, at least 
in theory, pre-implantation diagnosis.
Selecting partners on the basis of a gene test result is, of course, a powerful strategy in 
prevention. It has, in fact, proved to be successful in the prevention of Tay-Sachs 
disease, another lysosomal storage disorder, among orthodox Jews (Hietala 1998). A 
pre-requisite for such a prevention programme is a community in which marriages are 
arranged by families, thus allowing the consideration of the gene test results.
In most Western societies today, however, the autonomy of adults is considered a 
trumping value, which cannot be overridden by community interests. In addition, the 
termination of affected pregnancies is widely considered an acceptable option. Among 
non-orthodox Jews, many of which accept abortion due to a serious disease like Tay- 
Sachs, screening through prenatal diagnosis and selective termination has also been very
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successful. This success has been based on wide co-operation between medical 
practitioners, community leaders and religious leaders (Hietala 1998).
Identifying carriers could take place in many ways. Testing could take place in high 
schools, it could be offered in the basic health care system for people of a certain age or 
as part of maternity care during pregnancy. Much of the research in this area has 
concerned cystic fibrosis, which is the commonest severe autosomal recessive disorder 
among populations of northern European origin. Many pilot studies have been done, but 
so far no country has established a continuing screening programme. However, a 
consensus statement of the National Institutes of Health in the United States has 
recommended the offering of a carrier test for cystic fibrosis to couples planning a 
pregnancy or seeking prenatal care (Hietala 1998).
If screening takes place before pregnancy, an obvious advantage is that the couple’s 
reproductive choices are informed concerning the particular trait screened for. The 
problem is that actual participation rates in non-pregnant populations have been 
markedly lower than for screening during pregnancy (Hietala 1988).
Screening during pregnancy can be sequential or couple screening. In the former the 
woman is tested first and her husband or partner is tested only if she proves to be a 
carrier. In the latter strategy samples are taken from both parents at the same time.
Carrier screening for AGU has been carried out in two pilot studies in Finland. The 
first took place in Helsinki between 1994 and 1995, and AGU carrier screening was 
used as a model with which to evaluate the feasibility of a genetic screening programme 
in primary health care (Hietala 1998). The general conclusions of the study were that 
such a programme can be successfully implemented in primary health maternity care
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and that the Finnish population in general and the family members of AGU patients in 
particular had mainly positive attitudes toward genetic testing. Because of the rarity of 
AGU the author suggested that multiplex screening for several disease genes should be
i
j considered instead of screening for AGU alone.
The second study was conducted in Kuopio from 1995 to 1996, when pregnant women
i were offered carrier screening for AGU, fraX and infantile neuronal ceroid 
lipofuscinosis (INCL), which is another rare recessive disease concentrated in Finland. 
The project created tension between the researchers and the health care authorities, and 
it was ended sooner than was planned. The reasons for the closure were complex, but the 
questionability of informed choice was a main consideration (Jallinoja 2001).
i 10.3.3. Ethical issues
| The general ethical aspects of the prevention of AGU resemble those already discussed
£
in the context of DS and fraX. Having a child with AGU in the family will no doubt 
eventually turn out to be a burden sooner or later. During infancy years, however, the 
life of the family is probably no different from the life of an average family. The 
progressive clinical course of AGU increases the family burden, at least in terms of a 
lack of independence of the AGU individual. If the correct diagnosis is obtained in early 
childhood, which obviously is the case at least in Finland, where the disease is known,
f
I the future course of the disease and also the burden on the family can be predicted.
! The societal burden of AGU is small due to its rarity. Of course, individuals with AGU
] will never become good tax-payers, but, on the other hand, they usually spend their
childhood years at home with their parents and are able to attend sheltered workshops in 
adulthood.
As with DS and fraX, the quality of life argument is weak in that the quality of life of 
people with AGU does not, as such, support a general prevention programme.
Should screening for AGU, then, be included as a part of prenatal screening offered in 
Finland? Or should corresponding recessive conditions be screened for in other parts of 
the world?
The conclusion of the study by Hietala et al. was that multiplex screening for several 
disease genes should be considered instead of screening for AGU alone. The general 
attitudes towards such testing are mainly positive and the attitudes of the families of 
AGU patients have proved to be especially positive. The experiences in the experimental 
screening project in Kuopio showed, however, that very complex ethical issues arise. If, 
say, 10 or 15 recessive genes are tested in one package and this test is offered as part of 
standard maternity care, it is highly unlikely that the families involved are well-enough 
informed about all the conditions and what follows if one or more of the results are 
positive. This is not to say that such tests should not be developed and that such testing 
should never take place. Those interested should have access to knowledge about their 
genes, but before any general system is built up into maternity care or elsewhere, there 
should be enough resources for adequate counselling before, during and after the testing.
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11. Conclusion
In the beginning of this thesis I presented four cases. Now it is time to return to these 
| cases and draw some conclusions. But first, a brief summary of the case presentations.
In case 1 Sarah and Tom have just heard the results of the serum screening test, 
according to which Sarah’s risk for carrying a foetus with Down syndrome is 1 in 150. 
Now they have to decide whether they wish to have an accurate diagnosis by 
amniocentesis, which, however, increases slightly the risk of miscarriage. The nurse at 
the maternity clinic is sympathetic but refuses to answer Sarah’s question about how she 
would decide if she were in a similar situation.
In Case 2 Tina and Harry are expecting their first child. Tina has a younger brother 
\ who has fragile X syndrome and is mildly intellectually disabled. Tina is a carrier of the 
I syndrome and knows that the probability for intellectual disability in her possible future 
offspring is considerable. Tina is more positive than Harry about the idea of continuing 
pregnancy with a male foetus with fragile X syndrome.
The first two cases were fictional, although they could very well be true. Case 3 is real 
and takes us from the individual to the community level: How should health authorities 
in eastern and northern Finland respond to the suggestion that testing for the AGU 
(aspartylglucosaminuria) gene were introduced to routine maternity care?
| Case 4 is also real, and, in fact, it is a very famous one. The fate of Baby Jane Doe, a 
child with Down syndrome and oesophageal atresia, created much controversy in the 
United States in the 1980’s. There was nothing very specific in the case as such. It is 
highly probable that many children with a similar condition have faced similar death on
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both sides of the Atlantic. The disagreement between doctors and the early involvement 
of courts of law were probably the main factors that made the case so well known.
11.1. Definition
In Chapter 2 I discussed in detail the definition of intellectual disability (ED) and many 
related issues. In light of that discussion, what can be said about cases 1-4 and the 
foetuses or children involved?
According to definition 1 ‘a person is intellectually disabled if he or she falls below 
two standard deviations in a standardised intelligence test’. In light of this definition, the 
L probability for ID would be very high in cases 1 and 4, Down syndrome. In case 3,
f|
| AGU, the affected individuals definitely end up being intellectually disabled, but it
[
; would happen only after relatively normal first years of life. In case 2 the prognosis
f
i
would be the most uncertain: a boy with fragile X genotype could be severely, 
moderately or mildly intellectually disabled or have normal intelligence.
Definition 2 paints a more colourful picture of ID, and, in addition, sub-average 
intellectual functioning refers to ‘related limitations in two or more of the following 
applicable adaptive skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, 
community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and
I
| work’. It is, however, obvious that this definition would cover my cases in a manner that 
closely resembles that of definition 1. Some individuals with Down syndrome may be
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quite independent in their lives, but extremely few would not have limitations in less 
than two of the areas mentioned.
|
i
11.2. Geneticisation
In Chapter 3 geneticisation was defined as the ‘ongoing process by which priority is 
given to searching for variations in DNA sequences that differentiate people from each 
other and to attributing some hereditary basis to most disorders, behaviours and 
physiological variations’. It is, of course, obvious that, in my cases, Down syndrome, 
fragile X syndrome and AGU, genes determine, to a high degree, the lives of these
j. individuals. Thus one might be tempted to think that geneticisation does not play a roler
I here: what is genetic is genetic period.
f
However, geneticisation and genetic determinism are relevant also in the context of 
cases like these. An individual is, after all, a product of both genes and the environment, 
even in a case in which genes radically limit the potential for intellectual development. 
The genes may determine the upper limit of intellectual capacity in Down syndrome and 
fragile X syndrome and the speed of deterioration in AGU, but this determination does 
not mean that various forms of therapy would have no or only minor influence on the 
lives of these people. In addition, the strong position of genetics in the world of science 
■ means that research aiming at, for example, enhancing communication skills among the 
intellectually disabled is in a much weaker position than biological research is.
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11.3. Epidemiology
In cases 1, 2 and 4 individual families faced difficult decisions about abortion or quality 
of life or both. In case 1 the family was involved in a screening programme, in case 2 the 
problem could be anticipated because of the family history, and in case 4 the problem 
became obvious only after the birth of the child and the diagnosis of oesophageal atresia.
Down syndrome and fragile X syndrome are the commonest genetic causes of 
intellectual disability, and especially screening for the former has been a hot topic in 
biomedical research for over two decades. It should be remembered, however, that 
people with these syndromes are still a minority among the intellectually disabled. Even 
if there were available screening methods with 100% sensitivity and specificity and if 
every foetus with these syndromes were aborted, the impact on the general prevalence of 
ID would be less than 20 %. And, as has become obvious, this is a highly improbable 
scenario for both scientific and ethical reasons.
Case 3 focused on the level of society, and the burden of decision was on the health 
authorities. Of course, if screening is introduced, the burden is on individuals, as in the 
other cases. From the point of view of epidemiology the significance of the decision is 
almost nil in any case. The whole question of screening for the AGU gene is worth 
bringing up only for certain parts of Finland, and even these areas only occasional cases 
of ID could be prevented even with a 100% uptake of tests.
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11.4. Prenatal diagnosis and screening
Case 1, 2 and 3 demonstrate most of the ethical issues mentioned in the chapter on 
prenatal diagnosis and screening. Firstly, the issue of the consent of parents does not 
seem to be a problem in cases 1 and 2 (and it is as yet irrelevant in case 3). According to 
the case descriptions both the couple with a 1:150 risk for Down syndrome and the 
couple with possible fragile X offspring seemed well informed. The former couple 
consented to screening and the latter was considering the possibility of prenatal 
diagnosis.
Secondly, the tension between the reproductive autonomy model and the public health 
model is obvious in cases 1 and 3. Although it is common in the rhetoric of today’s 
medicine to state that screening programmes exist to enhance the reproductive autonomy 
of individual women and families, there is no doubt that a public health perspective 
exists there also. The risk for Down syndrome in case 1 was 1:150, and it was 
considered ‘high’. Someone had decided that the risk was high enough to justify the 
offer of an invasive procedure. Although not obvious today, it is plausible that cost- 
benefit calculations from the early years of prenatal screening still influence the cut-off 
points used today. In case 3 it is also obvious that screening for AGU is not considered 
solely for the reproductive autonomy of individual families. If it were so, it would be 
totally irrelevant whether or not the families who screen positive opt for abortion.
Thirdly, in case 2, the possibility of a prenatal diagnosis can be seen as a response to a 
request from the woman (couple). With a long experience of life in a fragile X family, 
she is a true expert on the social and psychological aspects of the syndrome. Her request,
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if anybody’s, can be thought of as justified. This kind of case may, however, be an 
exception in the context of prenatal diagnosis and screening. It may be that the 
availability of screening technology has created the request and not vice versa.
Fourthly, reassurance is a relevant issue in cases 1, 2 and 3. Most women who undergo 
prenatal diagnostic testing receive good news (although the good news of not having the 
condition sought for is too often interpreted as news of a healthy foetus). The probability 
for Down syndrome in case 1 is very small and the probability for AGU (if the screening 
is introduced) in case 3 is even smaller. In case 2 the probability for an intellectually 
disabled offspring is high, but the issue of reassurance is still relevant.
Fifthly, the question of eugenics, ‘deliberate control, by law or social pressure, of the 
perpetuation of human genetic traits’, is worth mentioning briefly. Such control of 
reproduction by law is obviously out of the question in Western democracies. Case 3 
describes, however, a situation, which may introduce social pressure. Although there 
have been only experimental studies on AGU screening, empirical evidence from other 
existing programmes has demonstrated that such social pressure can be real.
11.5. Genetic counselling
Did genetic counselling take place and was it successful in our cases?
In case 1 there was no formal genetic counselling in the sense that a genetic counsellor 
would have been involved. Nevertheless, the couple seemed to have been well informed 
by their maternity clinic personnel, who described Down syndrome briefly and gave the
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parents a leaflet about it. On a later occasion the nurse refused to answer Sarah’s 
question about how she would decide in a similar situation. She was, however 
sympathetic and promised to give her full support, whatever the decision. At least 
superficially the course of events seems satisfactory. From the case description it can be 
inferred that the couple did not take for granted any of the alternatives. The decision to 
take part in the screening was made freely and although we do not know whether 
amniocentesis was performed, at least the couple was well informed of the situation.
From the point of view of genetic counselling, case 2 seems simple, since Tina had 
inside knowledge about fragile X syndrome and had already been tested and found to be 
a carrier. The case is, however, simple only if genetic counselling is mainly thought of 
as counselling about facts. There would be an obvious role here for dialogical 
counselling, ‘ensuring that decisions are as fully informed and carefully deliberated as 
possible’ (White 1999). A good genetic counsellor could help the couple in a ‘joint 
search for a morally excusable decision’ (Hoedemaekers 1998).
In light of studies performed in Finland, it is not probable that, in case 3, health 
authorities will decide to introduce AGU screening in maternity care. The main reason 
for this attitude would be the rarity of the disease, but perhaps multiplex screening for 
AGU and some other diseases would be suggested instead. As noted at the end of 
Chapter 10, this decision would, however, create an almost untenable situation from the 
point of view of genetic counselling.
If the case descriptions concerning Baby Doe, case 4, are truthful, obviously no 
adequate genetic counselling took place. We do not know what kind of information was 
provided by the obstetrician and the paediatricians involved, but Baby Doe’s father
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hardly would have talked about the ‘never ... a minimally acceptable quality of life’ 
after even minimal counselling about the facts of Down syndrome. Whatever the final 
decision of the parents, ‘ensuring that decisions are as fully informed and carefully 
deliberated as possible’ would have been better.
11.6. Why prevent?
The reasons for preventing ID were discussed generally in Chapter 8 and with respect to 
Down syndrome, fragile X syndrome and AGU in Chapter 10.
The eugenic argument and the foetal-wastage argument proved weak and vague, and 
they are not considered here. The societal burden argument, the family burden argument 
and the quality of life argument are briefly reviewed with respect to the cases.
Although cost-benefit calculations may never be very accurate in the context of 
prenatal screening, there is no doubt that most people with Down syndrome (case 1) or 
AGU (case 3) are an economic burden to society. The situation is less clear with fragile 
X syndrome (case 2) since the spectrum of intelligence is wide and not all individuals 
are intellectually disabled. As a group, however, people with fragile X can be said to be 
an economic burden to society. Thus it would be in the interest of society to prevent 
these syndromes.
The non-economic burdens to society are far less obvious. In fact, even the opposite 
can take place and a ‘burden’ can turn into something else. A paediatrician with long 
experience in the field of ID wrote recently that people with Down syndrome are ‘the
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elite among the intellectually disabled, who usually live a happy life and enrich the 
environment with their joyfulness’ (Wilska 2001). It is, of course, as difficult or 
impossible to quantify this kind of enrichment as it is to quantify the emotional burden 
in these families. In real life some families with an intellectually disabled child do well 
while others do not.
The burdens on individual families with an intellectually disabled child can take 
different forms, psychological and economic. They vary substantially and should be 
dealt with in the context of society and the health care system. There is no evidence of 
substantial burdens that ruin the lives of these families generally. However, in particular 
cases, having a child with Down syndrome, fragile X or AGU may be a terrible burden 
to the rest of the family. If abortion on request is accepted and if parental autonomy in 
reproductive issues is valued highly, then it is up to Sarah and Tom (case 1) and Tina 
and Harry (case 2) to decide whether the expected burden in their families is great 
enough to justify abortion.
While the family burden argument refers to the life of other individuals in the family, 
the quality of life argument concerns the individual with ID. Although there are 
problems with the concept of quality of life, it is not obvious that the quality of life in 
Down syndrome (case 1 and 4), the fragile X syndrome (case 2) or AGU (case) would 
be considerably lower than that in the general population. Existing empirical evidence 
shows that differences are minor. In addition, quality of life is so much determined by 
external factors that it may not be meaningful to refer to whole groups of people with 
these syndromes, especially when physical handicaps usually play a minor role in the 
lives of these individuals.
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11.7. Moral status
In Chapter 9 ,1 presented Mary Ann Warren’s multi-criterial theory of moral status and 
applied it to potential or actual individuals with or without ID.
In cases 1 and 2 we had two young foetuses, who, according to the Respect of Life 
Principle, had some moral status and should not be killed or otherwise harmed, without 
good reasons that do not violate the other principles. They were not yet sentient, and 
therefore the Anti-Cruelty Principle was not valid. The mothers (families) had full moral 
status, and, if a conflict of interest between the foetuses and the mothers (families) 
would have arisen, abortion may have been justified. ED as such would not lower the 
moral status of foetuses under these circumstances, but it may be a contributing factor 
when mothers (families) make decisions about their future.
In case 4 the situation was different. According to the Human Rights Principle, Baby 
Doe should have had the same moral rights as moral agents have, within the limits of her 
own capacities and the limits of the Agent’s Rights Principle. Baby Doe’s oesophageal 
atresia was certainly relevant in the case, but her Down syndrome was relevant only if it 
could be shown to have an effect on her physical prognosis. ED in relation to Down 
syndrome should not have had an effect on her care.
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